Transnational Labor Citizenship by Gordon, Jennifer
Fordham Law School
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
2006
Transnational Labor Citizenship
Jennifer Gordon
Fordham University School of Law, jgordon@law.fordham.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Immigration Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 503 (2006-2007)
TRANSNATIONAL LABOR CITIZENSHIP
JENNIFER GORDON*
I. INTRODUCTION
On the parched plaza outside the U.S. Consulate in Monterrey,
Mexico, hundreds of men and women lean against tree trunks or press their
backs into the consulate wall, seeking any sliver of shade. They wait to be
fingerprinted, interviewed, and-with luck-approved as one of the
175,000 guest workers admitted to the United States each year. An ordinary
day in May 2005--or perhaps not quite. Under one tree, a meeting is
underway. At the center of a circle stands a labor organizer, copy of a
contract in hand. Asegtirense que sus derechos sean respetados, he urges
the crowd, all of whom are bound for North Carolina. "Make sure that your
rights are respected." Another man, his crisp shirt and spotless jeans
belying the previous sixteen hours spent on a bus from his hometown,
stands up and offers advice to the others. Cuidado con el patr6n en Ranch
Farm. "Careful with the boss at Ranch Farm." He continues: "He's still
trying to get away with piece rate when he's supposed to be paying us by
the hour. Call the union's North Carolina office if it happens to you."
Others nod assent. After half an hour of sharing information and
reestablishing bonds, the group disperses. Before the week's end, they will
be thinning tobacco plants in the hot Carolina fields. For the first time in
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history, guest workers are about to cross the border into the United States
as union members.
Over one million new immigrants arrive in the United States each
year.' This spring, Americans saw several times that number pour into the
streets, protesting proposed changes in U.S. immigration and guest work
policies. 2 As the signs they carried indicated, most migrants come to work,
and it is in the workplace that the impact of large numbers of newcomers is
most keenly felt. For those who see both the free movement of people and
the preservation of decent working conditions as essential to social justice,
this presents a seemingly unresolvable dilemma. In a situation of massive
inequality among countries, to prevent people from moving in search of
work is to curtail their chance to build a decent life for themselves and their
families. But from the perspective of workers in the country that receives
them, the more immigrants, the more competition, and the worse work
becomes.
As an advocate for immigrant workers for over twenty years, I have
often spoken from the heart of that dilemma. 3 This Article proposes a way
out. In it, I develop the idea of "transnational labor citizenship," a new
approach to structuring cross-border labor migration that draws on, but
goes beyond, current theories of transnational political citizenship.
Transnational labor citizenship reconceptualizes the relationship among the
governments of immigrant sending and receiving countries, civil society
labor institutions, such as unions and worker centers, and private actors.
Inspired by recent efforts to organize workers as they move across borders,
transnational labor citizenship would link permission to enter the United
States in search of work to membership in cross-border worker
organizations, rather than to the current requirement of a job offer from an
employer. It would facilitate the enforcement of baseline labor rights and
allow migrants to carry benefits and services with them as they move. Its
goal, heretofore elusive, is to facilitate the free movement of people while
1. JEFFREY S. PASSEL & ROBERTO SURO, RISE, PEAK, AND DECLINE: TRENDS IN U.S.
IMMIGRATION 1992-2004, at i-ii (2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?Report
ID=53.
2. Luis Andres Henao, After the Amnesty: 20 Years Later, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 13,
2006, at A3.
3. See, e.g., JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS
(2005) [hereinafter GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS]; Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by
Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 407 (1995); Jennifer Gordon, Immigrants Fight the Power-Worker Centers Are One
Path to Labor Organizing and Political Participation, NATION, Jan. 3, 2000, at 16.
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preventing the erosion of working conditions in the countries that receive
them.
Labor organizations are central to this proposal. Historically, unions
have been restrictionist in their approach to immigration, but today most
unions in the United States welcome immigrants already present in the
industries they organize, including the undocumented.4 While this Article
applauds this pro-immigrant position, it argues that to move forward on the
immigration question from a social justice perspective, and to succeed in
their goal of improving working conditions, unions must refashion
themselves so they can accommodate an ongoing influx of new migrants.
Simultaneously, the United States must reconfigure its approach to labor
migration so that it sees workers' organizations as allies in the process.
This Article offers the new concept of "labor citizenship" as a lens for
understanding the challenges unions face in taking the leap to an open
attitude toward the future flow of migrants. By labor citizenship I mean the
ways in which workers' organizations create membership regimes, set and
enforce rules for those who belong, and approach their goal of improving
wages and working conditions. Labor citizenship also encompasses the
normative expectation of solidarity among workers and active participation
by them in the democratic governance of their own institutions.
Strikingly, aspects of labor citizenship implemented by unions in the
United States parallel the conventional national citizenship framework.
Like countries, which apportion privileges based on national citizenship,
unions offer a special set of benefits to their members alone.5 At a
4. I use the term "undocumented" to refer to noncitizens with no legal immigration status
because it avoids the pejorative inherent in phrases like "illegal immigrant" or "illegal alien." The word
also highlights a fairly recent emphasis on documentation at the intersection of U.S. labor and
immigration law. It was not until 1986, with the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act
and its employer sanctions provisions, that all job seekers in the United States were required to present
"documents" proving their authorization to work before being hired.
5. For an accounting of the way nonunion workers also benefit from the efforts of unions, see
infra note 50 and accompanying text. In this Article, I use the word "members" when referring to
workers who are represented by a union. This should be qualified. First, in states that have passed so-
called "Right to Work" legislation, workers are released from the obligation to join or pay dues to the
union that represents them. For a typical "Right to Work" Law, see IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 44-2003
(2003). In such states-currently numbering twenty-three--employees in a unionized workplace who
do not wish to offer the union their financial support do not have to do so, although under the doctrinal
duty of fair representation the union must always represent the interests of all workers in the bargaining
unit. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944); U.S. Dep't of Labor, State Right-
to-Work Laws and Constitutional Amendments in Effect as of January 1, 2007 with Year of Passage,
http://www.dol.gov/esa/programs/whd/state/righttowork.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2007). Furthermore,
after the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, although unions in non-"Right to Work" states can negotiate
"agency shop" or "union shop" contracts that require that all workers in the bargaining unit pay dues, it
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minimum, union boundaries separate those eligible to claim the higher
wages guaranteed by union contracts from those beyond the contract's
scope. In some organizing models, particularly in the building trades, there
have been times when labor citizenship is treated as a limited commodity,
denied to some workers in order to increase the share of those within the
circle. This model echoes the way that nation-states circumscribe those
who will be admitted to citizenship to facilitate the amassing and
distribution of limited resources. As nations do, unions assert that this line
drawing is normatively important, in addition to its instrumental value.
From the union perspective, bounded citizenship aids in the development of
democracy and solidarity within the union, and enhances the capacity of
union members to realize full and equal citizenship outside the workplace
as well. From the perspective of the nation-state, it is often said to be a
precondition for the creation of community and the flourishing of
democracy.
In the past decade, much has been written about the ways that political
participation, once seen as a single-state phenomenon, has transformed into
a transnational experience under pressure from massive migration around
the globe.6 Transnational scholarship describes immigrant remittances as
the driving force behind many of these changes but is curiously silent on
the conditions of the work that produces remittance income.7 Such scholars
is illegal to require workers to formally affiliate as members with the unions that represent them. See,
e.g., Int'l Union of Elec., Elec., Salaried, Mach. & Furniture Workers Local 444, 311 N.L.R.B. 1031,
1041 (1993) (invalidating a clause in a collective bargaining agreement requiring all employees to
become "members of the Union in good standing" because such a clause "fails to apprise employees of
the lawful limits of their obligation" to the union and "would lead an employee unversed in labor law to
believe that employees were obliged to join the Union and satisfy all of the requirements for
membership as a condition of employment"). Thus, even in a "union shop" there may be workers
represented by the union who are not technically members.
6. The literature on transnational citizenship is vast. Foundational works include TOWARDS A
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON MIGRATION: RACE, CLASS, ETHNICITY, AND NATIONALISM
RECONSIDERED (Nina Glick-Schiller et al. eds., 1992) and YASEMIN NUHO6LU SOYSAL, LIMITS OF
CITIZENSHIP: MIGRANTS AND POSTNATIONAL MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE (1994). Linda Bosniak's article,
Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2000), offers an empirical and
theoretical exploration of whether citizenship is an inherently national project, or whether it can and
should be expanded across national borders. Roger Waldinger, David Fitzgerald, and Jonathan Fox,
among others, have recently offered critiques of the argument that transnational citizenship represents a
meaningful shift in the citizenship paradigm. See Jonathan Fox, Unpacking "'Transnational
Citizenship," 8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 171 (2005); Roger Waldinger & David Fitzgerald,
Transnationalism in Question, 109 AM. J. SOC. 1177 (2004). A recent volume of the N.Y.U. Law
Review explores this phenomenon in detail including Anupam Chander's useful taxonomy of the
emerging institutions of transnational economic and political citizenship. Anupam Chander, Homeward
Bound, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60 (2006).
7. There are a few exceptions, including the work of David Fitzgerald and Lynn Stephen, who
have explored the links between labor unions and transnational political behavior. See David Fitzgerald,
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have also been reluctant to take the leap from description of transnational
activities to normative exploration of how the transnational framework
might be reshaped so that it serves the ends of a more just labor and
immigration system. In exploring the potential for transnational labor
citizenship, this Article takes on both tasks.
The same forces shifting the practice and structure of citizenship on
the national level are also bearing down on unions. Yet the
transnationalization of political citizenship emerging on the national level
does not yet have a clear parallel in labor citizenship. I argue that unions'
legitimate concerns about the effect of an oversupply of workers on
working conditions has hampered their ability to reshape labor citizenship
to respond effectively to ongoing immigration. To be sure, as of the late
1990s unions in the United States became much more open to organizing
new immigrants, including the undocumented. 9 And, in the context of the
global movement of capital, a number of unions have initiated cross-border
efforts to support workers and unions in other countries. 10 But the core
Beyond "Transnationalism ": Mexican Hometown Politics at an American Labour Union, 27 ETHNIC &
RACIAL STUD. 228 (2004); Lynn Stephen, Mixtec Farmworkers in Oregon: Linking Labor and
Ethnicity Through Farmworker Unions and Hometown Associations, in INDIGENOUS MEXICAN
MIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 179 (Jonathan Fox & Gaspar Rivera-Salgado eds., 2004).
8. It is also important to challenge the idea that the shift from nationalism or transnationalism
has been linear, universal, or complete. Borders are still tremendously important sites for the exercise of
real and symbolic national power, as the 2006 congressional mandate for the construction of a 700-mile
wall along the southern U.S. border illustrates. Secure Fence Act of 2006, H.R. 6061, 109th Cong. § 3
(2006). Within the United States, the state's capacity to exclude and deport immigrants increased over
the course of the 1990s and 2000s. Changing laws drastically increased the facility with which legal
permanent residents convicted of crimes could be stripped of their green cards, and ramped up
surveillance and enforcement against those whose religion, ethnicity, or nationality placed them within
the state's rubric of "suspected terrorists." See generally Muneer Ahmad, Homeland Insecurities:
Racial Violence the Day After September 11, 20 SOC. TEXT 72 (2002); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the
Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002); E-mail from Sameer M. Ashar, Assistant Professor, City
University of New York School of Law, to author (Aug. 2, 2006) (on file with author) ("[T]he post-9 /11
reinforcement of national borders and immigration enforcement and the 1996 targeting of LPR's with
criminal convictions seem to suggest a tiered system in which some populations are allowed to
transnationalize, while others are targeted and put outside of our national borders."). In these ways,
transnationalism is best understood as a phenomenon that is permitted for "desirable aliens" by some
receiving country governments, but forbidden by them to a large swath of would-be migrants (some of
whom nonetheless migrate or remain illegally, and create transnational forms of participation from the
bottom up).
9. See infra Part III.B. 1.c.
10. For a historical overview of labor's cross-border efforts, see BEVERLY J. SILVER, FORCES OF
LABOR: WORKERS' MOVEMENTS AND GLOBALIZATION SINCE 1870 (2003). Examples of concrete
campaigns are set out in Terry Davis, Cross-border Organizing Comes Home: UE & FAT in Mexico &
Milwaukee, 23 LAB. RES. REV. 23 (1995); Andrew Herod, Organizing Globally, Organizing Locally:
Union Spatial Strategy in a Global Economy, in GLOBAL UNIONS? THEORY AND STRATEGIES OF
ORGANIZED LABOUR IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 83 (Jeffrey Harrod & Robert O'Brien eds.,
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model of labor citizenship has remained reliant on efforts to curtail the
number of workers entering the labor market. In bringing undocumented
immigrants into the fold of labor citizenship, most unions did not forgo the
idea of boundaries. They merely extended their borders to include a new
group. The idea that the future flow of migrants remain outside the reach of
labor citizenship-and that union borders must be defended against them,
or they will undermine the viability of that citizenship-remains essential
to the vision of much of the labor movement today. And yet, new migrants
continue to arrive.
Surprising many, Service Employees International Union ("SEIU")
and UNITE HERE, two leading members of the Change to Win Coalition
made up of unions that withdrew from the American Federation of Labor
and Congress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO") in 2005, recently
endorsed a new "guest work" program." After the 1964 demise of the
bracero program, which brought over 4 million Mexicans to U.S. fields
over the two decades of its existence, the idea of addressing large-scale
labor needs through guest work fell into disfavor.' 2 But the idea of an
expanded temporary worker program was revived by President George W.
Bush in 200413 and has gained currency in some unexpected quarters,
including some immigrant advocacy groups that had previously considered
permanent legalization the only acceptable solution to the problems of the
undocumented. 14 SEIU and UNITE HERE have joined that camp.
Meanwhile, the AFL-CIO contends that a new guest work program would
undercut every effort to organize low wage workers. In truth, as long as a
guest worker program positions "guests" outside the paradigm of labor
2002); Kenneth Zinn, Labor Solidarity in the New World Order: The UMWA Program in Columbia, 23
LAB. RES. REV. 35 (1995).
11. See infra Part IV.B. The ironies ofusing the term "guest" to describe workers brought in on a
temporary basis to take a country's most undesirable jobs under conditions of extreme exploitation are
inescapable. However, because the phrase "guest worker" enjoys universal recognition and its potential
synonyms-temporary worker, nonimmigrant worker-have multiple meanings, I will refer to "guest
workers" throughout this piece.
12. For overviews of the bracero program, see generally KiTTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE:
THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND THE I.N.S. (1992); ERNESTO GALARZA, MERCHANTS OF
LABOR: THE MEXICAN BRACERO STORY (1964) [hereinafter GALARZA, MERCHANTS OF LABOR];
ERNESTO GALARZA, SPIDERS IN THE HOUSE AND WORKERS IN THE FIELD (1970) [hereinafter
GALARZA, SPIDERS IN THE HOUSE]; MAE NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE
MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2004).
13. President George W. Bush's first guest worker speech was delivered on January 7, 2004.
Bush on Immigration; Excerpts from Bush's Address on Allowing Immigrants to Fill Some Jobs, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2004, at A28.
14. For a full exploration of the guest work issue, see Part IV, infra.
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citizenship, such a program is doomed to undermine the quality of work
despite whatever protections it technically provides for its participants.15
It is the central contention of this Article that the hard-bordered model
of labor citizenship is untenable in the face of an increasingly global
market for labor. Instead, I ask how we might productively reconceive of
the relationship between labor citizenship and nation-state citizenship in a
context of ongoing labor migration. Could a different form of labor
citizenship better achieve the norms that the concept embodies? What
approach to labor organization makes sense in a globally interconnected
world, if the goal is to create good work-at a bare minimum, work that
can support a family, does not endanger the worker's health, and provides
adequate time off for other pursuits-in this country no matter who the
worker is? 16
In response, I call for a thought experiment in the transnationalization
of labor citizenship. 17 I propose an opening up of the fortress of labor and
of the nation-state to accommodate a constant flow of new migrants
through a model that would tie immigration status to membership in
organizations of transnational workers rather than to a particular employer.
These memberships would entitle migrants to services, benefits, and rights
that cross borders just as the workers do. In exchange for the authorization
to work that they would receive as members, migrant workers would
commit to the core value of labor citizenship: solidarity with other workers
in the United States, expressed as a commitment to refuse to work under
conditions that violate the law or labor agreements.
The premise behind this proposal is that in the face of enormous
inequality between countries, immigration controls will not stop the
movement of workers from the South to the North. But recognizing that
migrants will continue to arrive in the United States regardless of our
policy does not require abdicating wages and working conditions to
employers who would set them as low as the market permits. Advocates
have long stated that the government must actively enforce basic workplace
standards in immigrant-heavy workplaces to set a floor for all workers.
Such a step is necessary but insufficient. The state does not have the
political will, the staffing, or the mechanisms to enforce those laws
consistently, and even if it did, the minimums are set too low to assure
15. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the problems posed by even the best-designed guest worker
programs).
16. Despite the transnational focus of my proposal, the central concern of this Article remains
addressing conditions of work within the United States.
17. See infra Part V.
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workers a decent standard of living. To engage the state more fully in
enforcement, and to go beyond inadequate existing levels of protection,
workers themselves must organize. Transnational labor citizenship would
shift the enforcement of a floor on working conditions from the arena of
immigration policy in employer hands, where it currently lies, to the arena
of labor solidarity in worker hands, where it belongs. In this way, I argue,
we can create structures that respond at once to the desires of migrants for
jobs and to the aspirations of labor citizenship to preserve decent working
conditions in this country.
A brief map of the road ahead is in order. I begin in Part II by
elaborating the concept of labor citizenship, drawing on the nation-state
citizenship framework and emphasizing the key pragmatic and normative
roles of borders in union organizing. In Part III, I trace the interactions
between labor citizenship and its nation-state counterpart, arguing that in
the context of large-scale immigration, the boundaried nature of labor
citizenship is frequently its undoing, creating a recurring conflict between
solidarity and defense. In Part IV, I lay out the dilemma of guest work as
the last frontier in this progression. I draw on the history of both the
bracero and more recent temporary work visa programs in the United
States to argue that even a "good guest work program" would not address
the challenges of establishing labor citizenship in a transnational world
because guest work proposals inevitably preserve barriers between "guests"
and residents that undermine efforts to raise or even maintain wages and
working conditions. In Part V, I lay out my proposal for transnational labor
citizenship, and in Part VI, I explore practical and theoretical hurdles and
suggest how they might be overcome.
II. LABOR CITIZENSHIP
Unions in the United States have often approached membership in
ways that echo aspects of nation-state citizenship. In this Part, I develop the
concept of "labor citizenship" as a way to explain the role of boundaries
within unions and to elucidate the relationship between labor's borders and
those of the nation-state.
A. THE CONCEPT OF LABOR CITIZENSHIP
Labor citizenship describes the structure of membership in workers'
organizations, the expectations such groups have of their members, and
strategies they use to leverage better working conditions. From the
perspective of workers, labor citizenship refers to the status of membership
[Vol. 80:503
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in a workers' organization, and to the act of participation in the
decisionmaking processes of that organization, with the goal of improving
wages, working conditions, and the dignity of work. As these three things
come together, they may forge a fourth component, identity, as participants
come to identify with their organization and with fellow "labor citizens,"
and stand in solidarity with them. From the perspective of the organization,
the effort to build labor citizenship is at once an effort to create a strong
democratic internal culture, and to exercise power in the workplace, the
community, and the political arena in order to achieve recognition of and
compensation for workers' economic contributions to society.
Unlike similar-sounding theories of economic or industrial citizenship,
which call on the state to provide decent work and to protect working
conditions through law and policy, labor citizenship as I envision it is
located in an organization or collective effort, and the benefits it provides
are the direct product of the actions of workers themselves., Its
development may be facilitated by state policies that support economic or
industrial citizenship and held back by laws that seek to restrict the scope
18. The idea of economic citizenship has its roots in T.H. Marshall's classic work, Citizenship
and Social Class. Marshall described full citizenship as an amalgam of political, civil, and social rights.
Although he did not make economic rights one of his three pillars, the availability of decent work and
the assurance of a minimum income underpin his concepts of civil and social rights. See T.H.
MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS AND OTHER ESSAYS (1950); Alice Kessler-Harris, In
Pursuit of Economic Citizenship, 10 SOC. POL. 157, 159-62 (2003). Scholars such as William Forbath,
Kenneth Karst, Alice Kessler-Harris, Vicki Schultz, and Judith Shklar have developed the idea of
economic citizenship more fully, including the right to decent work and, in the case of Kessler-Harris,
to compensation for unpaid care work, as an essential component of a just citizenship regime. See
JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION (1991); William E. Forbath,
Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1999); Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis
of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 523 (1997); Kessler-Harris, supra, at 157-
61; Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1886-88 (2000).
In a somewhat different sense, the Canadian labor scholar Harry W. Arthurs wrote in 1967 about
the concept of "industrial citizenship," meaning the collective rights and duties legislatively granted to
employees. Harry W. Arthurs, Developing Industrial Citizenship: A Challenge for Canada 's Second
Century, 45 CANADIAN BAR REV. 786-89 (1967). Canadian labor scholarship has engaged with this
rubric ever since. The introduction to a recent journal volume revisiting the theory lays out the
trajectory of this scholarship. See Michel Coutu & Gregor Murray, Towards Citizenship at Work? An
Introduction, 60 REL. INDUSTRIELLES/INDUS. REL. 617-19 (2005).
A third use of "citizenship" in conjunction with work is found in Katherine Stone's recent book,
From Widgets to Digits, where she uses the phrase "citizen unions" to describe organizing by labor
unions that is focused on a geographic region (rather than being centered on a particular workplace).
KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING
WORKPLACE 227-37 (2004). Stone deploys the word "citizen" in this context to evoke standing to
participate based on work and territorial presence but does not link it to a theorized concept of
citizenship either in the nation-state or the workplace. See id.
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of workers' rights, but at its core labor citizenship is the product of worker
agency, exercised collaboratively, with or without state permission.19
B. THE ROOTS OF THE METAPHOR: NATION-STATE CITIZENSHIP
In an aspirational sense, I use the concept of labor citizenship to refer
to participation by workers in collective efforts to achieve recognition of
and compensation for their economic contributions to society. Although
this vision can be achieved through many organizational forms-
spontaneous campaigns, worker centers, and employee coalitions among
them-the most familiar structure through which labor citizenship has been
enacted in the United States is the labor union.20
Especially in the context of a union, the use of the term "citizenship"
to describe this phenomenon is an obvious choice. The parallels between
labor citizenship in a union and nation-state citizenship are striking. You
gain the status of labor citizenship if you become a part of a union, just as
you gain national citizenship by being admitted to membership in a
country. In the union setting, that status entitles members to a package of
rights exclusively available to insiders2 1 and binds them to a set of
responsibilities that outsiders do not bear, as nation-state citizenship does.
Like national citizenship, labor citizenship is embodied in the act of
democratic participation within the organization and collective action
outside it, both to advance the group's campaigns and to protect its gains.
Reflecting these parallels, the form of labor citizenship that has developed
in unions in the United States is often explicitly analogized to the nation-
state: "industrial democracy" created in the image of political democracy. 22
Citizenship is an enormously appealing concept. Like its cousin,
"democracy," "citizenship" is almost always deployed with a positive
19. Theories of economic and industrial citizenship, by contrast, are state-centric. Economic
citizenship is presented by its proponents as a universal right that flows from status citizenship, to be
guaranteed by the state and taken up by citizens in their individual capacity. See, e.g., Karst, supra note
18, at 553-59. Although Arthurs's theory of industrial citizenship casts collective action in a more
important role, his notion of industrial citizenship is at base quite similar to Marshall's, a package of
legislated rights that establish "the right to economic security." Arthurs, supra note 18, at 812. Its
exercise is only available to designated industrial citizens (that is, legal employees). Id. at 787.
20. For a discussion of alternative forms of labor citizenship, see Parts V and VI, infra.
21. I refer to the benefits guaranteed by a collective bargaining agreement to members of the
bargaining unit it covers. A high level of unionization also delivers benefits to nonunion workers. In
infra note 50 and accompanying text, I discuss the positive effects of unionization on nonunion
workers, including union advocacy for legislation to advance the rights of all workers and the spillover
wage effects of unionization in an industry for nonunion workers in the same industry.
22. See infra Part II.B.2.
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cant. 23 It connotes belonging, participation, inclusion. It speaks of shared
endeavor and shared benefit, with echoes of goodness, fairness, and
equality. It is hard to imagine someone advancing a theory of citizenship in
which the term is a negative. Because of its emancipatory potential, the call
for "full citizenship" has been renewed by generations of social movements
and is undergoing a renaissance yet again today.24
But citizenship is also problematic. In Part VI, I explore the way the
citizenship concept so often turns exclusionary, a phenomenon as manifest
on the nation-state level as it is within the labor union. There, I ask how
choosing citizenship as a metaphor may have distorted my transnational
labor citizenship proposal. For the moment, it will suffice to note a
challenge that is easier to overcome: the term's chronic imprecision.
Because citizenship brings its normative blessing to whatever status, act, or
benefit it labels, 25 it has become a sort of rhetorical trump card, or, in
Boaventura de Sousa Santos's terminology, a "topos," a "widely accepted
point[] of view with very open, unfinished or flexible content easily
adaptable to the different contexts of argumentation." 26 The temptation to
use the word is strong, and few have resisted the call. Today "citizenship"
is used on the nation-state level to describe the legal status of permanent
membership in a country, the act of voting, and the right to receive benefits
from the welfare state; it is also applied to a broad range of transnational
economic and political relationships and to participation in and
identification with a wide variety of institutions and cultural communities.
The term covers such extensive ground that to label something"citizenship" is to raise the question of "what kind"? 27 In the face of
divergent meanings, it is necessary to be precise in creating a citizenship
metaphor, and I will aim for such precision in my discussion of labor
citizenship. Particularly helpful in that regard is the taxonomy that Linda
23. Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, Civil Citizenship Against Social Citizenship? On the Ideology
of Contract-versus-charity, in THE CONDITION OF CITIZENSHIP 90, 90 (Bart van Steenbergen ed., 1994)
("We find no pejorative uses."). See also Linda Bosniak, Critical Reflections on "Citizenship" as a
Progressive Aspiration, in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES
& POSSIBILITIES 339, 340 (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 2002) ("There is... one thing that almost
everyone does seem to agree on, and that is that citizenship is something very significant and
desirable.").
24. For case studies of emerging social movements using "citizenship" as a framework, see
INCLUSIVE CITIZENSHIP: MEANINGS AND EXPRESSIONS (Naila Kabeer ed., 2005).
25. Fraser & Gordon, supra note 23, at 90 ("[T]he word appears often as a prefix to another term,
always adding dignity to the original, as in 'citizen-soldier', 'citizen-worker', 'citizen-mother."').
26. BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE AND
POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION 40-41 (1995).
27. See SHKLAR, supra note 18, at 1; Bosniak, supra note 6, at 450.
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Bosniak offers, dividing understandings of the term into four categories:
citizenship as legal status, citizenship as political activity, citizenship as
rights, and citizenship as collective identity.28
On the national level, citizenship as legal status refers to formal
membership in the nation-state, the determination of whether a person is a"citizen" of a particular country by virtue of birthplace, parentage, or
naturalization. Political citizenship, meanwhile, encompasses the myriad
ways in which people participate in the governance of the communities in
which they live. In the classic, civic republican sense, traced most often to
Aristotle's Politics, a "citizen" is a person who is a full member of and
legitimate political participant in a state, 29 but citizenship-as-political-
participation has long been enacted in other realms within the nation-state
and across its borders. Citizenship as rights, sometimes called social
citizenship, is rooted in T.H. Marshall's classic work, Citizenship and
Social Class.30 It denotes the package of entitlements that flow to citizens
by virtue of membership. Finally, citizenship as identity evokes the feeling
of being a part of, and allied with, a larger group: the identification and
solidarity that go with belonging.3 1 I will trace parallels to each of these
aspects of citizenship in my discussion of labor unions.
To be clear, I am not arguing that labor citizenship and nation-state
citizenship are perfectly aligned. Unions operate within the framework of
the nation-state rather than as autonomous actors outside it, and they have
taken a wide range of approaches to membership, only some of which are
as focused on boundaries as countries are.32 Most notably, a union has an
28. Bosniak, supra note 6, at 455. Earlier scholars offered their own taxonomies. For example,
Judith Shklar suggests four categories: citizenship as standing, citizenship as nationality, citizenship as
active participation, and citizenship as "ideal republican citizenship." SHKLAR, supra note 18, at 3.
29. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS (Stephen Everson ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (350
BCE). See also LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY
MEMBERSHIP (2006) [hereinafter BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN]; J.G.A. Pocock, The Ideal of
Citizenship Since Classical Times, in THE CITIZENSHIP DEBATES: A READER 31, 31-33 (Gershon Shafir
ed., 1998).
30. MARSHALL, supra note 18, at 110-11.
31. For a discussion of citizenship and identity, see Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian
American History and the Loss of Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405, 449-77
(2005).
32. Furthermore, too great a reliance on the analogy risks casting unorganized workers as labor's
"enemies." Nation-states defend their borders against invasion by individuals, organizations, or states
that pose an ideological or resource-based threat. The analogy suggests that when unions take a hostile
stance toward immigrants, they are likewise defending against their adversaries. Labor competition is a
problem that unions must grapple with, but casting migrant and other workers as labor's nemesis
ignores the role of capital in opposing worker organization generally and in choosing the workforce. In
industrial unionism, it is management, not the union, that makes the de facto decision about who will be
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immediate interest in improving the working conditions at nonunion
enterprises within the labor market in which it operates in order to avoid
giving nonunion employers an advantage over unionized businesses. This
mandate to address the needs of nonmembers as a matter of institutional
survival has no easy parallel in the nation-state citizenship context.33 My
goal here is therefore not to construct a tight analogy but to highlight a few
of the noteworthy areas where labor citizenship has paralleled nation-state
citizenship, both in its structure and in its rhetoric. In particular, I address
the ways that status citizenship, the benefits of citizenship, political
participation, and identity/solidarity have manifested themselves inside
unions. In Part III, I go on to explore the ways that labor's concern about
competition over jobs has led it to rely on nation-state citizenship rules to
curtail the supply of workers in order to reinforce labor citizenship's
capacity to achieve its goals.
1. Status, Benefits, and Border Defense in Labor Citizenship
There are many membership models among unions, and they vary
widely in the importance they assign to the border between members and
outsiders, depending on their industry, geographic location, and organizing
philosophy. Among the various approaches, the classic craft unions-and
in particular building trades or construction unions-have offered the
clearest parallels with national citizenship. 34
The traditional craft union approach, the hallmark of the American
Federation of Labor ("AFL"), characterized most labor organizing in this
country for the first third of the twentieth century and is still in effect in the
building trades and the entertainment industry among others. Building
trades unions, for example, arose in decentralized labor markets where
a union member by hiring one employee rather than another. My thanks to Sameer Ashar and Sarah Fox
for elaborating on these implications of the analogy.
33. It is also clearly in wealthy countries' interests to address poverty and health issues in poor
countries. However, while unions must support the rights of nonunion workers to ensure labor's
continued existence, countries from the global North continue to see aid to developing countries more
as a matter of charity than an imperative related to the survival of the donor states.
34. Like all generalizations, this has its exceptions. Historically, there have been craft unions that
developed more open organizing approaches, foreshadowing the inclusive strategies of industrial
unionism. See, e.g., Dorothy Sue Cobble, Lost Ways of Organizing: Reviving the AFL 's Direct Affiliate
Strategy, 36 INDUS. REL. 278, 279-80 (1997). Furthermore, in the past few decades, craft unions such
as the building trades have found that their exclusivity has been their downfall in the face of an influx of
nonunion construction firms, often staffed by new immigrants. The resulting loss of market share and
decline in union strength in the construction industry has led many in the building trades to rethink the
classic craft union model and to develop programs to draw in immigrants and others historically
excluded from their ranks. See, e.g., Bruce Nissen, The Role of Labor Education in Transforming a
Union Toward Organizing Immigrants: A Case Study, 27 LAB. STUD. J. 109, 109-13 (2002).
2007]
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
workers held particular skills in demand by employers, yet jobs were brief,
hiring was competitive, and tenure with any one employer was likely to be
short.35 To improve working conditions, they sought to take wages out of
competition, ensuring that labor costs were uniform so that contractors
could not underbid each other by paying lower wages. One way they did
this was by attempting to control the supply of workers in their trade.
Formally, construction unions limit the numbers of people who can enter
the skilled worker pool through qualification rules and apprenticeship
periods.36 Until recently, equally entrenched in a number of building trade
unions have been informal practices of exclusion through nepotism,
corruption, and race and gender discrimination. 37  Craft unions then
negotiate rules about wages, benefits and working conditions that all
employers in the industry must respect if they wish to have access to these
highly skilled workers.
With regard to status citizenship--citizenship as admission to
membership-such unions have created bright-line rules distinguishing
between members and nonmembers. Those on the inside, the "labor
citizens," have rights and privileges which are denied to everyone else, and
have obligations to each other with which outsiders are not expected to
comply. 38  As with nation-state citizenship, the line-drawing that
accompanies the construction union version of labor citizenship is not
merely a heuristic device for separating the ins from the outs, but a
mechanism that makes these increased benefits possible.39
35. For a description of how these characteristics of the labor market in construction led to the
emergence of the distinctive structure of building trades unions, see ROBERT MAX JACKSON, THE
FORMATION OF CRAFT LABOR MARKETS 123-80, 209-12 (1984); MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F.
SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE 115-17 (1984).
36. See MARK ERLICH, WITH OUR HANDS: THE STORY OF CARPENTERS IN MASSACHUSETTS 18-
19 (1986); MICHAEL KAZIN, BARONS OF LABOR: THE SAN FRANCISCO BUILDING TRADES AND UNION
POWER IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 98 (1987); GRACE PALLADINO, SKILLED HANDS, STRONG SPIRITS: A
CENTURY OF BUILDING TRADES HISTORY 141-44 (2005).
37. See ERLICH, supra note 36, at 208-18; KAZIN, supra note 36, at 145-76; PALLADINO, supra
note 36, at 157-66. For a discussion of how exclusionary strategies have backfired for building trades
unions in a context of high immigration, with the result that many of those unions now actively seek to
recruit immigrants as members, see note 34, supra, and note 42, infra.
38. In states governed by so-called "Right to Work" legislation, where the benefits of a union
contract must be extended to all workers in the bargaining unit whether they pay dues or not, "insiders"
for the purposes of contract benefits include everyone in the bargaining unit.
39. For a discussion of the importance of labor's boundaries to successful collective action (and
of unions' need to effectively police borders against defection as well as intrusion), see David Abraham,
Individual Autonomy and Collective Empowerment in Labor Law: Union Membership Resignations and
Strikebreaking in the New Economy, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268 (1988).
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When borders are this important, a great deal of energy goes into their
defense. As with the nation-state, building trades' labor citizenship
boundary-drawing strategies fail without the policing of those who would
undermine them by taking work at lower rates.4 0 Thus, like countries,
construction unions set rules about who can be a member, how members
are expected to conduct themselves, and what consequences will befall
those who deviate from that code.4 '
This model of labor citizenship is threatened when an employer has
easy access to alternative sources of workers with similar skills and can fill
its labor needs outside the union pool.42 As mass production rose to
prominence in the 1920s, with its reliance on vast numbers of "unskilled"
workers, the typical AFL union's approach faced severe challenges. 43 In
response, the industrial model was forged by unions in steel, auto plants,
and mines, which eventually came together to form Congress of Industrial
Organizations ("CIO").
Industrial unionism rejected the exclusivity of the craft approach.
Rather than focusing on highly skilled workers whose abilities were in
40. As Mark Erlich notes in his study of Massachusetts construction unions, "[e]ven a handful of
men outside the union community represented a threat...." ERLICH, supra note 36, at 50.
41. Craft union constitutions and bylaws often establish intricate systems governing admission to
membership, member discipline, and expulsion. Entire suborganizations within unions are dedicated to
weighing the evidence against members who have transgressed and deciding whether they will be
permitted to retain their membership. The United Brotherhood of Carpenters, for example, has a system
of councils and trial committees to hear claims against members who violate union rules. United
Brotherhood of Carpenters Constitution §§ 51-52, available at http://www.ranknfile.net/
constitution'01.htm (follow "Offenses and Penalties" hyperlink; then follow "Charges and Trials"
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 11, 2007). For examples of such union rules in action, see ERLICH, supra
note 36, at 73; KAZIN, supra note 36, at 95-97.
42. With the influx of immigrants into the industry over the past few decades, building trades
unions' control over construction jobs has been severely eroded. The unions' first reaction was to seek
to expel the immigrants. Of late, however, the construction unions who organize the less elite members
of the construction workforce-including the bricklayers, laborers, and carpenters-have begun to
invite them within the circle. Nissen, supra note 34 (providing a case study of the role of labor
education in efforts by the South Florida Regional Council of Carpenters to organize new immigrant
workers); Miriam Jordan, Rebuilding Plan: Carpenters Union Courts Immigrants to Increase Clout-
Undocumented Workers See Risk of Firings, Fewer Jobs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2005, at A l (discussing
union efforts to court immigrants); Nate Schweber, Worked Over? Union Organizers Say Immigrants
Get Cheated, HERALD NEWS (Passaic County, N.J.), Sept. 6, 2004, at AI (recounting outreach efforts
by the Laborers' International Union of North America to reach out to immigrants on construction sites
in New Jersey); Nicole Andrea Silverman, Deserving of Decent Work: The Complications of
Organizing Irregular Workers Without Legal Rights (Oxford Centre on Migration, Policy and Society,
Working Paper No. 21, 2005) (discussing a case study of efforts by the New England Regional Council
of Carpenters to organize Latino immigrant workers).
43. To be fair, the AFL included unions with a far wider range of organizing strategies than is
commonly acknowledged, including a number of locals with an industry-wide approach. Cobble, supra
note 34.
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demand, it sought to organize entire industries, bringing skilled and
unskilled workers together. Without skill as a source of leverage, an
industrial union could only take wages out of competition by organizing as
many employers as possible in a given industry. Once it established a
presence in a particular sector of a labor market, therefore, the industrial
union's goal could be characterized as maximum inclusiveness. Where the
goal of bringing all employers within the labor market under contract
proved elusive, the union sought to raise wages in the industry by other
means and to keep nonunion shops from profiting at unionized employers'
expense." Driven by this imperative and by solidarity with nonunion
workers, industrial unions have perennially been leaders in advancing and
supporting legislation on behalf of all workers.45
Another key difference between the industrial and the craft models is
that, unlike a craft union, the industrial union does not choose its members.
Its contracts apply to whomever the employer hires, a decision over which
the union has no authority. After the initial campaign, in which union
representation is determined by the desires of a majority of the employees
in a bargaining unit, new hires are brought within the circle of union
protection by virtue of being selected by the employer for a job in the
organized unit.4 6 In this sense, industrial unions can only influence the
44. For a discussion of the emergence and characteristics of the industrial union model, see
DAVID BRODY, WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 82-119 (1980); NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF
THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 20-53 (2002).
45. Beyond legislative efforts, a newer effort to reach out to nonunion workers is reflected in the
upsurge in affiliate membership programs among unions. In recent years, U.S. unions have
experimented with a range of ways to draw in people who are not yet in a position to become members.
In 1994, the ILGWU/UNITE! created several immigrant worker centers, through which immigrants
could become "associate members," gaining access to services and support. Immanuel Ness,
Organizing Immigrant Communities: UNITE's Workers Center Strategy, in ORGANIZING TO WIN: NEW
RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES 87, 91, 93 (Kate Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998). Many unions now
have some form of affiliate membership. See, e.g., United Steelworkers, Associate Member Program,
http://www.usw.org/uswa/program/content/overview-sub.php?modules2_ID= 1 86&modulesID=285
(last visited Mar. 11, 2007). In 2003, the AFL-CIO created Working America, an association with
membership open to anyone concerned with the group's core issues of good work, health care, and
other benefits. See Working America, www.workingamerica.org (last visited Mar. 11, 2007).
46. There are exceptions to the rule that workers are admitted to craft unions based on skill but
join industrial unions once they are hired by an employer. Some industrial unions run hiring halls, such
as those operated by the Culinary Union Local 226 (an affiliate of the Hotel Employees and Restaurant
Employees International Union ("HERE")) for the hotels, casinos, and banquet halls of Las Vegas.
Harold Meyerson, Las Vegas as a Workers' Paradise, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 2004, at 38. In a hiring hall
model, a worker first joins the union (often after completing a training program) and then becomes
eligible for employment through the union's job center. See PIORE & SABEL, supra note 35, at 116.
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composition of their membership by declining to organize entire
workplaces, rather than by deciding among employees.47
Because of these distinctions, the industrial union view of the role of
borders in labor citizenship is at variance with that of craft unions. Once
workers are present within a given labor market, the industrial union wants
to bring them into its ambit, not to exclude them. Yet, industrial unions,
too, would prefer less competition for jobs to more. The industrial union's
leverage-that is, its ability to negotiate higher wages for members-
comes, as with craft unions, from its capacity to threaten convincingly to
shut down production. Industrial unions' ability to follow through on such
a threat is undermined by the presence of large numbers of nonunion
workers.48 This raises the question of how boundaries might be drawn that
would keep some workers out of the labor market. As I set out in Part III,
the desire to reduce the supply of workers has often motivated industrial as
well as craft unions to pursue restrictive immigration policies.
Boundaries continue to play other roles within industrial unionism as
well. Despite industrial unions' incentive to improve wages and working
conditions for all workers, the fact remains that those covered by a union
contract are granted privileges denied to those outside the circle. Only
union members have access to the rights and benefits in the collective
bargaining agreements that the union negotiates. These contracts ordinarily
provide benefits that go considerably beyond the legal minimum,49
including higher wages, health insurance and pension plans, job security,
and a wealth of other goods, such as job training, guaranteed raises, and
paid vacation and holidays.5" Furthermore, there have been times in the
history of industrial unionism when leaders focused almost exclusively on
existing membership. During the height of "business unionism," from the
late 1940s through the 1970s and even into the 1980s, most craft and
industrial unions within the AFL-CIO were inward-looking, paying little
47. For a description of these and other characteristics of industrial unions, see BRODY, supra
note 44, at 82-119; CHARLES C. HECKSCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM 23-24 (1988); LICHTENSTEIN, supra
note 44.
48. Under the permanent replacement doctrine of labor law, an employer can respond to a union
that strikes for higher wages by permanently replacing its members with nonunion workers. NLRB v.
MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 343 (1938).
49. Or, I should say, most union contracts secure most of these things. In the context of low-wage
immigrant workers, I have seen union contracts that add almost nothing to the floor set by law.
50. Nonetheless, nonunion workers may benefit indirectly from high union density in their
industry, as their employers raise wages in order to remain competitive in the labor market while
avoiding unionization. See David Card, Thomas Lemieux & W. Craig Riddell, Unions and the Wage
Structure, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF TRADE UNIONS 246, 247 (John T. Addison & Claus
Schnabel eds., 2003).
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attention to new organizing or to the needs of the unorganized. 51 During
those decades, the line separating those who belonged to unions from
outsiders was particularly important.
The foregoing analysis emphasizes the exclusionary aspects of the
barrier that traditional labor citizenship constructs between those inside its
realm and those outside it. But what makes labor citizenship so complex is
that, at its best, its ethos is a powerfully inclusionary one-and that the
boundaries of labor citizenship also play important roles in fostering
unions' capacity to develop a strong spirit of solidarity and democracy
among their members. The union version of labor citizenship thus echoes
some of the "hard on the outside and soft on the inside" features of nation-
state citizenship in the United States.5 2
In this regard, the justifications for labor citizenship's boundaries are
very similar to those offered by communitarian theorists with regard to the
nation-state.53 Michael Walzer, for example, has defended bounded
citizenship as necessary to foster the growth of genuine democratic
community as well as to ensure the flow of substantive goods to those who
are citizens. In his foundational book Spheres of Justice, Walzer writes
"[w]hen we think about distributive justice,... [w]e assume an established
group and a fixed population." 54 Elsewhere, he notes that the "idea of
distributive justice presupposes a bounded world, a community within
which distributions take place, a group of people committed to dividing,
exchanging, and sharing, first of all among themselves." 55 Along similar
51. See generally PAUL BUHLE, TAKING CARE OF BUSINESS: SAMUEL GOMPERS, GEORGE
MEANY, LANE KIRKLAND, AND THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN LABOR (1999).
52. BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN, supra note 29, at 4 (emphasis omitted).
53. For a discussion of the essential role that enforceable union borders play in fostering the
pursuit of collective goods (including the collective good of democracy within the group), see
Abraham, supra note 39, at 1288, 1292-93.
54. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 31
(1983) [hereinafter WALZER, SPHERES].
55. Michael Walzer, The Distribution of Membership, in BOUNDARIES: NATIONAL AUTONOMY
AND ITS LIMITS 1, 1 (Peter G. Brown & Henry Shue eds., 1981). The communitarian argument is open
to critique on the grounds that it derives its legitimacy from the inaccurate assumptions that all those
who are present within the community are equal participants in its democracy, and that all those who
are affected by the decisions made through these deliberations are likewise represented in them.
WALZER, SPHERES, supra note 54, at 31, 62. Neither holds true in the United States today, if indeed they
are descriptive of any society. Millions of immigrants are physically present within our borders and
governed by our laws but are ineligible for citizenship because they are undocumented or, if legally
present, because they have not yet met the requirements to apply. To be fair to Walzer, he recognizes
this situation as a real possibility, and decries it, calling for the incorporation into full membership of all
who live and work in a community. WALZER, SPHERES, supra note 54, at 62-63. See also BOSNIAK,
THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN, supra note 29, at 37-76 (discussing Walzer's position on immigrants and
crediting him with a more complex analysis than his usual characterization as a proponent of firm
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lines, political scientists such as Gary Freeman have argued as a descriptive
matter that wealthy countries' emphasis on boundaries and border control
is a direct outgrowth of their strong social citizenship policies.56 "The
welfare state," Freeman notes, "seeks to take care of its own, and its ability
to do so is premised on its ability to construct a kind of safe house in which
to shelter its members from the outside world. 5 7
2. Democracy and Political Participation in Labor Citizenship
On the level of the workplace, unions have been celebrated as the
guarantors of what has been termed "industrial democracy," a workplace-
based system of majority representation. The analogy between industrial
democracy and political democracy on the national level was explicit in the
crafting of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") scheme and is
frequently drawn on by the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") and
courts, particularly in the context of union representation elections.58 As the
Congressional Record stated at the time of the passage of the Wagner Act
in 1935, "[D]emocracy in industry must be based upon the same principles
as democracy in government. Majority rule, with all its imperfections, is
the best protection of workers' rights, just as it is the surest guaranty of
political liberty that mankind has yet discovered." 59
Unions also emphasize democracy as an internal governing principle
and as a justification for the demands they place on their citizens.6 ° At its
boundaries allows). This granted, Walzer does not seem to have conceived of undocumented workers
present in numbers so high that their incorporation challenges his core idea of bordered sovereignty. It
is unclear what he would say about the situation of the United States at present.
Millions of others possess formal citizenship status but are denied many of its benefits by virtue
of race, ethnicity, or gender. Furthermore, literally billions of people outside of the community are
deeply affected by the decisions made within it. Communitarianism's appeal as a progressive theory is
significantly undermined by these observations about its application in real nation-states.
56. Gary Freeman, Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State, ANNALS AM.
ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI., May 1, 1986, at 51, 54.
57. Id. See also Lucie White, The Power Beyond Borders, 70 MiSS. L.J. 865, 866, 873-74 (2001).
58. The analogy between the two forms of democracy is not always apparent. For critiques from
a pro-union perspective, see Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation and
Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REv. 495, 542, 547, 569-70 (1993); James J. Brudney, Neutrality
Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOwA L. REV. 819,
867-74 (2005). For a conservative critique of the analogy, see Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for
Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1405-06 (1983)
("It is not part of a tradition of voluntarism or democracy to grant workers the power to conscript the
employer and dissenting workers into the service of their cause.").
59. 79 CONG. REc. 7571 (1935).
60. For elaborations of this argument, see Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the
Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1422-27 (1993);
Becker, supra note 58. See also Reinhold Fahlbeck, Collective Agreements: A Crossroad Between
2007]
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
best, union democracy offers members a far more intimate, immediate, and
hands-on experience of self-governance than is possible at the national,
state, or even local government levels.61 The building blocks of democracy
in the union are the small communities of the bargaining unit and the
enterprise. Although union bylaws vary, the governance of labor
citizenship is generally carried out through a system of worksite
representatives or "shop stewards" (often, although not exclusively, elected
by workers from among the rank-and-file) who organize on the shop-floor
level and press workers' grievances with management.62 Depending on the
culture and constitution of the particular union, any number of decisions
may be put to a vote at the worksite or the level of the local union, from
daily disputes about break times to major issues like contract ratification
and strike decisions. Union locals send delegates to the national union's
conventions and are thereby represented in debates about the union's
overall direction and leadership. The power of union democracy grows
from the directness of these representation schemes and from the
immediate impact of the decisions made through them on the work lives of
members.
Much as communitarians highlight the borders limiting national
citizenship as essential to the development of a genuine community within
a country, the boundaried nature of labor citizenship plays an important
role in facilitating the development of genuine community within a union.
Public Law and Private Law, 8 COMP. LAB. L.J. 268, 275 (1987); Reuel E. Schiller, From Group Rights
to Individual Liberties: Post-war Labor Law, Liberalism, and the Waning of Union Strength, 20
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 6-7, 19-20 (1999); Stewart J. Schwab, Union Raids, Union
Democracy, and the Market for Union Control, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 367, 371 ("Whether pessimistic or
optimistic about the likelihood of union democracy, analysts typically turn to democratic political
theory for an analogy and a yardstick.").
61. Many unions have long and vibrant democratic traditions. To be frank, other unions are run
in a way that make a mockery of the term "democracy." In a number of such unions, the rank-and-file
are actively engaged in struggles to bring their union closer to realizing these goals. Internal democracy
movements are a part of many unions, including the well-known Teamsters for a Democratic Union.
The Association for Union Democracy is a clearinghouse for such movements. The Association for
Union Democracy, http://www.uniondemocracy.org/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2007).
Democratic rights are guaranteed to union members through federal law under the 1959
Landrum-Griffin Act, passed in the wake of growing congressional concern about union corruption.
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosures (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73
Stat. 519 (1959) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). The Act establishes free speech and
assembly rights within the union, requires regular elections by secret ballot, and sets rules for union
reporting and the management of union funds. Id. Landrum-Griffin offers disenfranchised workers
important tools to challenge antidemocratic practices within their unions and further reinforces the
parallels between a union and a nation. Id.
62. See, e.g., United Auto Workers, UAW Constitution, http://www.uaw.org/constitution/
ethics.cfm (last visited Mar. 11, 2007) (discussing internal democracy within the union).
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As I note earlier, borders are central to the view of the good society
inherent in the communitarian enterprise. Within a bounded community,
the theory goes, democracy can take root, and rules to ensure fairness and
reciprocal obligation can be developed. Indeed, Michael Walzer argues,
"The community itself is a good-conceivably the most important good-
that gets distributed. '63 Walzer is referring to political community, but the
analogy to the union is apt because democracy is a particularly strong value
of labor citizenship and one that is facilitated by union boundaries.64
3. Identity and Solidarity in Labor Citizenship
Finally, solidarity is an essential norm of labor citizenship. What
patriotism is to a country, solidarity is to a union.65 Like national
citizenship, labor citizenship is founded on the expectation that members
will meet a high standard of identification with and action on behalf of
fellow members. Within the boundaries of labor citizenship-among the
workers in a workplace or an industry where a union is active, and across
unionized workplaces and industries-solidarity among workers is
essential to labor's success. To organize, unions must unite workers rather
than divide them. In the simplest sense, an industrial union can only come
to represent the employees in a workplace if a majority of them stand
together in favor of the union. 66 Beyond the initial choice about
representation, workers' power resides in their capacity to act collectively
and to respond to an injury to one as an injury to all. Employers have long
sought to undermine that power by setting workers against each other on
the basis of race, language, ethnicity, country of origin, or immigration
status.67 Unions can only prevail if they persuade workers to overcome
their differences and stand united, protesting each other's grievances and
respecting each other's picket lines. To be a labor citizen in this sense
63. WALZER, SPHERES, supra note 54, at 29.
64. 1 return to this question in Part VI, where I explore whether my prescription for a more open
form of labor citizenship dilutes unions' democratic capacity.
65. For a discussion of solidarity in the national context, see Janine Brodie, Citizenship and
Solidarity: Reflections on the Canadian Way, 6 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 377 (2002).
66. This reiterates the commonly understood version of the centrality of majority unionism to the
U.S. industrial relations scheme. For the contrary argument that minority unionism has a rich tradition
in the United States and that it merits consideration again as the labor movement moves forward, see
CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN THE
AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2005).
67. For just two examples, one from the most famous labor novel of the turn of the last century
and the other from a contemporary newspaper article, both set in the meatpacking industry, see UPTON
SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906); Charlie LeDuff, At a Slaughterhouse Some Things Never Die: Who
Kills, Who Cuts, Who Bosses Can Depend on Race, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2000, at Al.
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means to understand the struggle of all workers as the same struggle. To
the extent that immigrants are present in a workplace that a union seeks to
organize, they must be included in this circle or an effort to establish labor
citizenship will fail.
III. LABOR CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP IN A
CONTEXT OF TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION
In a context of high immigration and intense competition for work, a
contradiction within labor citizenship comes to the fore. On the one hand,
labor's motto is solidarity; division among workers is its downfall. Unions
must reinforce the bonds among workers, or employers will succeed in
fracturing organizing efforts along the enduring lines of race, ethnicity,
language, and immigration status. On the other hand, job competition from"outsiders" is the primary threat to labor citizenship. Unions fear being
undermined by workers willing to take wages and benefits lower than those
they have negotiated. Although unions have designated "outsiders"
according to various criteria over the past century and a half, including race
and gender, the line has frequently come to rest at the national border.68 To
defend labor citizenship, unions have sought to keep would-be immigrant
competitors out of the country, or, where that has failed, to bar them from
the workplace. The restrictionist policies they have pursued have alienated
immigrants and created divisions among workers-the antithesis of
solidarity.69
68. Beyond the scope of this Article, but equally powerful and equally representative of the
solidarity/defense conflict, has been labor's relationship with African-American workers. For
explorations of this long and complex history from a variety of perspectives, see, for example,
MICHAEL K. HONEY, SOUTHERN LABOR AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS: ORGANIZING MEMPHIS WORKERS
(1993); RUTH NEEDLEMAN, BLACK FREEDOM FIGHTERS IN STEEL: THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRATIC
UNIONISM (2003); BRUCE NELSON, DIVIDED WE STAND: AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR BLACK EQUALITY (2001); Colin J. Davis, Shape or Fight?: New York's Black Longshoremen,
1945-1961, 62 INT'L LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 143 (2002); Alex Lichtenstein, The CIO in Black
and White, 82 RADICAL HIST. REV. 203 (2002) (reviewing NELSON, supra); BAYARD RUSTIN, The
Blacks and the Unions, HARPER'S MAG., May 1971, reprinted in DOWN THE LINE: THE COLLECTED
WRITINGS OF BAYARD RUSTIN 335 (1971); supra note 37 (listing sources that discuss labor's
relationship with African-American workers).
69. For accounts of this tension in a variety of contexts, see KAZIN, supra note 36, at 145-47
(describing appeals to members' racial fears and hatred by union leaders in San Francisco in the
Progressive Era); ANTHONY T. LANE, SOLIDARITY OR SURVIVAL? AMERICAN LABOR AND EUROPEAN
IMMIGRANTS, 1830-1924 (1987) (describing obstacles for immigrants within the emerging U.S. labor
movement as a whole); Bruce Nissen & Guillermo Grenier, Local Union Relations with Immigrants:
The Case of South Florida, 26 LAB. STUD. J. 76 (2001) (discussing union relationships with immigrants
in contemporary Miami).
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As this illustrates, labor citizenship as crafted by U.S. unions is not
merely a metaphor that draws on parallels with nation-state citizenship but
a concept in dynamic interaction with citizenship at the state level. Before
proceeding to explore the pendulum swings of this relationship, it is worth
pausing to note that the topic of the relationship of citizenship-as-
nationality to citizenship in the workplace has received surprisingly little
scholarly attention. As Bosniak has pointed out, historians, political
theorists, and law professors deploying the term "citizenship" to describe
aspects of work have long played on the word's evocation of democratic
participation and equal rights while ignoring its relationship to immigration
status.70 Marshall's work, described above, and that of other scholars such
as William Forbath, Kenneth Karst, and Judith Kessler-Harris, who have
built on Marshall's notion of economic citizenship, have made critical
contributions to our understanding of the role of work in the context of
other aspects of the citizenship framework. As Bosniak observes, however,
this work-as-citizenship discourse operates as if in an insulated sphere from
the nationality-as-citizenship discourse, which permits such scholars "to
avoid addressing the fact that the national community within which
universal citizenship is championed is a community that is constituted by
boundaries that keep nonmembers out," and to avoid asking the critical
questions about the extent to which "achievement of economic justice-or
economic citizenship-within the national society [is] contingent upon
such restriction., 71
In fact, however, as the next two sections illustrate, the two forms of
citizenship are inextricably interrelated. With regard to citizenship as
political participation, over the course of U.S. history active labor
citizenship has consistently produced and enriched political participation in
the community, state, and national arenas. With regard to citizenship as
status, labor citizenship has long relied on the nation-state's limits on
immigration as a sort of front-line defense for its own efforts to reduce
competition. In that setting, the interactions between labor and nation-state
citizenship have brought the recurring tensions between labor citizenship's
twin pillars of solidarity and defense to the fore.
70. BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN, supra note 29, at 114; Linda Bosniak, Citizenship
and Work, 27 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 497,503 (2002).
71. BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN, supra note 29, at 114.
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A. LABOR CITIZENSHIP: CRADLE FOR NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP
Across the breadth of U.S. history, unions and labor citizenship have
produced strong participants in the political sphere as well as the
workplace. As Bruce Watson describes the Lawrence, Massachusetts,
millworkers strike of 1912,
People from all over the globe, having packed their belongings and come
to America, found themselves on the nation's bottom rung. They bore
their burden well for a while, and then rose up. Once merely workers,
they became citizens-in name or only in spirit-demanding a living
wage and a little respect. 72
The same could be said of generation after generation of newcomers who
have entered labor struggles and there been exposed to, and come to
participate in, citizenship in both the economic and the political spheres.
Some unions literally "make citizens," in the sense of assisting
immigrant members to naturalize. The International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union ("ILGWU"), true to its immigrant roots, was one of the
most active in this regard. In the early 1900s, it forged a close alliance with
Jane Addams and Hull House, the pioneering Chicago immigrant
settlement house, which saw supporting the growth of "strong citizens"
among its Italian, Russian, and Polish immigrant members as its primary
goal.73 In 1986, when Congress created an immigrant amnesty program, the
ILGWU founded its Immigration Project to help as many of its members as
possible move from undocumented status toward citizenship.7 4 Other
unions also began offering classes and legal support to members who
wanted to take advantage of the amnesty provision.75 In 1995, Teamsters
Local 890 launched a particularly ambitious Citizenship Project among
72. BRUCE WATSON, BREAD AND ROSES: MILLS, MIGRANTS, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE
AMERICAN DREAM 3 (2005). See also Clayton Sinyai, Unions and Immigrants: No Longer Enemies,
COMMONWEAL, Aug. 11, 2006, at 9 (quoting Samuel Gompers, AFL President from 1886-1924 (except
in 1895), describing the outcome of a 1902 coal mine strike involving many immigrants, as saying:
"from then on the miners became not merely human machines to produce coal but men and citizens,
taking their place.., abreast of all the people not only of their communities but of the republic").
73. For a discussion of the relationship among the ILGWU, Jane Addams, and the Hull House,
see JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE DREAM 35-36
(2006).
74. UNITE HERE!, Our History, http://www.unitehere.org/about/historyunite.php (last visited
Mar. 11, 2007). The ILGWU (by then UNITE!) Immigration Project was discontinued in 2005.
75. Labor's Outreach Efforts Fill a Need-Illegal Aliens and Amnesty Under Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, AFL-CIO AMERICAN FEDERATIONIST, Jan. 17, 1987, available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-ml 009/isv94/ai_4655455.
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Mexican workers in Salinas, California.76 All of these projects help
immigrant workers achieve citizenship "in name," or legal status.
Labor citizenship, though, has historically sought to move workers
beyond legal immigration status onto the path of active participation. 77 One
aspect of the formal exercise of citizenship is, of course, voting. Here the
link between labor citizenship and the exercise of political citizenship is not
limited to immigrant workers.78 Some unions go to great lengths to instill a
sense of commitment to voting in all of their members. The United Auto
Workers ("UAW") Constitution, in general distinguished by its length, lists
only three brief duties for UAW members. 79 The first two relate to
upholding union solidarity under all circumstances. 80 The third is "the duty
of each member to participate in all local, state, provincial and federal
elections through registration and balloting." 8 1 Unions that promote voting
succeed in moving their members to do so. Empirical studies have
confirmed a significantly higher rate of voter participation among active
union members compared to the unorganized population. 82
76. Paul Johnston, who founded and directs the project, has also documented its work over time.
Paul Johnston, Organising Citizenship at Local 890's Citizenship Project: Unleashing Innovation
Through an Affiliate Organisation, 14 DEV. PRAC. 85 (2004). Much of Johnston's writing is available
on the Internet at PublicActions, http://www.newcitizen.org/PublicActions.htm (last visited Feb. 2,
2007). See also Fitzgerald, supra note 7, at 235-37 (describing efforts of a local union in South City,
California, to promote citizenship among its members).
77. See, e.g., Evelyn Savidge Sterne, Beyond the Boss: Immigration and American Political
Culture from 1880 to 1940, in E PLURIBUS UNUM? CONTEMPORARY AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON IMMIGRANT POLITICAL INCORPORATION 33, 43-50 (Gary Gerstle & John Mollenkopf eds., 2001)
(arguing for the importance of unions among other civic and religious associations to the political
incorporation of immigrants). Paul Johnston, Rethinking Cross-border Employment in Overlapping
Societies: A Citizenship Movement Agenda, in FORUM FOR TRANSNATIONAL EMPLOYMENT 62, 65
(Amber L6pez ed., 2001) (stating that "a great body of historical research on the emergence of
citizenship has shown that labor movements among workers who are excluded from basic citizenship
rights have been and remain today among the most important forces in history for the expansion of
citizenship in all these domains").
78. "Evidence shows that participation in organizations in general and unions in particular
increase [sic] political efficacy, sophistication, and interest." Benjamin Radcliff, Organized Labor and
Electoral Participation in American National Elections, 22 J. LAB. RES. 405, 406 (2001) (internal
citations omitted).
79. UAW Constitution, supra note 62, art. 41, § 3.
80. Id.
81. Id. See also SEIU, 2000 Constitution and Bylaws art. XV, § 15, http://www.seiu7.org/
appResources/scdocs/SEIUConstitutionin english.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2007) ("The Executive
Board of each Local Union shall appoint a Committee on Political Education to assist such Executive
Board in carrying out a program for sound political education and political action and encouraging its
members and their families to register and vote.").
82. Radcliff, supra note 78, at 409-11 (concluding that "[u]nions play a major role in
determining the extent of citizen participation"); Roland Zullo, Labor Council Outreach and Union
Member Voter Turnout: A Microanalysis from the 2000 Election, 43 INDUS. REL. 324, 327 (2004)
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Beyond voting, unions also provide their members with opportunities
for other forms of political participation.8 3 In the case of immigrants, this
experience may come long before formal citizenship status does. In the past
decade, for example, numerous unions and worker centers have worked
with noncitizen members to create political change through electoral and
legislative campaigns in which noncitizens were as or more active than
their citizen counterparts. 84 In all of these ways, labor citizenship becomes
a conduit to the attainment of citizenship in the national sense, both on the
level of immigration status and in terms of full political participation.
B. LABOR CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP: THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN SOLIDARITY AND DEFENSE
One logical relationship between nation-state citizenship and labor
citizenship might be a straightforward one: immigration status dictates who
can take a job and therefore who can join a union. In this view, because
undocumented immigrants are forbidden to work, the question of whether
they can become union members is one step beyond moot. This equation
would be feasible in a country with secure borders, where the aspirations
set out in immigration law were reflected in the actual population. But we
are no longer such a nation, if we ever were one. 85 By 2005, more
(emphasizing the relationship between active union membership and political participation, and arguing
that membership in inactive labor organizations is insufficient to generate an increase in political
participation).
83. For a discussion of the labor movement's long history of engaging workers in political
action, see CLAYTON SINYAI, SCHOOLS OF DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
LABOR MOVEMENT (2006).
84. GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS, supra note 3, at 241-49 (discussing political
participation of immigrants in a campaign to change New York State wage payment laws); Paul
Johnston, Transnational Citizenries: Reflections from the Field in California, 7 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 199,
204-07 (2003); Monica W. Varsanyi, The Paradox of Contemporary Immigrant Political Participation:
Organized Labor, Undocumented Migrants, and Electoral Participation in Los Angeles, 37 ANTIPODE
775, 783-85 (2005). The New York Civic Participation Project, an organization founded by three New
York City local unions, a community organization and the National Employment Law Project, involves
working-class immigrants in local efforts to make change through the political process. New York Civic
Participation Project, http://www.nycpp.org (last visited Mar. 11, 2007). The founding partners were
SEIU Local 32 BJ, AFSCME/DC 37, UNITE-Here Local 100, Make the Road by Walking, and the
National Employment Law Project. But see Fox, supra note 6, at 176 (concluding that "acting like a
citizen is not the same as being a citizen").
85. Contrary to the popular perception, undocumented immigration is not a new phenomenon. As
long as the United States has placed any requirements or restrictions on those who could immigrate
(that is, beginning roughly in the last quarter of the nineteenth century), there have been would-be
migrants who sought to evade inspection by government officials and enter the country illegally. Many
of these were people of European and Chinese origin, who made their way to the Mexican or Canadian
borders and slipped in undetected. For a fascinating and meticulously researched history of the "illegal
alien" in the United States, see NGAI, supra note 12.
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immigrants entered the United States illegally than came in through legal
channels. 86 They joined an undocumented population now numbering
nearly 12 million. 87 Their growing presence is evident in the workplace.
According to the best recent estimates, undocumented immigrants make up
nearly five percent of the U.S. labor force. 88 In some sectors their presence
is much stronger. A fifth of all cooks, a quarter of all construction workers,
and a third to a half of the agricultural workers in this country are
undocumented. 89
The relationship between labor citizenship and nation-state citizenship
is thus considerably more complicated than the logical equation suggests.
As the presence of undocumented immigrants in the workplace has grown
steadily despite decades of both harsh and lenient immigration policies,
unions have faced an increasingly difficult series of choices that have
thrown the tension between labor citizenship's exclusive and inclusive
strands into sharp relief.
In a situation of effective border control, where national immigration
policy is deployed at a country's boundary to exclude would-be migrants
before they get to the workplace, unions feel little tension between the
solidarity and defense imperatives of labor citizenship in relation to
immigrants. The logic of both poles seems to be consistent: keep the
outsiders out so the insiders can stand together with less fear of being
undermined. This sense of compatibility is greatly facilitated because, for
most unions, the two functions are taking place far away from each other.
When unions do not encounter immigrants already in the workplace or
labor market (because they have been excluded at the country's border),
solidarity and defense have no conflict. Spatial separation of the functions
creates the sense that the goals of preserving nation-state citizenship and
building labor citizenship are separate but aligned. That this "ideal" has
rarely been achieved-and that even when it has, many other workers, such
as African-Americans and women, have been physically present yet
86. PASSEL & SURO, supra note 1, at iii.
87. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT
POPULATION IN THE U.S. 1 (2006).
88. Id. at9.
89. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS SURVEY
(NAWS) 2001-2002: A DEMOGRAPHIC AND EMPLOYMENT PROFILE OF UNITED STATES
FARMWORKERS 7 (2005), available at http://www.doleta.gov/agworker/report9/nawsrpt9.pdf
[hereinafter DOL NAWS SURVEY]; Eduardo Porter, Here Illegally, Working Hard and Paying Taxes,
N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2006, at Al.
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excluded from labor citizenship,90 reigniting the defense dynamic-has not
kept labor from striving for it repeatedly.
Even when that strategy was successful, however, labor's defensive
urge did not completely dictate its policy toward immigrants.
Simultaneously, in the interests of solidarity, a number of unions sought to
organize those immigrants already in the workplace. 9' This accommodation
between defense and inclusiveness ceased to function well beginning in the
1970s, as the borders of the United States became increasingly porous. In
such a setting, the desire to defend the borders of labor citizenship led
unions to advocate for moving border control into the workplace. But once
employers had been deputized as immigration agents through employer
sanctions, as described below, labor's capacity to establish solidarity was
imperiled. Unions then sought to reconstitute the possibility of solidarity by
opening their doors to new immigrants. And yet the wider the welcome, the
more urgent the anxiety became in some segments of the labor movement
about increasing competition from immigrants yet to come.
1. In Search of a Compromise Between Solidarity and Defense
Unions seek to minimize competition for jobs. Labor citizenship is
easier to establish and leverage into better working conditions where legal
immigration status is hard to obtain, so long as the borders are secure.
Limit immigration to limit competition: it is this equation that drove labor's
pursuit of restrictions on immigrant admissions to the United States for
over a century.
90. It is worth reiterating here that only craft unions make a choice individually about which
workers to exclude from membership. As I note above, industrial unions represent whomever the
unionized employer hires. Therefore, an industrial union could only "decide" to exclude black workers,
women, or some other group from membership by avoiding organizing in the industries where those
workers labor. Once the employer hires such workers into unionized positions, they are immediately
brought within the union's ambit. How attentively the union addresses those workers' needs is a
different question. Technically, a union is bound by the "duty of fair representation" to represent the
interests of all workers in the unit in a way that is not "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). See also Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204
(1944) (imposing the duty under the Railway Labor Act). Duty of fair representation claims are,
however, notoriously hard to win, and as discrimination became more subtle, would-be plaintiffs
increasingly found themselves in the position where "[t]he Union's response to its members' complaints
was enough to discharge its duty of fair representation, yet not enough to satisfy their demands." Reuel
E. Schiller, The Emporium Capwell Case: Race, Labor Law, and the Crisis of Post-war Liberalism, 25
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 129, 144 (2004).
91. See, e.g., HECTOR L. DELGADO, NEW IMMIGRANTS, OLD UNIONS: ORGANIZING
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN Los ANGELES (1993) (describing an organizing effort among
undocumented workers in a waterbed factory in the early 1980s).
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a. Defending Labor Citizenship Through Immigration Control at the
Border
From the 1870s, when serious talk of national immigration control
first began, roughly until the 1970s, the mainstream labor movement
answered the question of what the ideal immigration policy might be from
the point of view of sustaining labor citizenship with little equivocation.
The less immigration, the better.
The labor movement's efforts to restrict immigration from the 1870s
through the 1920s have been amply detailed elsewhere. 92 In brief, the
Knights of Labor and later the AFL endorsed a series of restrictive
immigration measures during the golden era of immigration in the decades
before and after the turn of the twentieth century, and saw a number of
them passed into law. In no small part through labor's efforts, the once
open U.S. immigration scheme came to include a prohibition of contract
labor;93 bans on the immigration of specific ethnic groups, such as the
Chinese; 94 literacy requirements, widely understood as a stab at Southern
and Eastern European immigrants and as a proxy for weeding out unskilled
laborers; 95  and, eventually, restrictive numerical quotas for all
immigrants. 96
There were always dissenters. Militant unions such as the Industrial
Workers of the World ("IWW" or the "Wobblies") saw both prospective
immigration and the organizing of immigrants already present as
emblematic of its drive to unite the working class world-wide. 97
92. Readers interested in this history should see VERNON M. BRIGGS, JR., IMMIGRATION AND
AMERICAN UNIONISM (2001); KITTY CALAVITA, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE CONTROL OF
LABOR: 1820-1924 (1984); LANE, supra note 69; ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE INDISPENSABLE ENEMY:
LABOR AND THE ANTI-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA (1971).
93. The Alien Contract Law of 1885, which both the Knights of Labor and the AFL favored,
prohibited employers from contracting to bring foreign workers into the country. Alien Contract Labor
Law, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332 (1885) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1552 (1952)).
94. The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, strongly supported by the Knights, barred new Chinese
immigrants from entering the United States and prevented those already inside the country from
becoming citizens. SAXTON, supra note 92, at 177-80.
95. The AFL endorsed a literacy test as a precondition for immigration in 1897. CALAVITA,
supra note 92, at 111; LANE, supra note 69, at 95-113. It was finally enacted by Congress in 1917. In
1891, the Knights defunct, the AFL passed an internal resolution calling for a halt to all immigration.
LANE, supra note 69, at 75-92.
96. Numerical quotas on immigration entered into effect for the first time in the nation's history
in 1921, in the wake of World War I. NGAI, supra note 12, at 20.
97. The IWW wholeheartedly rejected the nativist position of the AFL, which it mocked as the
"American Separation of Labor." CALAVITA, supra note 92, at 101-02. For a discussion of the IWW,
see generally PHILIP S. FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, VOL. IV:
THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD, 1905-1917 (2d ed. 1973).
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Particularly interesting for the purposes of this Article is the approach of
unions such as the Knights of Labor, which opposed prospective
immigration but looked favorably on immigrants already present, because
it illustrates the recurring bargain unions have struck to balance the
imperative to organize everyone within the worksite while limiting those
who competed for those jobs.98 Despite a number of unions' considerable
engagement with the existing population of immigrants, however, and
98. LANE, supra note 69, at 57-72. Some AFL locals also organized among European
immigrants already in the country, and their staff and rank-and-file members had begun to recognize
immigrants' potential as union supporters as early as the late 1800s. In the words of one delegate to the
1897 AFL convention, the AFL was guilty of ignoring the fact that "the best trade unionists were the
foreigners." PHILIP S. FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, VOL. II:
FROM THE FOUNDING OF THE AFL TO THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN IMPERIALISM 363 (2d ed. 1975).
It is not uncommon for groups to take a restrictionist position vis-A-vis future immigration while
advocating on behalf of newcomers already on the ground. Such organizations fit within the
"Nationalist Egalitarian" quadrant of political scientist Daniel Tichenor's useful model of immigration
politics in the United States. DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION
CONTROL IN AMERICA 36-37 (2002). Groups that oppose new immigration often make the distinction
between "anti-immigration" positions (advocating increased limits on the flow of newcomers) and"anti-immigrant" ones (opposing immigrants themselves, the implication being that the opposition
derives from racism and other forms of animus). Tom Barry, Immigration Debate: Politics, Ideologies
of Anti-immigration Forces, AMS. UPDATER (Int'l Rel. Ctr., Americas Program), June 17, 2005,
available at http://www.americaspolicy.org/reports/2005/0506ideologies.html ("The [immigration]
debate [in the United States] divides sharply into two sides. On one side stand those who believe that
immigration flows should be dramatically restricted. Commonly described as being anti-immigrant,
these groups object to the negative label, saying that they oppose uncontrolled immigration, not
immigrants themselves."). Some have further argued that efforts to restrict immigration are in the best
interests of immigrant groups already within the country. Mark Krikorian, A Stern Face and a Warm
Welcome: What to Do About Immigration Policy and Immigrant Policy-Two Different Things, NAT'L
REV., Oct. 27, 2003 ("Thus the answer: a meta-policy that combines low immigration and no-nonsense
enforcement with an enthusiastic embrace of lawfully admitted newcomers. In other words, a pro-
immigrant policy of low immigration-fewer immigrants but a warmer welcome.").
Historically, those unions that excluded particular groups of workers argued that their decisions
were motivated not by racism or anti-immigrant sentiment but by the need to limit supply. See, e.g.,
Herman D. Bloch, Craft Unions and the Negro in Historical Perspective, 43 J. NEGRO HIST. 10, 10
(1958) ("[W]hite workers discriminated against Negro employment .... They justified their position by
emphasizing the scarcity of work. Race prejudice, they declared, was not the issue; in other words,
industrialization and not trade unionism produced discrimination.").
The distinction has proven as difficult to sustain in the immigration context as it was with race.
This is particularly so where unions with "anti-immigration" policies express them through actions
targeting immigrant workers. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 42 (quoting James Hadel, vice president of
the United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers and Allied Workers, recalling that fifteen years ago, the
union was "' looking at the Hispanic workers as our enemy,"' and noting that at the time the union was"videotaping Hispanic immigrants on construction sites in Kansas City, with the aim of getting them
deported"). Unions that actively seek to organize current immigrants, but support restrictionist policies
for those yet to come, risk having their position read as xenophobic or racist, however firmly they
maintain it is rooted in concerns about supply. Also, as I recount below, the anti-immigration policies
labor pursued eventually put even the most pro-immigrant unions in a position where they were unable
to establish solidarity with immigrants already in the workplaces they sought to organize.
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despite dissent on the national level from radical unions, the public face of
the mainstream labor movement was unequivocally opposed to new
immigration during this period.
Following the restrictions on immigration put into place in 1921 and
1924, immigration dropped, and the numbers of newcomers fell sharply
again during the Depression. 99 With this, the AFL's concern about
immigration receded. 100 The CIO emerged during this period and thus was
not immediately forced to face the question of what position to take on
future immigration. Consistent with the spirit of inclusiveness embodied in
its model of industrial unionism, the CIO affirmatively sought to build
solidarity among immigrants already present, African-Americans, and the
white working class.' 01 Immigration reappeared briefly on labor's radar in
the 1950s, in the context of the Cold War, but the Cold War immigration
debate was more of a blip on labor's screen than an enduring concern. 10 2
From the perspective of the labor movement, the lull was a period of
success for its strategy of defending its workplace gains from competition
by drawing on nation-state immigration control. 10 3 With the exception of
agriculture, to which I turn now, immigration was not a major issue for the
labor movement from the 1930s through the mid-1960s.
While most unions in the labor movement in mid-century operated in
northern cities, and thus experienced border defense as spatially separate
from the workplace, agricultural worker organizing efforts in border states,
whose members were largely Mexican-Americans, had a different
perspective. As former farm worker and United Farm Workers ("UFW")
organizer Roberto de la Cruz recalls,
The problem is that in the rural areas, especially in California and
Arizona and Texas, all of which border Mexico, it's real easy to bring
99. See BRIGGS, supra note 92, at 96.
100. ld. at 81-123.
101. LIZABETH COHEN, MAKING A NEW DEAL: INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN CHICAGO, 1919-1939,
at 333, 337-39 (1990). "The chasms that CIO unions devoted themselves most intensively to closing
separated workers of different races and ethnicities." Id. at 333.
102. Although George Meany, president of the newly merged AFL-CIO, spoke in the mid-1950s
in favor of a "reasonable" level of immigration as a way to "combat world communism," the
Federation's ideological commitments were overshadowed by its fear of increased competition. Any
more than 25,000 visas to working migrants, an AFL-CIO representative testified to Congress at the
time, would raise the risk of "a tidal wave of immigration" that would pose a threat to U.S. workers and
working conditions. NGAI, supra note 12, at 243, 250, 252.
103. The lull in immigration from 1924-1965 was an important time for the integration of white
immigrants into American society (or, as some would argue, for ethnic immigrants to "become white").
For the argument that labor's success was closely linked to the lower levels of immigration, see
BRIGGS, supra note 92, at 81-82.
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people in from Mexico to break the strike. We'd convince the
strikebreakers not to [work] ... and as soon as we had, they'd bring
thousands more, and we would have to convince them too. But once that
group would stop working, the growers and the immigration would just
bring in a whole other group of immigrants. 10 4
As a result of this proximity, while most of the AFL-CIO's attacks on
the undocumented took place in the higher echelons of federal
policymaking, farm labor unions' battles with undocumented migrants
more often resembled hand-to-hand combat. In the late 1940s and early
1950s, for example, historian Mae Ngai has described the efforts of the
National Agricultural Workers Union of the AFL to fight undocumented
immigration, including picket-lines on the border and "citizen's arrests" of
alleged illegal aliens. 105 Unions supported "Operation Wetback," a series of
raids in 1954 that resulted in the deportation of over 1 million migrants.0 6
More than a decade later, the UFW-otherwise known for its social
movement orientation and emphasis on pride in Mexican identity-
continued this tradition. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the UFW used
every means at its disposal to get undocumented migrants out of the fields.
It reported workers to the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")
and demanded that the agency arrest and deport them.10 7 When repeated
and detailed communications with the border patrol on the whereabouts of
immigrants, pickets of the border patrol office, 10 8 and demands that the INS
raid labor camps as well as the fields did not generate the results the UFW
sought, the union set up a "private border patrol" near the San Luis border
104. Interview by Anamaria de la Cruz with Roberto de la Cruz, n.p. (n.d.), available at
http://www.farmworkermovement.org/essays/essays/109%2De%2OLa%2OCruzRoberto.pdf (last
visited Mar. 11, 2007).
105. NGAI, supra note 12, at 161.
106. Gonzalo Santos, Modern Human Migration and the History of "Immigration Problems" in
California, in CALIFORNIA'S SOCIAL PROBLEMS 154, 154-85 (Charles F. Hohm ed., 1997); CALAVITA,
supra note 12, at app. A. See also NGAI, supra note 12, at 60 (noting the Texas CIO's Latin American
Committee's support of the INS's actions during Operation Wetback, and also its opposition to some of
the methods used-such as bloodhounds-and to future plans to militarize the border).
107. United Farm Workers of America: Illegal Alien Farm Labor Activity in California and
Arizona (unpublished report, found in the Jacques E. Levy Research Collection on Cesar Chavez, Yale
Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Box 21, Folder 444;
Box 29, Folder 568). The UFW's mimeographed report recounts its efforts to spur the INS to action in
great detail. ("A total of 300 illegal aliens living at 3089 S. Del Rey, Sanger, California .... This
information was turned over to the Fresno County Border Patrol Office.... Four follow-up phone calls
were made to the patrol during the next three months. Out of 300 illegals, the border patrol arrested
four ...").
108. See Interview by Anamaria de la Cruz with Jessie de la Cruz, in Fresno, Cal. (Nov. 29-30,
2003), available at http://www.farmworkermovement.org/essays/essays/010%20De%2OLa%20Cruz_
Jessie.pdf.
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checkpoint. ° 9 The idea, at least originally, was to persuade potential
strikebreakers of their folly. Failing that, the union called in INS border
agents to return them to Mexico. 110
b. Moving the Border to the Workplace: Defense and Solidarity in
Tension
Since the 1960s, the United States has been in a period of increasing
immigration, both legal and undocumented. After the passage of the
Immigration Act of 1965 triggered a massive wave of legal immigration
from Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia, unions found themselves
back in the middle of the fray. The number of legal immigrants admitted
without regard to the country's employment needs rose sharply. Even more
precipitous was the surge in undocumented immigration beginning in the
1960s and 1970s. 111 The best available estimates indicate that the number
of undocumented immigrants in the United States had already reached 3.3
109. SUSAN FERRISS & RICARDO SANDOVAL, THE FIGHT IN THE FIELDS: CESAR CHAVEZ AND THE
FARMWORKERS MOVEMENT 244 (1997); Jeff Coplon, Cesar Chavez's Fall from Grace, Part II,
VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 21, 1984, at 18, 20.
110. Even within the union, there was ambivalence about this policy. See Memoir of Alfredo
Acosta Figueroa 1965-1979, at 29-30, available at http://www.farmworkermovement.org/essays/
essays/021%2OFigueroaAlfredo.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2007) (discussing his "differences with the
policies and direction that the UFW was taking" in asking its field offices to report undocumented
immigrants to the INS); Posting of Deborah Vollmer to the Documentation Project,
http://www.farmworkermovement.org/disc/May[l][2].pdf (May 9, 2004) (describing her deceased
husband, former UFW organizer Philip Vera Cruz's "differences with Cesar [Chavez] on the issue of
how undocumented farm workers should be treated"); Posting of Tom Dalzell to the Documentation
Project, http://www.farmworkermovement.org/disc/May[1][2].pdf (May 22, 2004) ("I remember
vigorous opposition within the Union to the anti-illegals campaign of 1973-1974 .... ").
Outside the union, and particularly in the urban Chicano movement, the UFW attacks on the
undocumented were widely denounced. MARIO T. GARCIA, MEMORIES OF CHICANO HISTORY: THE
LIFE AND NARRATIVE OF BERT CORONA 249 (1994). See also Ralph Abascal, Former California Rural
Legal Assistance ("CRLA") Lead Attorney, Class Discussion, Stanford Law School, Professor Michael
Wald's Class (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter Abascal Transcript]. But the UFW was driven
by a very practical concern that undocumented immigrants would undermine its capacity to strike for
higher wages. Chavez's response to objections was characteristically direct: "if somebody's busting our
picket line, the hell with them." Interview with Jerry Cohen, Former General Counsel, UFW, in Carmel,
Cal. (July 22, 1999). This is labor citizenship in pure defense mode.
UFW organizer Richard Ybarra makes the important point that undocumented immigrants who
supported the UFW were welcomed as members. The core issue was strikebreaking rather than
immigration status. Posting of Richard Ybarra to the Documentation Project, http://www.farmworker
movement.org/disc/June[ I ][2].pdf (June 27, 2004).
111. BRIGGS, supra note 92, at 141-43; DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, JORGE DURAND & NOLAN J.
MALONE, BEYOND SMOKE & MIRRORS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION 41-47 (2002); NGAI, supra note 12, at 265-66. See also PHILIP MARTIN, PROMISE
UNFULFILLED: UNIONS, IMMIGRATION, AND THE FARM WORKERS 180-96 (2003) (discussing the
upsurge in Mexican undocumented migration in the 1980s).
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million by 1980, and rose from there to 5 million in 1996, 8 million in
2000, and an estimated 11.5 to 12 million today.112
With attempts to stop immigration at the border in disarray and
undocumented immigrants increasingly being hired to fill low-wage jobs,
unions faced a difficult dilemma. The core tension of labor citizenship that
I set forth in Part II-the need for solidarity with immigrants once they are
present in the workplace pulling against the need to limit competition from
them-came to the fore. Beginning in the 1970s, labor's reaction to
immigration had a schizophrenic quality as it responded to both of these
impulses simultaneously and found it could succeed in achieving neither of
them. On the ground, many local unions found themselves facing
workplaces full of new immigrants, many of them undocumented. Some of
them actively engaged in the struggle to organize those workers and, in the
process, transformed into much more pro-immigrant organizations. 113 At
the same time, however, as a defensive measure, almost every international
union (the parents of these locals), and the AFL-CIO as a whole, continued
to advocate for policies that would remove undocumented immigrants from
the labor market. The policies that resulted made the locals' efforts to build
solidarity with immigrants much more difficult.
i. Employer Sanctions
During this time, labor argued that if the country could not stop low-
wage immigrant competition at its borders, it would have to find ways to
do so at the doors of the workplace. The UFW led the charge, winning a
1971 California law creating the first employer sanctions program
imposing penalties on employers for hiring undocumented workers." 14
112. PASSEL, supra note 87, at i.
113. For case studies of unions in transition, see Nissen & Grenier, supra note 69 (describing the
changing attitudes of four Miami union locals toward immigrants); David Kieffer & Immanuel Ness,
Organizing Immigrant Workers in New York City: The LIUNA Asbestos Removal Workers Campaign,
24 LAB. STUD. J. 12 (1999) (describing the transformation of a Laborers Union local in New York City
with regard to its approach to immigrant workers).
114. Kitty Calavita, California's "Employer Sanctions" Legislation: Now You See It, Now You
Don't, 12 POL. & Soc'Y 205 (1983). The idea of sanctions had been discussed in labor circles for over
fifteen years prior to its first success. In the late 1960's, the UFW asked CRLA to provide legal support
for its efforts to address the problem of undocumented immigration. Abascal Transcript, supra note
110, at 4-6. Part of that legal strategy, which CRLA spearheaded, was a campaign for an employer
sanctions bill in California. Id. The law was passed in 1971, but never enforced. Calavita, supra, at
205-06. The current UFW is deeply ambivalent about this aspect of its history and has at times sought
to minimize or even deny it. For example, in 2004, the UFW president, Arturo Rodriguez, stated:
"Since the early 1970s, the UFW was one of the first unions opposing sanctions on employers and
embracing a process to 'legalize' undocumented farm workers." Arturo S. Rodriguez, Online Guest
Editorial, Congress Should Pass the AgJobs Bill-Now, OREGONIAN, May 3, 2004, http://www.joehill
dispatch.org/laborwire/archives/2004-05.php. Nonetheless, the UFW lobbied for national employer
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Beginning in the 1970s, the AFL-CIO called for Congress to draft similar
legislation." 5 In 1986, with the passage of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act, unions saw their lobbying efforts transformed into a new
federal employer sanctions program, which imposed fines and eventual
criminal penalties on employers who failed to comply with the law's
documentation requirements.116
From the AFL-CIO's perspective, employer sanctions were an attempt
to make labor citizenship easier to establish and maintain by limiting
competition from undocumented workers at the moment the employer hired
its workforce. If employers were penalized for hiring the undocumented,
the reasoning went, they would turn to legal workers instead. But once the
locus of labor's battle to reduce competition from immigrants shifted from
the border to the workplace, the interaction between the two sorts of
citizenship proved much more detrimental than unions had predicted.
Sanctions complicated the legal landscape of the workplace." 7 After
the passage of employer sanctions, undocumented immigrants were
forbidden from working in the United States. Hiring people not authorized
to work could subject an employer to fines and, eventually, criminal
prosecution."18 The immigrants themselves faced not only deportation and
additional civil and criminal penalties if their initial entry was illegal, but
sanctions legislation in the early 1980s. See, e.g., Chronology: Cesar Chavez and the UFW,
BAKERSFIELD CALIFORNIAN, May 8, 2004, at A8 (stating that in "1981-UFW testifies in favor of
employer sanctions to discourage illegal immigration").
The idea of employer sanctions as a local (rather than state or federal) policy has emerged
recently as a part of the resurgent anti-immigrant sentiment in municipalities across the country. In
2006 in Suffolk County, New York, for example, County Executive Steve Levy proposed a law that
would require all companies doing business with the county to certify that all of their employees were
legally authorized to work. James T. Madore, Pols Ponder Immigrant Law, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Aug. 24,
2006, at A48.
115. The first federal employer sanctions bill was sponsored in 1973 by U.S. Congressman Peter
Rodino. Peter Brownell, The Declining Enforcement of Employer Sanctions, MIGRATION INFO.
SOURCE, Sept. 2005, available at http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=332.
116. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1985: Hearing on S. 1200 Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 99th Cong. 422-36 (1985) (statement of Thomas R.
Donahue, Secretary-Treasurer, AFL-CIO). Employer sanctions are codified in the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2000).
117. See Linda Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented
Worker Under United States Law, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 955 (discussing sanctions' history and their
impact); Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World: Going Beyond the Dichotomies
of Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 737 (2003) (same); Lori A.
Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for
Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345 (2001) (same); Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for
Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 497 (2004) (same).
118. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a). This is true whether they crossed the border surreptitiously or entered
legally on visas that then expired.
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also potential prosecution for presenting false documents to obtain work."l9
But these new rules were laid on top of a preexisting web of agency
regulations and court holdings explicitly including undocumented workers
under the coverage of most workplace protective laws. In an attempt to
protect legal U.S. workers from the job competition that results when
employers are tempted to hire undocumented workers in order to avoid the
expense of complying with basic workplace statutes, Congress, the courts,
and other authorities had generally covered the undocumented under the
federal minimum wage set by the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), the
worker safety protections established by the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, and, in most circuits, antidiscrimination laws as well. 120 It had
also unequivocally been held that undocumented workers were"employees" within the definition of the NLRA. 12 1 In passing sanctions,
Congress recognized the importance of this coverage, and to a great extent
it survives to this day. 22 Thus, it is fair to say that after sanctions passed,
119. Id. §1324(c).
120. The Fourth Circuit is the exception regarding Title VII. See Egbuna v. Time Life Libraries,
Inc., 153 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 1998). Workers' compensation for on-the-job injuries suffered by
undocumented immigrants is limited in a few states and under dispute in others, although most states
still guarantee coverage to the undocumented. For a recent case upholding the right, see the California
Court of Appeal's decision in Farmers Bros. Coffee v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 35 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 23 (Cal. App. 2005). For a case limiting some elements of the right, see the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's holding in Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board, 810 A. 2d
99 (Pa. 2002). For an overview of the state of the law in this regard, see John Annarino, Doug Hayden
& Pete Mihaly, Illegal Aliens and Workers Compensation, NEWSL. (American Association of State
Compensation Insurance Funds, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 2006, available at http://www.aascif.org/
public/jan feb mar06/alien.htm. Despite widespread coverage on the books, the undocumented are
often unable to gain compensation for on-the-job injuries. Liz Chandler, Illegal Immigrants Frequently
Denied Compensation, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (D.C. Bureau), Sept. 15, 2006, available at
http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/15527454.htm.
Undocumented workers are ineligible for unemployment insurance, as their lack of legal status
renders them unable to meet the requirement that recipients be "ready, willing and able" to accept
another job. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 591(2) (Consol. 2006) ("[N]o benefits shall be payable to any
claimant.., who is not ready, willing and able to work .... "). See Zapata v. Levine, 375 N.Y.S.2d 424
(App. Div. 1975) (reasoning that immigrants without valid work permission are unable to meet the
"available for employment" requirement because they are "legally barred from working").
121. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984).
122. IRCA's legislative history states:
It is not the intention of the Committee that the employer sanctions provisions of the bill be
used to undermine or diminish in any way labor protections in existing law, or to limit the
powers of federal or state labor relations boards, labor standards agencies, or labor arbitrators
to remedy unfair practices committed against undocumented employees for exercising their
rights .... As the Supreme Court observed in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984)
application of the NLRA "helps to assure that the wages and employment conditions of lawful
residents are not adversely affected by the competition of illegal alien employees who are not
subject to standard terms of employment."
H.R. REP. No. 99-628(I), at 58 (1986).
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undocumented immigrants were technically barred from the workplace by
immigration law (a bar frequently honored in the breach), but technically
protected once they were hired by workplace law (a protection frequently
honored in the breach).
The conflicts and gaps in the relationships between laws governing
nation-state citizenship and laws governing labor citizenship create both
opportunities and obstacles for unions. On the one hand, the fact that
undocumented workers are protected by most workplace laws offers unions
a legal hook to use in organizing. Litigation about the wages paid to
undocumented workers, for example, has been used to pressure recalcitrant
employers not only into compliance with the law but also to agree not to
interfere with those workers' efforts to unionize.1 23 Labor citizenship thus
grows in the cracks between the two legal schemes.
On the other hand, the clash between the imperatives of solidarity and
defense played out to unions' detriment with sanctions. Betraying labor's
expectations, sanctions proved minimally effective and possibly
counterproductive with regard to controlling the presence of undocumented
workers on the job.12 4 Even more destructive of labor citizenship,
The biggest exception came in a devastating 2002 Supreme Court ruling about the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA"), Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002). In Hoffman
Plastic, the Court held that an employer who had unknowingly hired an undocumented worker, and
then violated the NLRA by firing that worker in retaliation for his union support, would not have to
reinstate the worker or provide back pay, the standard remedies under the Act, despite the clear
violation of the Act's prohibition on such firings. Id. (The Court had earlier affirmed that undocumented
immigrants were "employees" protected by the NLRA.) The Court relied heavily on Congress's
passage of employer sanctions to support its conclusion that immigration law should trump labor law in
the workplace. Id. at 147-51. Although limited in its holding to the NLRA, Hoffman Plastic created a
great deal of concern among immigrants and their advocates about its possible extension to other areas.
See, e.g., Rebecca Smith & Amy Sugimori, Undocumented Workers: Preserving Rights and Remedies
After Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, IMMIGRANT WORKER PROJECT (Nat'l Emp. Law Project,
New York, N.Y.), Apr. 2003, available at http://www.nelp.org/document.cfm?documentlD=305.
123. One example of such an effort was the campaign to organize Manhattan greengrocers. See
Matthew T. Bodie, The Potentialfor State Labor Law: The New York Greengrocer Code of Conduct, 21
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 183 (2003); Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an
Era of Self-regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 350-52, 386-89 (2005); Immanuel Ness, Community
Labor Alliances: A New Paradigm in the Campaign to Organize Greengrocery Workers in New York
City, in FROM ACT UP TO THE WTO: URBAN PROTEST AND COMMUNITY BUILDING IN THE ERA OF
GLOBALIZATION (Benjamin Shepard & Ronald Hayduk eds., 2002).
124. Eduardo Porter, The Search for Illegal Immigrants Stops at the Workplace, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
5, 2006, at Al; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ILLEGAL ALIENS: SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLES TO
REDUCING UNAUTHORIZED ALIEN EMPLOYMENT EXIST (1999) ("[S]ignificant numbers of unauthorized
aliens still obtain employment because the process can be circumvented or easily thwarted by fraud.");
KEITH CRANE ET AL., THE EFFECT OF EMPLOYER SANCTIONS ON THE FLOW OF UNDOCUMENTED
IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES 73 (1990) ("Our labor market survey indicates that any decline in
undocumented immigration has been small.").
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employers used sanctions as an excuse to fire undocumented workers who
tried to organize.' 25
Thus, sanctions rendered undocumented immigrants more vulnerable,
less likely to report violations of minimum wage and other workplace
standards, cheaper, and increasingly resistant to organizing efforts. In other
words, they increased the appeal of undocumented workers to
unscrupulous employers and gave employers a way to derail organizing
campaigns in immigrant-heavy workplaces. 126  Under this regime,
undocumented status became an increasingly significant impediment to a
union's capacity to establish labor citizenship in a workplace by
organizing, the very opposite of the result that labor had intended. In the
words of David Koff, communications director for the union-sponsored
Immigrant Workers Freedom Ride, "[y]ou can't have a subclass of
vulnerable workers who can be deported without holding down the
capacity of all workers to improve their lives."'127 Labor's defense of labor
Within less than two decades, the government had essentially abandoned enforcement of the
program. In 2004, the Immigration Control and Enforcement Bureau issued Notices of Intent to Fine
under these provisions to a total of three employers, down from 417 in 1999. U.S. Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: WEAKNESSES HINDER EMPLOYMENT
VERIFICATION AND WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 7 (2006). As the immigration debate heated up
in 2006, increased sanctions enforcement and the intensification of document verification were
centerpieces of both the House and the Senate reform bills.
Sanctions' greatest impact was to encourage a flourishing market in false documents, to lower
wages of all workers in immigrant-heavy industries, and to further informalize immigrant work, thus
increasing the wage gap between the undocumented and those legally present. This downward trend in
wages was exacerbated by employers' shift to subcontractors in high-turnover industries dependant on
undocumented workers, seeking to insulate themselves from liability. MASSEY ET AL., supra note I11,
at 119-21. For another critical analysis of sanctions' impact, see Kitty Calavita, The Contradictions of
Immigration Lawmaking: The Immigration Reform & Control Act of 1986, 11 LAW & POL'Y 17 (1989).
125. Employers used employer sanctions and/or the ruling in Hoffman Plastics as an excuse to
squelch labor organizing or efforts to enforce workplace rights. See, e.g., MEX. AM. LEGAL DEFENSE &
EDUC. FUND, USED AND ABUSED: THE TREATMENT OF UNDOCUMENTED VICTIMS OF LABOR LAW
VIOLATIONS SINCE HOFFMAN PLASTIC COMPOUNDS V. NLRB (2003), available at www.maldef.org/
publications/pdf/HoffmanI 1403.pdf [hereinafter USED AND ABUSED]; Bob Shiles, Roger Carter
Suspends More than 20 Undocumented Workers, FREE PRESS (Kingston, N.C.), July 19, 2006; Petition,
Mexico National Administration Office ("NAO") of Mexico, Submission No. 9804 (1998) (filed by the
Yale Workers Rights Clinic) (alleging that INS enforcement impedes the enforcement of U.S.
workplace laws with regard to immigrants).
126. Matters deteriorated further after Hoffman Plastic. Post-Hoffman Plastic, a union seeking to
organize in a workplace with undocumented employees faced the reality that even if the union prevailed
before the NLRB, the only penalty for an employer's retaliatory dismissal of an undocumented worker
would be the posting of a "cease and desist" notice, an all but meaningless remedy. Hoffman Plastic,
535 U.S. at 152. For critiques of Hoffman, see USED AND ABUSED, supra note 125, and Maria
Ontiveros, Immigrant Workers' Rights in a Post-Hoffman World--Organizing Around the Thirteenth
Amendment, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 651 (2004).
127. Ricky Baldwin, A New Kind of Freedom Ride, Z MAG., Jan. 2004, at 17, available at
http://zmagsite.zmag.org/Jan2004/baldwinpr0104.html (quoting David Koff). See also Nina Shapiro,
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citizenship through exclusionary immigration policy had undermined the
possibility of establishing labor citizenship through solidarity.
ii. The Adverse Effect Wage Rate
Another illustration of the perverse effects of unions' efforts to use
immigration policy to defend labor's boundaries appears in the context of
guest work, an arena that I explore more fully in Part IV. Seeking to
prevent employers from importing agricultural guest workers to undercut
domestic wages, unions pressed the government to create the Adverse
Effect Wage Rate ("AEWR"), a pay level based on the average regional
wage, at which growers must demonstrate an inability to attract U.S.
workers before they are permitted to contract guest workers.' 28 The AEWR
is often significantly above the federal minimum wage.' 29
The AEWR appears at first glance to assist both guest workers (who
are the direct beneficiaries of its guarantee of a high minimum wage rate)
and U.S. workers (who are presumably less likely to be passed over for
jobs once the AEWR is enforced). But like employer sanctions, the AEWR
Let Freedom Ride, SEATTLE WEEKLY, Sept. 17, 2003, at 14 (identifying David Koff as the
communications director of the Immigrant Workers Freedom Ride).
128. Immigration & Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1188(a)(1)(A), (B) (2000). The AEWR is defined
as follows in the regulations:
Adverse effect wage rate (AEWR) means the wage rate which the Director has determined
must be offered and paid, as a minimum, to every H-2A worker and every U.S. worker for a
particular occupation and/or area in which an employer employs or seeks to employ an H-2A
worker so that the wages of similarly employed U.S. workers will not be adversely affected.
20 C.F.R. § 655.100(b) (2002). The AEWR is determined on a state-by-state basis, using "the annual
weighted average hourly wage rate for field and livestock workers (combined) for the region as
published annually by the U.S. Department of Agriculture." Id. § 655.107(a). Employers must pay
whatever is higher: the AEWR, the applicable prevailing wage, or the federal minimum wage. Id. §
655.107(b).
129. Although initially excluded from the Fair Labor Standards Act's minimum wage provisions,
most agricultural employees were brought under those protections through a 1966 amendment. 29
U.S.C. § 213(a)(6) (2000). Farm workers are still not covered by FLSA's overtime provisions. 29
U.S.C. § 213(b)(12). Federal minimum wage is currently $5.15 per hour. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (2000).
In 2005, the AEWR for Arizona was $7.63, in California $8.56, in Florida $8.07, and in Texas $7.89.
Labor Certification Process for the Temporary Employment of Aliens in Agriculture and Logging in the
U.S., 70 Fed. Reg. 10,152 (Mar. 2, 2005). One logical question is why growers use H-2A guest workers
at all, given their considerably higher cost. The answer resides in such workers' legally enforced
subservience and controllability. See infra note 169 and accompanying text. In a crop such as tobacco,
many small tasks must be accomplished over the course of the season. The work requires long periods
of idleness interspersed with intensive labor, is carried out under awesomely hot conditions, causes
nausea and dizziness, and is both unpredictable and time-sensitive. Employers who hire guest workers
can rest assured that they will be present for the entire season and available when needed.
Undocumented workers and other non-guest workers, employers complain, are unwilling to put up with
these conditions, demand higher wages at peak times, and are not always easy to come by when the
crop needs tending. Interview with Brendan Greene, Cdstulo Benavides & two H-2A workers traveling
to North Carolina, in Monterrey, Mex. (May 22, 2006).
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has affected labor citizenship in perversely negative ways. In its operation,
the AEWR has made undocumented workers-for whom there is no
AEWR and to whom growers often pay less than minimum wage-much
more attractive to growers. 130 In addition, the AEWR has imposed an upper
limit on what labor citizenship can win for union members. Should a group
of farm workers ever organize a union and demand even a few cents more
than the AEWR, they would immediately become "unavailable" for work
according to the law. The grower would then be authorized to replace them
with workers imported from abroad. 131 In this sense, the AEWR acts as an
artificial cap on what agricultural workers in the United States can demand
for their labor, even as it undermines the possibility that workers who are
legally present will receive jobs. It makes the U.S. government and growers
partners in enforcing that cap. And-by definition, because the AEWR is
based on the average regional wage-it sets the cap lower than what a
number of the workers in the fields are already making.' 32 The AEWR
protections, created in the name of protecting labor citizenship, instead
have made it harder to establish.
c. Bringing the Undocumented Within the Circle of Solidarity
Both farm worker unions and the AFL-CIO as a whole eventually
changed their strategies vis-a-vis undocumented workers toward inclusion
rather than exclusion. These shifts shed further light on the interrelationship
of the law governing labor citizenship and the law governing nation-state
130. According to the U.S. Department of Labor's own National Agricultural Worker Survey,
51% of the workers in the fields in 2001-2002 were undocumented, compared to 7% in 1989. DOL
NAWS SURVEY, supra note 89, at 7; U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS
SURVEY: A PROFILE OF U.S. FARM WORKERS tbl. 4.1 (1997), available at http://www.doleta.gov/
agworker/report/main.cfm. The number is likely to underestimate the undocumented workforce because
it relies on interviews with the workers themselves by representatives of the U.S. government. Of the
remainder, the vast majority were citizens and legal permanent residents, rather than H-2As. DOL
NAWS SURVEY, supra note 89, at 7. H-2As appear to account for approximately 2-3% of the
agricultural workforce. See American Immigration Lawyers' Association, AgJobs-We Need Reform
to Achieve a Stable and Legal Agricultural Work Force, http://www.aila.org/Content/default.aspx?
docid=9897 (last visited Mar. 11, 2007). Still, the presence of H-2A workers in the United States nearly
tripled in the 1990s. Michael Holley, Disadvantaged by Design: How the Law Inhibits Agricultural
Guest Workers from Enforcing Their Rights, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 575, 591 (2001).
131. OXFAM AMERICA, LIKE MACHINES IN THE FIELDS: WORKERS WITHOUT RIGHTS IN
AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 43 (2004), available at http://www.oxfamamerica.org/pdfs/labor
report 04.pdf; Bruce Goldstein, Guestworker Policy: H-2A Program Adverse Effect Wage Rates Are
Too Low (May 2006), available at http://www.fwjustice.org/ImmigrationLabor/H2abDocs/
AEWRTooLow.doc.
132. 20 C.F.R. § 655.107(a). See also OXFAM AMERICA, supra note 131, at 43. Growers have
been documented using a number of approaches to reject domestic applicants willing to work for the
AEWR, including performance tests, refusing housing, and outright refusal to consider their
applications. Holley, supra note 130, at 591-92.
[Vol. 80:503
TRANSNATIONAL LABOR CITIZENSHIP
citizenship. Partial victories for solidarity over defense, both of these
moves nonetheless illustrate the continued tensions faced by efforts to build
labor citizenship in a context of ongoing immigration.
i. The UFW
It is not only immigration law that constructs certain workers as the
unorganizable outsider; it is also the workings of other laws and the
changing strategies of unions themselves. The UFW's change in approach
to undocumented workers following the passage of a California law
governing the organization of farm labor in 1975 illustrates how a shift in
labor law can provoke a change in approach to labor citizenship that moves
a group of workers from the targets of defense to the subjects of solidarity,
outside to in, without any corresponding shift in immigration policy.
Until 1975, the UFW, like all farm worker unions, was not covered by
labor law. 133 Freed from the NLRA requirement that a majority of the
workers in a bargaining unit choose union representation, the union could
achieve recognition from growers through social movement pressure
without ever holding an election.' 34 The costs to the UFW of attacking
undocumented workers were thus particularly low because it did not need
their votes to prevail.
While exclusion from the NLRA had its advantages, it also left the
UFW devastatingly open to attack by growers and rival unions. To remedy
this, the union sought and passed the California Agricultural Labor
Relations Act ("ALRA") in 1975.135 This law created California's first
legal framework and administrative body to govern farm labor organizing.
Although the ALRA said nothing about immigration status, it made
majority election the only route to union recognition. Nothing in the law
excluded undocumented workers from this process. Suddenly, the vote of
each undocumented worker mattered as much as the vote of a legally
present worker. For the purpose of constructing labor citizenship under the
new ALRA rules, an undocumented farm worker had become every bit as
much a potential labor citizen as a U.S. citizen.
133. "The term 'employee' . . . shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural
laborer ... " National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000).
134. For an analysis of the UFW's use of law in conjunction with organizing strategies both
before and after the passage of the ALRA, see Jennifer Gordon, Law, Lawyers and Labor: The United
Farm Worker's Legal Strategy in the 1960s and 1970s and the Role of Law in Union Organizing Today,
8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1 (2005).
135. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1140-1166 (West 2005).
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Literally overnight, the UFW's position on undocumented immigrants
transformed. The undocumented had become the union's constituency, and
the UFW began to take up their cause both privately and publicly.136 It
abruptly stopped goading the INS for its failure to remove "illegals" from
the fields. At a critical moment in the fate of the California employer
sanctions measure, which was itself the result of the union's own advocacy,
the union withdrew its backing for the law. 137 And it ended its policy of
reporting individual undocumented workers to the government for
deportation. Over the years that followed, the UFW emerged as an
advocate for the undocumented in the United States, supporting efforts to
advance the rights of undocumented workers and lobbying vigorously for
special legislation to legalize migrant farm laborers. 138 Much earlier than
the mainstream labor movement, the UFW developed a vision of
undocumented immigrants as potential labor citizens. But like the AFL-
CIO when it caught up a quarter-century later, the UFW found itself
continuing to grapple with the question of future flow.
ii. The AFL-CIO
The election in 1995 of a new slate of AFL-CIO leaders with a
markedly pro-immigrant stance and a renewed commitment to organizing,
combined with growing union experience with organizing campaigns
involving undocumented immigrants, fostered a sense that the AFL-CIO's
official policy on immigrants was due for reconsideration.1 39 This urgency
136. It is interesting to note that the effects of this shift replicated on the labor citizenship level
T.H. Marshall's influential theory that economic and social rights follow political rights in the context
of nation-state citizenship (because once people can vote, politicians will begin to take them into
account in designing social programs and economic policy). MARSHALL, supra note 18.
137. The UFW withdrew its support for employer sanctions just as CRLA was preparing to argue
for the law's validity against a preemption challenge before the Supreme Court in December, 1975.
Abascal Transcript, supra note 110, at 8-9. See also Calavita, supra note 114, at 221. CRLA continued,
and prevailed. The case DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356, 365 (1976), upheld sanctions in principle,
remanding to the California state courts to determine whether the law would conflict with any federal
laws in its application. Neither CRLA nor the state pursued the case, and the law was never enforced.
Calavita, supra note 114, at 219; Abascal Transcript, supra note 110, at 19-20.
138. For examples of the UFW's efforts to advance legislation benefiting immigrants, see United
Farm Workers, www.ufw.org (last visited Mar. 11, 2007).
139. JULIE R. WATTS, IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE CHALLENGE OF GLO1ALIZATION: UNIONS
AND EMPLOYERS IN UNLIKELY ALLIANCE 154-58 (2002). This impulse bore fruit in 1999 and 2000,
when the AFL-CIO debated and eventually endorsed a proposal calling for legalization of the
undocumented and a repeal of employer sanctions. Id.
As HERE President John Wilhelm said during the floor debate at the AFL-CIO convention in 1999:
HERE in the 1980s supported employer sanctions ....
And we see in our workplaces that the harsh reality is that employer sanctions are used as
a weapon by employers against workers, as if employers needed another weapon against
workers ....
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was intensified by the realization that the future of many of its member
unions lay with immigrant workers. As global competition decimated
labor's traditional industrial strongholds and employers moved production
offshore to countries with lower labor costs, unions here came to see that if
they were to survive they would have to organize work and workers that
were locally rooted. Focusing on janitors, hotel maids, laundry workers,
and health care aides brought unions organizing in those sectors face to
face with the new and often undocumented labor migrants who hold these
jobs. It quickly became obvious that if unions were to gain a stronghold in
service work, they would have to gain a foothold among immigrant
workers. 140
After intensive internal debate, the AFL-CIO emerged from its 2000
executive committee meeting with a radical new statement on immigrants
and immigration policy. It endorsed a new amnesty and stated its
unequivocal opposition to employer sanctions. Today, the majority of
unions within the mainstream labor movement at least espouse an attitude
of solidarity and inclusiveness toward undocumented immigrants already
present. 141 Many locals go well beyond this, actively embracing the
undocumented as members and leaders. 142
- When those who.., built this labor movement as we know it today in the great
depression, in the great strikes in rubber and steel and hotels and so many other industries...
they didn't say "Let me see your papers" to the workers in those industries. They said "Which
side are you on?" And immigrant workers today have the right to ask of us the same question.
John Wilhelm, President, HERE, Address Before the AFL-CIO Convention (Oct. 12, 1999), available
at http://saxakali.com/immigration/afll.htm. The proposal was debated at the October 1999 AFL-CIO
membership convention, formally approved and issued as a statement at the February 2000 meeting of
the AFL-CIO Executive Committee, and officially ratified at the December 2001 membership
convention. Id.
140. Muzaffar Chishti, Guest Workers in the House of Labor, 13 NEW LAB. F. 67, 68 (2004) ("For
unions in the low-wage sector, organizing workers today is synonymous with organizing immigrant
workers.").
141. The U.S. labor movement is not the only one to have undergone such a shift. For an
exploration of the changing response of European unions to immigrants, see WATTS, supra note 139.
142. See, e.g., LEON FINK, THE MAYA OF MORGANTON: WORK AND COMMUNITY IN THE NUEVO
NEW SOUTH (2003) (describing a poultry plant organizing campaign in North Carolina supported by
Laborers' International Union of North America ("LIUNA")); ORGANIZING IMMIGRANTS: THE
CHALLENGE FOR UNIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CALIFORNIA (Ruth Milkman ed., 2000) (describing union
organizing campaigns by California-based locals of HERE, SEIU, the United Food and Commercial
Workers ("UFCW"), and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers actively
incorporating undocumented immigrants); IMMANUEL NESS, IMMIGRANTS, UNIONS, AND THE NEW U.S.
LABOR MARKET 58-95 (2005) (describing the involvement by UNITE and UFCW locals in a campaign
to organize largely undocumented deli workers in New York City); David Johnson, Model Organizing
Campaign Doubles Union Membership in Nine Months, LAB. NOTES, May 2002, at 16, available at
http://www.cpcs.umb.edu/labor_notes/files/27816.pdf (describing a campaign by the Laborers Eastern
Region Organizing Fund, a department of the Laborers Union, among immigrant asbestos workers in
New Jersey).
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2. The Problem of Future Flow
Labor's policy toward immigration remains unresolved with regard to
the "future flow" of migrants. Here the contradiction in labor citizenship
comes once more to the fore.
As both the UFW and the AFL-CIO have discovered, a change in
labor's position in relation to the undocumented is only half the battle.
Immigration law must change as well, or the unique vulnerability of the
undocumented to exploitation will continue. The coming of the ALRA did
not erase the problem of competition from undocumented workers in the
fields.1 43 The new AFL-CIO policy did not reduce employers' capacity to
fire undocumented workers with impunity, because their status in relation
to the state had not changed. Undocumented workers remained desperate to
earn money and vulnerable to abuse, and therefore unlikely to walk off the
job in protest or to honor a picket line. Unions still faced the challenge of
convincing such workers that they should take the risks associated with
becoming labor citizens, risks that grew from federal immigration law and
that unions could do little to address through on-the-ground organizing
strategy.
Even if the continuing vulnerability of undocumented workers could
be addressed, labor's resolution of its competing principles in favor of
solidarity with undocumented workers is an inherently unstable solution to
the tensions in labor citizenship. In casting their lot with the undocumented,
unions have not eliminated line-drawing. They have just moved the line
further out, so that workers currently present within the country-whatever
their immigration status-are seen as potential labor citizens, while
migrants yet to come remain the targets of labor's defensive impulses. In
2006, for example, the AFL-CIO called for "an immigration system that
protects all workers within our borders-both native-born and foreign, 144
while recognizing the inevitability of continued immigration so long as
global inequality persists. Nonetheless, its proposed policy would bar any
expansion of the temporary labor migration program and would only
143. MARTIN, supra note 111, at 181-82, 192-93. Indeed, undocumented immigration began to
rise dramatically in the 1980s. Philip Martin has argued that this influx of undocumented workers was a
critical factor in the UFW's decline during that period. Id. Others have pointed to different precipitating
factors for the union's decline. For a recent piece of investigative journalism on the topic, see Miriam
Pawel, UFW: A Broken Contract: Decisions of Long Ago Shape the Union Today, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10,
2006, at Al.
144. AFL-CIO, Responsible Reform of Immigration Laws Must Protect Working Conditions for
All Workers in the U.S. (Mar. 1, 2006), available at http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/
ecouncil/ec02272006e.cfm (emphasis added).
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permit the entry of workers on permanent employment visas in response to"actual, demonstrated labor shortages."' 45
This stretching of the boundaries of labor citizenship to be contiguous
with physical presence (rather than legal status) inside the United States
would make sense-so long as undocumented immigrants currently within
the country could be legalized or fully protected under labor and
employment laws, and so long as further undocumented immigration was
greatly curtailed. 146
Unions in the United States today are pursuing steps in the first
direction. To overcome the impediments to organizing the undocumented,
the Change to Win Coalition and the AFL-CIO have enthusiastically
endorsed a legalization program for undocumented immigrants currently
present. In the interim, they also seek to remove the impediments to
organizing that currently accompany undocumented status. Most of the
labor movement is united in pursuing reform of policies that hamper
undocumented immigrants' ability to enforce their rights in the workplace.
Among other provisions in this vein, they call for an iron wall between the
Department of Homeland Security's immigration agency and the
Department of Labor, and various changes in enforcement practices to
facilitate the detection and punishment of employers who violate basic
workplace laws. 147
These are all sensible and much-needed proposals. Undocumented
workers are cheaper than others in part because they are less able to enforce
their workplace rights; were these initiatives to be implemented, they
would increase the rights that undocumented workers could claim and thus
145. Id. Ana Avedaflo, Director of the AFL-CIO Immigrant Worker Program, argues that this
policy may not be any more restrictionist than the current one, as the number of visas would rise at
times of demonstrated labor shortages, which could potentially increase visa availability beyond current
levels. Telephone Interview with Ana Avedafilo, Director, AFL-CIO Immigrant Worker Program (Oct.
17, 2006).
146. Of course, legalization still incorporates large numbers of new workers into the labor market.
In a perfect world, as I have noted, unions would want to curtail labor supply rather than augmenting it.
Their support for legalization is founded on the recognition that, if the presence of new immigrants in a
labor market cannot be avoided, it is better to legalize them than to have them present but vulnerable to
greater exploitation because of their lack of legal status.
147. AFL-CIO, supra note 144. Letter from Anna Burger, Chair, Change to Win, to Arlen Specter
and Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senators (Mar. 1, 2006), available at http://www.changetowin.org/fileadmin/
pdf/Immigration%2OLetter%/o20-%20PDF.pdf. During the 2006 immigration debate, Senator Kennedy
attempted unsuccessfully to amend S. 2611, the immigration reform bill that would eventually pass the
Senate, by adding a number of these enforcement provisions. 152 CONG. REG. S4950-51, S4954 (daily
ed. May 23, 2006) (statement by Sen. Kennedy) (discussing Amendment No. 4106, Amendment to
Enhance Labor Law Protections for American Workers and Guestworkers, to S. 2611).
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reduce the incentive for employers to hire them over others. 148 But even if
the proposals all passed, they would be unlikely to completely level the
playing field. Not all of the wage penalty associated with undocumented
status is due to diminished rights on the job; other factors include the
increased likelihood that undocumented workers will labor under wage-
lowering subcontracting arrangements in the wake of employer sanctions
and the uncertainty about duration of stay that discourages undocumented
immigrants from investing in job training.1 49
Nor are these workers attractive to employers solely because of their
low wages. Indeed, as the history of guest worker programs has shown, the
actual cost of an employee may run second to an employer's desire for
subservient workers.' 50 In employers' oft-voiced view, the ideal worker
"doesn't complain" and "is willing to work hard."'15 1 Employers judge
subservience through a complex mix of racial stereotypes, immigration
status, and length of time in the United States.' 52 Although race is a critical
factor in this mix, like wage levels, it is insufficient as a predictor of
employer preference. Vulnerability to deportation and recent arrival as a
proxy for ignorance of rights appear to trump both skin color and wage
levels. Employers may hire new African and black Caribbean immigrants
but spurn African-Americans, look for Poles with expired visas while
148. On the wage penalty that results from undocumented status under an employer sanctions
regime, see Julie A. Phillips & Douglas S. Massey, The New Labor Market: Immigrants and Wages
After IRCA, 36 DEMOGRAPHY 233 (1999). Phillips and Massey calculate the wage penalty to be 22%,
meaning undocumented immigrants earn 22% less than legally present workers in similar jobs. Id. at
II.
149. MASSEYETAL.,supra note Ill, at 122-23, 128-30.
150. Historian Cindy Hahamovitch has observed that in the early 1940s, at the inception of the
bracero program:
Caribbean and Mexican workers were not more attractive because they were cheaper than
domestic workers. Growers who hired them had to pay a minimum wage, provide housing,
pay their way home, guarantee three-quarters of their wages if work was unavailable, and pay
the government a non-refundable fee per worker.... The attraction lay in the fact that, unlike
domestic workers, the importees could be promptly and unceremoniously 'repatriated' and
replaced.
Cindy Hahamovitch, The Politics of Labor Scarcity: Expediency and the Birth of the Agricultural
"Guestworkers " Program, BACKGROUNDER (Ctr. for Immigr. Stud., Wash., D.C.), Dec. 1999, at 5.
151. See, e.g., Lee Mueller, Coal Firm Wants to Hire Hispanics, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER,
Feb. 7, 2006, at AI ("The company's objective is to attract workers to the area who 'have the necessary
work ethic."'); Jeffrey Leiter, Leslie Hossfeld & Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, North Carolina
Employers Look at Latino Workers (Apr. 2001) (unpublished paper, on file with author) (quoting a
manager: "[M]ost of the supervisors will say, I've got to have all Hispanic workers. [Why do you think
that's the case?] The work ethic .... They're going to work overtime if we need people overtime.").
152. See ROGER WALDINGER & MICHAEL I. LICHTER, HOW THE OTHER HALF WORKS:
IMMIGRATION AND THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF LABOR 141-80 (2003); Leticia M. Saucedo, The
Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker and the Making of the Brown Collar Workplace, 67
OHIO ST. L.J. 961, 977-79 (2006).
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turning their backs on white citizens, and seek out undocumented Mexicans
but ignore Chicanos.153
As to the second point, is it realistic to believe that undocumented
immigration can be curtailed? Even if the immigration status issues could
be addressed through a complete amnesty for undocumented immigrants
already present, all evidence indicates that hundreds of thousands of
migrants will continue to enter the country illegally each year unless they
are provided with legal avenues through which to do so. Full militarization
of the border, oft-threatened, has an economic and political price tag
beyond imagination. 154 And even were it to be achieved, it would not begin
to address the problem of undocumented migration. Overstays of non-
immigrant visas-which are issued by the U.S. government at the rate of
over 30 million a year (the vast majority to tourists)' 55-currently account
for an estimated forty-one percent of the undocumented population, 156 a
number that would surely grow dramatically were border-crossing to
become a less viable option.
One way or another, people who want to migrate will find a way, in
numbers generated not by our formal legal permission but because of
decades upon decades of economic and social pressures in both countries.
To imagine that we can roll back the century or more of migration history
between the United States and Mexico (and other countries as well),
eradicate the entrenched migrant networks that bind the two countries to
153. See, e.g., WALDINGER & LICHTER, supra note 152, at 165 ("Managers looked askance at
assimilation.... The second generation was seen as not so willing to cooperate with authority... [n]or
were they willing to work as hard .... ). As employers decide which among new immigrants to hire,
however, race discrimination once again comes to the fore. See, e.g., Joleen Kirschenman & Kathryn
M. Neckerman, "We'd Love to Hire Them, But... ": The Meaning of Race for Employers, in THE
URBAN UNDERCLASS 203, 210-11 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) (discussing
employer preferences for Eastern European white workers for skilled jobs and Hispanic workers for
unskilled jobs); Jennifer Steinhauer, Domestic Workers Face Blatant Discrimination, Investigation
Reveals, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2005, at B3 (detailing a settlement between N.Y. Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer and domestic work placement agencies after an investigation uncovered widespread racial
coding of available jobs).
154. Furthermore, as data from the Mexican Migration Project has shown, tightening of U.S.
borders has converted what would otherwise be cyclical migration, sensitive to the ups and downs of
the labor market, into permanent immigration, with migrants remaining to compete for jobs even in
times of high unemployment. Efforts to curtail illegal entry through border control thus have the
perverse result of increasing the long-term undocumented population of the country. MASSEY ET AL.,
supra note 11, at 128-33.
155. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2005 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS (2006), available
at www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2005/OIS_2005_Yearbook.pdf.
156. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., ILLEGAL ALIEN RESIDENT POPULATION (1996),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/illegal.pdf.
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each other, and undo the complex web of economic interdependence that
characterizes our thoroughly integrated labor markets, is pure fantasy.
Although this claim is usually cast in terms of the desperation of
would-be migrants ("they will come at any cost"), it is only honest to
acknowledge that the U.S. dependence on migrant labor is the other side to
that coin. The fantasy is flawed not only because it ignores the tremendous
pressure on Mexicans to migrate for income, but also because it disregards
the role of U.S. corporations in creating a situation where jobs that once
attracted U.S. residents are no longer of a quality that will do so, and thus
remain open as a draw to migrants. By deskilling and deunionizing large
swaths of work, and stripping jobs of benefits through subcontracting and
other forms of contingent employment, corporations have turned many jobs
that once attracted U.S. citizens with their high wages and full benefits, into
low-wage, no-benefit work.157 They are then able to argue that the United
States needs to import migrants because U.S. workers "will not do these
jobs. 158
For some in the labor movement, the image most readily associated
with migrants yet to come is still that of an unstoppable tide. Donald
Kaniewski, political director for the Laborers' International Union of North
America, speaks for many union leaders when he states in a recent
newspaper article, "I don't think there's a tolerance for an unlimited,
unregulated flow of foreign workers."' 159 Kaniewski points to competition
as the issue, arguing: "There is a reality that immigrants, particularly those
out of status, put downward pressure on wages."' 160 Seen through the cold
lens of supply and demand, the newcomers represent an ongoing threat to
labor citizenship.
157. Nowhere is this more evident than in the food processing/meatpacking industry. From the
1960s through the early 1980s, meatpacking was a largely unionized industry that paid wages 15-19%
higher than the average in manufacturing in the United States. Today, after a concerted effort by giant
meatpacking companies such as Iowa Beef Processors, those jobs have been automated, deskilled, sped
up, and deunionized. Now paying 24% less than the average U.S. manufacturing wage, these jobs are
increasingly filled by nonunion immigrant labor. LANCE COMPA, BLOOD, SWEAT, AND FEAR:
WORKERS RIGHTS IN U.S. MEAT AND POULTRY PLANTS 11-14 (2004); Marc Cooper, The Heartland's
Raw Deal: How Meatpacking Is Creating a New Immigrant Underclass, NATION, Feb. 3, 1997, at 11.
158. The Essential Worker Immigration Coalition ("EWIC"), to which the American Meat
Institute belongs (together with the Chamber of Commerce and most other large industrial lobbies),
calls for increased temporary migration programs to fill jobs "that most Americans take for granted but
won't do themselves." EWIC, 5 Myths Regarding Immigrants and Comprehensive Immigration Reform
in the U.S., http://www.clca.us/immigration/moreinfoDocs/l.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2007).
159. Rachel L. Swarns, Union Leader Supporting Guest Worker Proposal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24,
2006, at A14 (quoting Donald Kaniewski, Political Director for the Laborers' International Union of
North America, speaking in opposition to the McCain-Kennedy guest work proposal).
160. Id.
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IV. IS A GUEST WORKER PROGRAM A SOLUTION TO THE
PROBLEM OF FUTURE FLOW?
What, then, is to be done? The defensive strand of labor citizenship
still cries out for some effective means of border control. Yet for unions to
advocate excluding future migrants through harsh border policies or
restrictions on new visas is distasteful to their immigrant members,
inconsistent with the solidaristic emphasis of current labor movement
policy, and likely to fail in any case. This is labor's quandary. The question
unions currently confront is whether a new guest worker program is a way
out of this conflict, or would mire them more deeply in it.
A. GUEST WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES
The United States currently has a guest worker program, although
most people associate the term in this country exclusively with the bracero
program, relegated in collective memory to an unsavory corner of our past.
In 1942, faced with shortages of field workers as a result of World War II,
the United States signed the Mexican Farm Labor Program Agreement with
the government of Mexico, creating what would become known as the
bracero, or "manual laborer," visa. This was not the country's first guest
worker experiment-that honor belongs to a category of temporary
agricultural workers created to address shortages during World War I61-
but it was its most massive, bringing a total of 4.6 million workers to the
United States during more than twenty years.
Contrary to popular perception, the end of the bracero program in
1964 did not bring guest work to a close in the United States. The "H"
category of the Immigration and Nationality Act provided for the
admission of other temporary workers beginning in 1952, during the
bracero era. When the bracero program was abolished, use of those visas
expanded. Currently, the United States imports approximately 175,000
guest workers a year in three categories: (1) H-1B, for skilled professional
workers, most often used in the technology field; (2) H-2A, for agricultural
workers; and (3) H-2B, for other seasonal workers.' 62 Outside of these
161. Alice J. Baker, Agricultural Guestworker Programs in the United States, 10 TEX. HIsP. J.L.
& POL'Y 79, 82 (2004); Cindy Hahamovitch, Creating Perfect Immigrants: Guestworkers of the World
in Historical Perspective, 44 LAB. HIST. 69, 70, 79-80 (2003).
162. Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § ll01(a)(15)(H) (2000). Although
admitted in numbers close to 200,000 per year in the early 2000s, H-I Bs are currently capped at 64,300
per year, with an additional 20,000 available for holders of masters degrees or their equivalent. Press
Release, U.S. Citizenship & lmmigr. Servs., USCIS Reaches H-lB Cap (June 1, 2006). H-2Bs are
capped at 66,000 per year. 8 U.S.C. §1184 (g)(1)(B) (2000). Both of these categories are oversubscribed
2007]
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
areas, there is currently no general guest worker category, nor has there
ever been one.
In the summer of 2001, the idea of a new legalization program was
gaining political currency, as President George W. Bush entered what was
to be a series of meetings with his Mexican counterpart, Vicente Fox, to
discuss amnesty as well as other matters of shared concern. On September
11, the gathering momentum came to a skidding halt. When President Bush
again raised the issue of immigration reform two years later, his focus was
on temporary, rather than permanent visas. 163 In the ensuing years, with the
President's vocal support, the idea of a general guest work program has
gained support across the political spectrum.' 64
From the perspective of service businesses rooted in the United States,
it is not hard to understand why guest work is an appealing concept, with
its guarantee of an unending supply of workers at low cost. 165 More
surprising is the recent hint of a sea change in the immigrant advocacy
community on the issue of guest work. Manuel Pastor and Susan Alva
surveyed a range of immigrants' rights advocates in 2002 and found a
surprising willingness (at least in private interviews, if not in public
positions) to consider support for a "decent guest worker program."' 166 As
one activist noted, "'If cross-border life is irreversible, then maybe we need
cross-border institutions."'' 167 In theory, such advocates say, a temporary
worker program could become a source of recognition and support for the
reality of transnational migrant lives.' 68
and thus are fully used each year. H-2A visas are not capped; approximately 30,000 are issued per year.
U.S. Dep't of State, Table XVI(B): Nonimmigrant Visas Issued by Classification (Including Crewlist
Visas and Border Crossing Cards) Fiscal Years 2001-2005, http://travel.state.gov/pdf/FY05
tableXVIb.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2007). Although H-2B visas are limited to "nonagricultural work of
a temporary or seasonal nature," 8 C.F.R. 214.2(h)(1)(ii)(D) (2001), they are granted in a wide range of
industries, from hotel and restaurant, to construction, to factory work. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
Seasonal Workers (H-2B Workers), http://www.uschamber.com/issues/index/immigration/spousal.htm
(last visited Mar. 11, 2007).
163. Chishti, supra note 140, at 70-71.
164. See infra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., EWIC, www.ewic.org (last visited Feb. 3, 2007) (outlining positions taken by the
EWIC, which counts among its members some of the country's largest corporations and business
associations); Petition at 12, NAO of Mexico, Submission No. 2003-1 (2003) (filed by the Central
Independiente de Obreros Agricolas y Campesinos and the Farmworker Justice Fund) (alleging the
failure by the United States to implement and effectively enforce the labor laws applicable to
agricultural workers under the H-2A program in North Carolina) [hereinafter NAO H-2A Petition].
166. Manuel Pastor & Susan Alva, Guest Workers and the New Transnationalism: Possibilities
and Realities in an Age of Repression, 31 SOC. JUST. 92, 100-04 (2004).
167. Id. at 100 (quoting an unidentified activist).
168. For one example of a coalition of immigrant-led community organizations that actively
supports a guest worker proposal, see the November 2004 statement of the National Alliance of Latin
[Vol. 80:503
TRANSNATIONAL LABOR CITIZENSHIP
Unions until recently had been united in rejecting guest work. But the
instability introduced in labor citizenship by the fear of ongoing large-scale
immigration-combined with the belief that it may be impossible to stem
the flow, but feasible to regulate it-led some within the labor movement
to reconsider this position.
B. GUEST WORK AND LABOR CITIZENSHIP
Historically, unions have staunchly opposed guest worker programs
on the ground that they posed an insuperable threat to establishing labor
citizenship. The dangers were abundantly clear during the bracero
program. Growers preferred braceros over resident workers because they
had control over them and could work them harder, and because they
provided insulation from labor unrest. 169 Despite myriad protections on
paper, the mistreatment of braceros was legion: pay at times barely
sufficient to cover daily costs, diminished further by illicit "deductions"
that were never repaid, shoddy housing, poisonous food, and dangerous
transportation. 170
Unions did not consider bringing guest workers inside labor
citizenship a viable option. The sole recorded attempt to reach out to
braceros as allies and potential union members, spearheaded in 1950 by
American and Caribbean Communities ("NALACC"), a nonprofit association of more than seventy-five
community-based organizations led by immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean. One of the
four central points of this group's immigration reform proposal affirmatively calls for "temporary
worker programs for foreign workers that guarantee worker rights, including the right to collective
bargaining." Press Release, NALACC, Latin American and Caribbean Immigrants Present Immigration
Reform Agenda at Meeting in Los Angeles (Nov. 9, 2004), available at http://www.enlacesamerica.org/
articlesO3O3/NALACC-postconfinenglishll-09-041.doc. The National Council of La Raza has also
recently endorsed a new temporary worker visa program. Janet Murguia, Op-Ed., A Change of Heart on
Guest Workers, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2007, at B7.
I do not want to overstate the support among advocacy groups for a new guest worker program. It
is fair to say that far more immigrant rights advocates oppose than support such an expansion. See, for
example, the signatures of over 140 organizations on the National Statement to Support Human and
Civil Rights for All Immigrants and to Oppose Compromise Immigration Reform Proposals (Apr.
2006), available at http://www.nnirr.org/projects/immigrationreform/statement.htm#endorsers,
developed by the National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, which takes an unequivocal
stance against the expansion of guest work programs.
169. LINDA C. MAKA & THEO J. MAJKA, FARM WORKERS, AGRIBUSINESS, AND THE STATE 142
(1982) ("Even where there were a sufficient number of domestic workers willing to accept the low
wages advertised, braceros were often illegally hired instead: they were less likely to strike or disrupt
harvest operations."). Braceros were also systematically used to break strikes. GALARZA, MERCHANTS
OF LABOR, supra note 12, at 216-18; GALARZA, SPIDERS IN THE HOUSE, supra note 12, at 23-28;
Hahamovitch, supra note 150, at 5.
170. See GALARZA, MERCHANTS OF LABOR, supra note 12, at 183-98; NGAI, supra note 12, at
143-44.
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union organizer and author Emesto Galarza, was a failure.'71 For the fifty
years that followed, although there have been various temporary worker
programs continuously in effect, there has been little evidence of efforts to
draw those workers into U.S. unions. The bracero program finally ended in
1964, done in by the accumulated weight of expos6s of its abuses and a
public push by the newly established UFW, which found braceros a nearly
insurmountable impediment to organizing in the fields. 172  Not
coincidentally, the UFW launched its first strike within a year of the end of
the bracero program and signed its first grape contracts within two years,
winning a forty percent increase in grape-pickers' wages. 173
As H visas extended the realm of guest work past the end of the
bracero era, Congress made a variety of guarantees in terms of H-2A
workers' wages, housing, travel expenses, and access to free legal
representation. 174 Just as in the bracero era, however, growers have been
able to evade many of these obligations.' Similar dynamics are at work
171. While working in California for the National Farm Labor Union ("NFLU"), an affiliate of the
AFL, Galarza invited braceros to join the NFLU and make common cause with the Mexican-Americans
next to whom they labored. GALARZA, MERCHANTS O- LABOR, supra note 12, at 222-23. For
descriptions of this effort, see NGAI, supra note 12, at 161-63 and STEPHEN J. PIrTTI, THE DEVIL IN
SILICON VALLEY: NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, RACE, AND MEXICAN AMERICANS 142-45 (2003).
172. For a television broadcast that put the issue of braceros squarely in the public eye, see
Edward R. Murrow's 1960 documentary, Harvest of Shame (CBS television broadcast Nov. 26, 1960);
Philip Martin, There Is Nothing More Permanent than Temporary Foreign Workers, BACKGROUNDER
(Ctr. for Immigr. Stud., Wash., D.C.), Apr. 2001, at 1, 3.
173. Martin, supra note 172, at 3.
174. For an overview of H-2A protections, see Holley, supra note 130, at 592-93, 613-14. In
other areas, however, H-2As have considerably less protection. For example, they are not entitled to
coverage under the federal Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act ("AWPA"). Id. at
605. In addition, agricultural work as a whole-the sector in which most guest workers labor-is
exempted from coverage, or at best granted limited protection, by almost every federal protective
workplace law. For an overview of these exclusions, see OXFAM AMERICA, supra note 131, at 38-41.
The AWPA provides special protections for domestic farm workers, but it addresses few of these gaps,
although it offers crucial guarantees of grower liability for many contractor abuses and mandates that
farm worker housing and transportation meet federal standards. AWPA, Pub. L. No. 97-470, 96 Stat.
2583 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.); 29 C.F.R. § 500 (2002); OXFAM
AMERICA, supra note 131, at 40.
There is considerable tension inherent in a system that offers rights to one set of workers with the
sole purpose of protecting a second group of workers against competition from the first group. See Fran
Ansley, Mexican Guest Workers in Carolina del Norte: Social Movement Lawyering on Transnational
Ground 15 (unpublished paper, on file with author). The same tensions are evident in the argument that
the reason to enforce basic workplace rights for undocumented workers is to make those workers less
attractive to employers relative to legally present workers.
175. See generally LANCE COMPA, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 146-60 (2004); OXFAM
AMERICA, supra note 131, at 47-50; Holley, supra note 130, at 594-616; NAO H-2A Petition, supra
note 165.
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with regard to unionization. Although the H-2A regulations do not forbid
unionization, they operate in a way that discourages it.176 Growers openly
warn H-2A workers away from unions, and they enforce contractual bans
against visitors to the fields or labor camps that keep workers from talking
to union organizers.' 77 The warnings are rarely necessary. Under current H-
2 visa programs, a migrant's right to remain lasts only as long as her
relationship with the employer who brought her to the United States. 178
This is the fundamental obstacle to making any paper rights real, or to
guest worker unionization. Recognizing that antagonizing her employer is
likely to result in a quick ticket home and a guaranteed slot on future
blacklists, an H-2A worker is unlikely to want to take the risk of supporting
a union organizing campaign.
With these experiences in mind, unions such as the UFW and the
Farm Labor Organizing Committee ("FLOC") had long been leading
voices in opposition to temporary work programs. They pointed out that the
"labor shortages" that were used to justify the need for importing more
workers were a fiction. 179 Furthermore, they insisted that politicians'
promises of a guest worker program with rights and protections that would
keep foreign workers from competing unfairly with domestic ones were
impossible to keep in the face of vast power imbalances and weak
enforcement.180 In 1999, UFW president Arturo Rodriguez unequivocally
176. COMPA, supra note 175, at 146-60 (describing how the agricultural guest worker program
impedes unionization in practice); Holley, supra note 130, at 575-623 (same). But see Hearing on H.R.
4548, the "Agricultural Opportunities Act, " Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Dr. James S. Holt, Senior Economist on
behalf of the National Council of Agricultural Employers). Dr. Holt said:
First it should be noted that use of the H-2A program as a strike-breaking tool is expressly
prohibited. H-2A workers may not be employed in any job opportunity that is vacant because
the former occupant of the job is on strike or involved in a labor dispute. Secondly, there is no
impediment to an H-2A worker becoming a union member.... If an employer seeking labor
certification has a collective bargaining agreement and a union shop, the H-2A aliens, like all
other employees, can be required to pay union dues and may become union members.
Id.
177. COMPA, supra note 175, at 147, 153-55; NAO H-2A Petition, supra note 165.
178. Holley, supra note 130, at 595.
179. See, e.g., Marc Grossman, Op-Ed., Why Import More Farm Workers When We Already Have
Too Many?, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 13, 2003, at B5 ("An agricultural guest-worker program can only
be justified if there are really labor shortages. All the objective data say as a rule shortages don't
exist."); Gonzales & Rodriguez, Inhumanity in the Fields, DENVER POST, July 18, 1999, at K3 ("As
Mike Femer of FLOC stated, 'If the industry paid the workers properly, there would be no labor
shortages."'). In a fascinating article, historian Cindy Hahamovitch details the creation of guest worker
programs by the U.S. government during WWII in the face of a surplus, not a shortage, of workers, as a
mechanism to placate growers who demanded a more predictable and controllable workforce when U.S.
workers threatened labor unrest. Hahamovitch, supra note 150.
180. Grossman, supra note 179; Arturo Rodriguez, Statement (Nov. 1999), http://www.ufw.org/
sggwI 199.html.
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stated: "Fifty-seven years with guest worker programs tell us that in the
end, terms and conditions will be set by the growers-despite all the
wonderful guarantees and protections advertised in any bill. That is why
the UFW views any bracero or guest worker programs as indentured
servitude."' 8 1
In 2003, however, farm labor unions did an about-face, announcing
their support for the AgJobs bill, which coupled the legalization for
undocumented workers that the UFW had long sought with grower-friendly
changes to the current temporary worker program. 182 This willingness to
consider an expansion of guest work was initially less a matter of choice
than of realpolitik, born of the need to give in on guest work in order to
secure the right for undocumented workers to legalize. But, at least in the
case of FLOC, it appears to have since developed beyond a political
decision to an affirmative position. While rejecting President Bush's
temporary visa proposal, FLOC has endorsed a "Freedom Visa, with
freedom to travel and work with full rights and dignity for all workers."' 183
At a 2006 conference, FLOC President Baldemar Velasquez called for"some kind of guest worker program to handle the future flow of these
workers into the United States,"' 184 citing the need for free movement of
labor to complement the free movement of capital in a globalized world.
Part of the mainstream labor movement is undergoing a similar shift,
while the remainder continues to oppose guest workers categorically.
Several of the Change to Win unions-including leader SEIU-have
endorsed the concept of a large new guest worker program. 185 SEIU
181. Rodriguez, supra note 180 (calling the Graham-Smith guest worker plan a "cruel hoax" on
farm workers).
182. United Farm Workers, UFW Announces Historic Compromise (Sept. 23, 2003),
www.ufw.org/H2Aanalysis.htm. Among other grower-friendly features, AgJobs would have frozen the
AEWR for three years, then phased it out entirely, and streamlined the process of obtaining guest
workers, a change for which growers had long lobbied. See Agricultural Job Opportunity, Benefits and
Security Act of 2003, S. 1645, 108th Cong. tit. 11 (2003). See generally Lauren Gilbert, Fields of Hope,
Fields of Despair: Legisprudential and Historic Perspectives on the AgJobs Bill of 2003, 42 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 417 (2005). AgJobs also would have maintained the existing link between a worker's legal
status and a particular employer, meaning that the visa is revoked if the worker seeks to change
employers, a rule that advocates have long decried as a breeding ground for exploitation.
183. Press Release, Farm Labor Organizing Committee ("FLOC"), Bush's Proposal Encouraging
but Falls Short: FLOC Proposes "Freedom Visa" (May 17, 2006), available at http://www.ggj
alliance.org/news.php?id=32.
184. Author's notes on Baldemar Velasquez, Keynote Speech at the Conference on Organizing
Migrant and Immigrant Workers at the University of Michigan (Jan. 20, 2006) (on file with author).
185. Rachel L. Swarns, Chamber and 2 Unions Forge Alliance on Immigration Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 2006, at A17; Jennifer Ludden, All Things Considered: Strange Bedfellows Join Forces for
Immigration Bill (Nat'l Public Radio broadcast Jan. 19, 2006).
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President Andy Stern argues that a guest work program will help address
the problems of undocumented immigration and the underground
economy. 186 No leader embodies the changing temper of the times more
than John Wilhelm, former president of the Hotel Employees Restaurant
Employees International Union ("HERE"), the former head of the AFL-
CIO immigration committee, and current president of the Hospitality
Division of Change to Win union UNITE HERE. In 2001, Wilhelm
described himself and his union as "unalterably opposed" to a guest work
program.187 He bluntly stated: "'To think the law will protect people whose
right to stay in the country ends with their job is not living in the real
world."" 88  Four years later, however, UNITE HERE endorsed and
Wilhelm himself praised a bill that would create the largest guest worker
program this country has seen since the bracero era, annually admitting
numbers of guest workers that rival bracero admissions at their peak.
Wilhelm called the bill "a rational solution for the millions of
undocumented workers in the United States" and "good for all American
workers."189
Meanwhile, the AFL-CIO remains staunch in its opposition to an
augmented guest work program.' 90 Its 2006 Executive Council Statement
186. Scott Shepard, Labor Takes Softer Line on Illegal Immigration, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 1,
2006, at 3A (noting that Stem views guest worker legislation as "a way to bring illegal immigrants out
of the underground economy"); Ludden, supra note 185.
187. See David Bacon, New Players-New Game? Guest Workers or Amnesty, PAC. NEWS SERV.,
Aug. 7, 2001. See also Leon Lazaroff, Be Our Guest: Legalization Debate Sparks "Immigrants
Freedom Ride, " TEX. OBSERVER, Aug. 17, 2001.
188. David Bacon, Be Our Guest, NATION, Sept 2, 2004, available at http://dbacon.igc.org/
Imgrants/2004guests.html (quoting John W. Wilhelm).
189. See John W. Wilhelm, President/Hospitality, UNITE HERE International Union, Statement
(May 25, 2005), http://www.unitehere.org/frontpagedetail.asp?ID=67. Wilhelm's comments refer to the
piece of legislation around which the labor debate about guest work crystallized in 2005. In May of
2005, Senators McCain and Kennedy introduced the Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act,
which combines intensified immigration enforcement measures with a legalization program and creates
a new guest worker program for all industries, offering 400,000 visas per year. S. 1033, 109th Cong.
(2005). For purposes of comparison, 445,197 braceros were admitted in 1956, that program's peak
year. See CALAVITA, supra note 12, at 218 (citing Congressional Research Service figures).
The AFL-CIO publicly recognized McCain-Kennedy as "an important legislative
accomplishment" at the time it was introduced, but did not endorse it. Letter from John J. Sweeney to
AFL-CIO National and International Union Presidents (June 1, 2005) (on file with author). See
Editorial, On the Border: The Best Solution So Far to One of America's Thorniest Problems,
ECONOMIST, May 21, 2005, (praising the McCain-Kennedy bill and noting that the AFL-CIO has
withheld endorsement of it). It has since lobbied against the bill in Congress. Telephone Interview, Ana
Avedaflo, supra note 145. See also Ludden, supra note 185 (quoting Ana Avedafio calling for
permanent legalization rather than guest work programs, and arguing that using guest workers to fill a
job will "change the fundamental nature of that job," increasing outsourcing and decreasing wages and
benefits).
190. AFL-CIO, supra note 144.
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on Immigration unequivocally rejected any immigration reform that
expanded guest work. "We are not a nation of guests; we are a nation of
citizens," the statement reads. "To embrace. . . the creation of a permanent
two-tier workforce ... would be repugnant to our traditions and our ideals
and disastrous for the living standards of working families."' 19 1
C. IS A "GOOD GUEST WORKER PROGRAM" POSSIBLE?
1. Components of a Good Guest Worker Program
Those who argue in favor of union support for temporary visas say
that it is possible to craft a temporary program that would be good for
migrants and good for unions as well. There is consensus among advocates
about the provisions and protections such a guest work program would
have to include to be considered humane. The visa would need to be
portable, rather than tied to a particular employer, because the potential for
exploitation increases dramatically once an employer controls a worker's
immigration status. The program would have to provide guest workers with
full rights in the workplace, including the right to unionize, and it would
need to contain multiple enforcement mechanisms for those rights,
including access to federally funded legal service attorneys. It would have
to allow guest workers to be accompanied by their families. Finally-and
most controversially-most insist that it would have to create a path to
permanent residence, permitting guest workers who wished to become
permanent residents to apply for a green card after a time in temporary
status. 192 So long as these conditions are met, pro-guest worker unions say,
it is far better to have a legal population of workers than one hidden in the
shadows.
2. Obstacles to Achieving the Goals of a Good Guest Worker Program
If incorporated into a new guest worker program (which is extremely
politically unlikely) and fully enforced (more unlikely still), such
provisions would make guest workers quite similar to full-fledged legal
immigrants. Even in this ideal form, however, the remaining differences
between guest workers and legal permanent residents are telling. So too is
191. Id.
192. Pastor & Alva, supra note 166, at 101-03; Coalition for Comprehensive Immigration
Reform, Principles for Comprehensive Immigration Reform, http://www.cimow.org/content/en/about_
principles.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2007).
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the likely impact of those differences on efforts to establish labor
citizenship in the workplaces where "guests" labor.
a. Guest Work Undermines Working Conditions in the United States
The unions that oppose guest work argue that there is no way to
adequately address the danger that such workers will be used to undercut
U.S. workers' wages and thus to undermine labor citizenship. While the
best proposals for a new guest worker program build in features designed
to protect the migrant workers' rights, those features will prove both
inadequate and beside the point if history is any guide. Temporary workers
know that they will be in the United States for a limited period of time, and
they are seeking to maximize the money they can earn. This is not a
mindset conducive to the defense of basic rights, much less to union
organizing.'93 The sense of contingent status the program creates, unions
argue, makes guest workers unlikely to take the risks needed to become
labor citizens. Therefore, their impact on the labor market will inevitably
be negative.
The response from the pro-guest work unions is that opponents are not
thinking creatively enough about the configuration of a new program. Just
because current past visas have proven exploitative, they argue, does not
mean a better way cannot be found.'94 But the opponents are not reassured.
Even a perfect program, they fear, would massively increase competition
from "outsiders" at the bottom of the labor market. 195 Indeed, the more
guest workers are able to act like free agents, the swifter their path to
permanent residence, and the more they look, from a traditional labor
citizenship standpoint, like an invasion of unorganized low-wage workers
coming to compete with those already here.
b. Guest Work Encourages Undocumented Immigration
Although guest work programs are often offered as the solution to
undocumented immigration-a way, in the crude terms in which it is
193. For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Part IV.C.2.a, supra. For an analysis of the negative
impact of immigrants' "sojourner" mentality on their likelihood to support union organizing, see Roger
Waldinger & Claudia Der-Martirosian, Immigrant Workers and American Labor: Challenge... or
Disaster?, in ORGANIZING IMMIGRANTS, supra note 142, at 49. See also GORDON, SUBURBAN
SWEATSHOPS, supra note 3, at 36-37.
194. See, e.g., Chishti, supra note 140, at 73-74 ("[E]ndorsing a temporary worker program, in
principle, today does not mean accepting elements that have made such programs so notorious in the
past.").
195. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 172, at 5 ("There is no way to eliminate the distortion and
dependence that accompanies guest workers.").
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sometimes put, to "dry up the pool"' 96-many argue that guest work is
unlikely to achieve that goal. As a historical matter, guest work programs
in the United States and Europe have led to increased migration, including
undocumented migration.' 97 And, even the most liberal guest worker
proposals currently on the table have features that virtually guarantee that
many in the temporary worker population will eventually become
undocumented, thus replenishing the "pool" that the legislation is intended
to drain.' 98
c. Guest Work Creates a Formal Tier of Second-class Citizens
The most fundamental normative argument against any form of guest
work is that, by its very nature, such a program creates explicit second-
class citizenship. 199 Temporary worker programs seek to ensure that people
admitted through the program will be here only so long as they are filling
specific labor needs. 20 0 By their name and structure, progressive opponents
urge, they induce in participants a sense that they are marked as lesser, the
perennial "other," never to be considered full and genuine members in the
196. See David Bacon, U.S. Corporations Win the Immigration Debate, Z MAG., Nov. 2004,
available at http://zmagsite.zmag.org/Nov2004/baconpr1104.html.
197. Tanya Basok, He Came, He Saw, He... Stayed. Guest Worker Programmes and the Issue of
Non-return, 38 INT'L MIGRATION 215, 217-28 (2000); Freeman, supra note 56, at 60 ("The problem
with the guest-worker system from the point of view of the host state is that it tends to break down.");
Friedrich Heckmann, Temporary Labor Migration or Immigration? "Guest Workers" in the Federal
Republic of Germany, in GUESTS COME TO STAY: THE EFFECTS OF EUROPEAN LABOR MIGRATION ON
SENDING AND RECEIVING COUNTRIES 69 (Rosemarie Rogers ed., 1985); Martin, supra note 172. See
also Maurice Schiff, When Migrants Overstay Their Legal Welcome: A Proposed Solution to the Guest-
worker Program, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 1401, 2004 INST. FOR THE STUD. OF LAB., at 1-2.
198. The McCain-Kennedy bill, for example, would require temporary visa holders to leave the
country after forty-five days of unemployment; if they do not, they are rendered ineligible to gain
permanent status. S. 1033, 109th Cong. (2005). Where is the Brazilian or Nigerian worker going to get
the money for the flight home after forty-five days without work? The worker will, instead, remain here
in violation of the law.
199. Leslie Berestein, AFL-CIO Has Guest-worker Strategy; Legalization Backed for Immigrants
Here, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2006, at Cl ("'To embrace the expansion of temporary guest-worker
programs is to embrace the creation of an undemocratic, two-tier society. "'(quoting Linda Chavez,
AFL-CIO Executive Vice President)). Journalist David Bacon has emphasized similar points in a series
of articles on the topic. See, e.g., Bacon, supra note 188 (arguing that guest worker programs render
migrants vulnerable to abuse, rob them of the ability to enforce their rights, and consign them to a
permanent underclass in U.S. society). See also David Bacon, Immigrants, http://dbacon.igc.org/
Imgrants/imgrants.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2007) (providing links to similar articles).
200. See Bush on Immigration, supra note 13 ("1 propose a new temporary worker program that
will match willing foreign workers with willing American employers when no Americans can be found
to fill the jobs.... This program expects temporary workers to return permanently to their home
countries.").
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communities where they live or in the country where they sweat out their
days. 20 1
Some would argue that we should be less concerned about guest
workers' second-class status where the law permits those workers
eventually to adjust to permanent residence. 20 2 But this, opponents respond,
does not address troubling inequities at both the individual and the societal
level.203 From the perspective of guest workers, such a regime still requires
them to be on their best behavior and remain in compliance with a
burdensome set of regulations for years before they will be permitted to
begin walking the path to full membership. From a societal perspective, it
is not an answer to concerns about second-class citizenship that any one
migrant's time in that status may be brief. The class itself is permanent,
even if its composition changes over the years. Indeed, the very fact that
migrants are only in the class temporarily may be used as a justification for
lower wages and worse treatment. For the United States to create a formal
category of residents who must earn the right to so much as apply for a
green card through years of hard manual labor, opponents say, is
unprecedented in U.S. history and inimical to this country's professed
tradition of equality and citizenship without tiers.204
V. TRANSNATIONAL LABOR CITIZENSHIP
In the short term, ongoing labor migration to the United States is a
given. Where countries of greatly unequal wealth share a border, and where
manual work abounds in the richer country, people will move in search of
opportunity. Although we seek to sort those people into legal categories,
such as "family-sponsored immigrant," "temporary worker," and"undocumented migrant," and attach limits and consequences to the
markers, in the end, labels shift but never wholly shape the reality of those
who bear them. Limit one category through which manual workers can
enter and another bulges. The urge to migrate and the demand for migrants
201. See Bacon, supra note 188; Berestein, supra note 199.
202. See, e.g., Chishti, supra note 140, at 74 ("Temporary worker status thus becomes a path
toward permanent residence.... [T]hey are not truly temporary workers, but actually permanent
residents-in-waiting.").
203. For a persuasive argument against any form of guest worker program, including those with a
path to permanent residence, on the grounds that such programs impede immigrant integration in the
long term, see Cristina M. Rodriguez, Guest Worker Programs and the Challenge to Immigrant
Incorporation, U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming Oct. 2007).
204. For a discussion of European temporary work programs as a form of "institutionalized
inequality," see generally KITTY CALAVITA, IMMIGRANTS AT THE MARGINS: LAW, RACE, AND
EXCLUSION IN SOUTHERN EUROPE (2005).
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is greater than the law (or, at the least, greater than the law we have as yet
been willing to pass, and we have passed some draconian laws).
In the long term, a genuine solution to the "immigration problem"
would focus not on refining and enforcing classes of entry, but on
addressing the underlying factors that bring so many to decide to leave.205
This will only happen through sustainable development in sending
countries so that their residents can support themselves and their families
on work available within the country. 216 Critical to achieving this is ending
the debt restructuring practices of institutions such as the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund. The structural adjustments imposed by
these lenders have pushed developing countries to invest less in education,
health care, and housing; devalue their currencies; refocus their economies
on production for export and on the consumption of goods produced
elsewhere; and take other measures that have undermined the living
conditions and future prospects of their residents. 20 7 It is helpful to
remember, however, that addressing push factors is only half of the
equation. As Alejandro Portes and Rubdn Rumbaut remind us in the
introduction to their classic Immigrant America: A Portrait, "Manual labor
migration is ... not a one-way flow away from poverty and want, but
rather a two-way process fueled by the changing needs and interests of
those who come and those who profit from their labor., 20 8 No long-term
205. A fuller solution-if complete societal transformation can be called a "solution"-is to
equalize developed and less-developed countries so that North to South migration is as attractive and
viable as the current unidirectional South to North flow. This would require not just development in
Southern countries but a weaning of more developed economies off of their astronomical consumption
of natural and other resources.
206. A study released by the Pew Hispanic Center in December of 2005 ignited a debate on this
point. The study found that "[tlhe vast majority of undocumented migrants from Mexico were gainfully
employed before they left for the United States." From this information, its author concluded, "failure
to find work at home does not seem to be the primary reason that the estimated 6.3 million
undocumented migrants from Mexico have come to the U.S." RAKESH KOCHHAR, PEW HISPANIC CTR.,
SURVEY OF MEXICAN MIGRANTS, PART III: THE ECONOMIC TRANSITION TO AMERICA, at i (2005). This
finding was widely reported in the media. See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Most Mexican Immigrants in New
Study Gave Up Jobs to Take Their Chances in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2005, at A30. But what the
study did not ask was, employed doing what? Informal, part-time, and low-paying jobs in Mexico are
"employment," but they do not generate an income that is stable or adequate enough to support a
family. See also ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBtN RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA: A PORTRAIT 11 (2d
ed. 1996) ("'[T]he findings indicate that it is not the lack of jobs, but of well-paid jobs, which fuels
migration to the United States."' (quoting WAYNE CORNELIUS, ILLEGAL MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE
UNITED STATES 4 (1977)).
207. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 53-67, 78-80 (2003); Carmen
G. Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization, Food Security, and the Environment: The Neoliberal Threat to
Sustainable Rural Development, 14 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 419,457-58 (2004).
208. PORTES & RUMBAUT, supra note 206, at 18.
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solution can be effective unless it also addresses work and the conditions of
work in the United States.
For the foreseeable future, there will continue to be an oversupply of
workers seeking so-called low-skilled jobs in the United States. How, then,
should we approach the task of preserving and creating decent work here?
In a transnational labor market, the answer lies in a form of labor
citizenship that correspondingly crosses borders. By this I mean
considerably more than the usual references to and experiments with
international solidarity between unions. I propose the creation of a new
immigration status, "transnational labor citizenship," which would entitle
the holder to come and go freely between the sending country and the
United States, and to work in the United States without restriction.20 9 The
transnational labor citizenship regime would be the product of a binational
public/private collaboration. For conceptual ease, I will limit the discussion
to Mexico, but the model could take root in any migrant-sending country. It
would be brought into being and governed by a combination of
negotiations between the United States and Mexico, unilateral regulation
by both governments, and the engagement of a network of
nongovernmental workers organizations operating across borders,
membership in one of which would be a precondition for obtaining a visa.
The network would have a strong presence both in sending and receiving
countries, with a mission of raising the floor on wages and working
conditions for all workers in the United States, with particular attention to
its members, the newest to arrive and thus the most easily exploitable.
A quick review of the legal and functional structure of the current
guest worker program for low-wage, low-skilled workers sets up the
contrast with transnational labor citizenship. The current regime is a
unilateral and largely privatized one. Unlike other countries' guest work
programs, such as the Mexico-Canada Seasonal Agricultural Workers
Program, the U.S. program was designed without formal input from
sending-country governments and does not require or envision any role for
such governments in administering or monitoring the flow of guest
209. Transnational labor citizenship fills the gaping hole left by NAFTA's failure to couple free
movement of capital across North American borders with free movement of labor. It also would vastly
increase the network of organizations with the capacity to utilize the complaint mechanism established
through NAFTA's labor side agreement. Finally, it would add a component of democratic deliberation
to the regional integration that NAFTA envisions. For a brief sketch of a proposal for deliberation and
collaboration across Mexico-U.S. borders, see David Bonior, Towards a North American Parliamentary
Union, DEMOCRATIC LEFT, Winter 2003-04, at 5, 13, 15. The European Union's coupling of free
migration between member states with open trade regimes and a range of transnational deliberative
mechanisms is an obvious model for what I propose.
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workers. 2 10 Under the current program, a U.S. employer that wishes to
employ guest workers under the H-2A and H-2B programs must first show
to the satisfaction of the Department of Labor that it has been unable to
recruit U.S. workers at the set wage rate, which varies across the
programs. 211 It is then certified by the Department of Labor and the
Department of Homeland Security's bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services to import a certain number of workers.2 12 Most employers recruit
migrants through private contracting firms operating in sending countries,
which themselves often subcontract the responsibility for choosing workers
to labor recruiters operating in cities and small villages. 2 13 Contractors hold
tremendous power, and the contracting system is riddled with abuses,
ranging from high fees through corruption, usury, and outright fraud.2 14
210. The Mexico-Canada Seasonal Agricultural Workers program was initiated in 1974, after
bilateral negotiations between the two countries. Memorandum of Understanding Between the
Government of Mexico and the Government of Canada Relative to the Admission into Canada of
Mexican Migratory Farm Workers (June 17, 1974) (on file with author). This agreement envisions both
a larger role for the Mexican government and a wider range of rights for participating workers than the
U.S. H-2A program. See Agreement for the Employment in Canada of Seasonal Agricultural Workers
from Mexico-2007, available at http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/en/epb/lmd/fw/forms/2007mexicansawp-e.pdf.
See also TANYA BASOK, TORTILLAS & TOMATOES: TRANSMIGRANT MEXICAN HARVESTERS IN
CANADA 37-40 (2002).
211. See 20 C.F.R. 653.501(d)(4) (2006) (discussing the H-2A program); U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Foreign Labor Certification: Prevailing Wage Determinations for Nonagricultural Programs, (Aug. 1,
2005), available at http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/wages.cfm (discussing the H-2B program).
212. Once the National Processing Center determines that the employer is in compliance with all
requirements, "the National Processing Center will grant the temporary foreign agricultural labor
certification for the number of job opportunities for which it has been determined that there are not
sufficient U.S. workers available." U.S. Dep't of Labor, H-2A Certification, http://www.foreign
laborcert.doleta.gov/h-2a.cfm (last visited Mar. 11, 2007); U.S. Dep't of Labor, OFLC Frequently
Asked Questions and Answers: H-2B Temporary Labor Certifications (Nonagricultural),
www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/faqsanswers.cfm#h2bl (last visited Mar. 11, 2007) ("Certification is
issued only or [sic] a specific job opportunity, for a specific number of workers, and for a specific
employment period."). Employers often contract out the responsibility for this certification process to
an employers' association (such as the North Carolina Growers' Association) or a labor contracting
firm (such as Global Horizons).
213. See, e.g., Fred Krissman, Farm Labor Contractors: The Processors of New Immigrant Labor
from Mexico for Californian Agribusiness, 12 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 18, 26 (1995).
214. These contractors and recruiters routinely charge workers steep fees for visa processing, with
additional bribes on the side for priority in the selection process. They often demand the money well in
advance of departure, working in tandem with local lenders who charge interest of upwards of 30%,
with the result that workers leave the country deeply in debt. WORLD BANK, AT HOME AND AWAY: JOB
OPPORTUNITIES FOR PACIFIC ISLANDERS THROUGH LABOUR MOBILITY 117, 131 (2006), available at
http://go.worldbank.org/FU6EIDBG30; Krissman, supra note 213, at 26-27. Mexico's federal labor law
does technically regulate labor contractors recruiting workers for foreign employment. The law is
limited in scope but contains some essential guarantees, including mandating that the employer cover
all transportation, food, visa and border-crossing costs, and requiring the contractor to post a bond to
ensure that these and other obligations (including the provision of a written contract) are met. Ley
Federal del Trabajo [L.F.T.] [Federal Labor Law], Titulo Il, Capitulo 1, Articulo 28, 1997 (Mex.). Like
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The U.S. government steps in again after receiving workers' passports from
contractors, as the U.S. consulate interviews and fingerprints the workers,
and-presuming that there are no security risks or immigration
violations-approves their visas. Migrants are then transported by the
private contractors to their ultimate destination. They must remain with the
employer who contracted them for their entire stay in the United States.
When that job ends, they must return home.
A. TRANSNATIONAL LABOR CITIZENSHIP: THE PROPOSAL
Transnational labor citizenship is based on the theory that the only
way to create a genuine floor on working conditions within a context of
heavy competition is to link worker self-organization with the enforcement
power of the state in a way that crosses borders just as workers do.215 In its
full form, transnational labor citizenship would reconfigure the relationship
between sending countries and the United States, rework core assumptions
of the U.S. immigration system, and reshape the way that the U.S.
government and civil society workers' organizations relate with regard to
labor migrants.216 The changes I propose are vast, and I will explore them
more fully in a separate venue. In the remaining pages of this Article, I will
do three preliminary things: sketch the outlines of the transnational labor
citizenship proposal, suggest a "micro" version that might be possible to
implement at this time, and, in Part VI, outline and briefly respond to some
of the concerns that might be raised about the model.
1. A Binational Collaborative Framework
The framework for transnational labor citizenship would be
established through negotiations between the U.S. and Mexican
many labor-protective laws in Mexico, however, it is essentially unenforced. See, e.g., No Guarantees:
Sex Discrimination in Mexico's Maquiladora Sector, 8 HRW (Hum. Rts. Watch/Women's Rts. Project),
Aug. 17, 1996, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/MexiO896.htm (documenting the Mexican
government's failure to enforce a range of laws intended to protect women from sex discrimination at
work); Interview with Rachel Micah-Jones, Founder and Executive Director, Centro de los Derechos
del Migrante, Inc., Zacatecas, Mex. (May 24, 2006).
215. For a discussion on the role of civil society organizations in regulatory enforcement, see note
218, infra. See also ARCHON FUNG, DARA O'ROURKE & CHARLES SABEL, CAN WE PUT AN END TO
SWEATSHOPS? (2001); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); Charles Sabel & Michael
Dorf, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
216. As noted above, this is a U.S.-centric proposal, designed to address the erosion of labor
citizenship within the United States and to tackle the problems faced by labor migrants to the United
States. A more comprehensive-and genuinely transnational-proposal would entitle transnational
labor citizens to travel and work freely across all national borders.
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governments 217  with considerable input from nongovernmetal
organizations with experience in the labor or migration fields. It would be
implemented through a collaborative process involving government
agencies and nongovernmental organizations within and across the two
nations. 218 A network of transnational labor organizations in both countries
would play an essential role in the process, both individually and through a
coordinating body.219
217. The Mexican government has called for a framework of "shared responsibility" in place of
the current unilateral system. See, e.g., Mexico and the Migration Phenomenon, Mex. Fed. Cong. Res.
(2006), available at http://internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/Mexico%20Migration%20
Phenomenon.pdf ("The migration phenomenon has international implications that demand from
Mexico actions and international commitments ... [which] should be guided by the principle of shared
responsibility.").
Indeed, for the negotiations to be truly transnational, they would need to take into account the
role of Mexico and the Central American nations as both sending and receiving countries. Mexico is
home to tens of thousands of migrants from Central America who travel there in search of better work
opportunities than they can find in their home countries. There is large-scale migration between Central
American countries as well. Sarah J. Mahler & Dusan Ugrina, Central America: Crossroads of the
Americas, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE (Migration Pol'y Instit., Wash., D.C.), Apr. 1, 2006.
218. Claus Offe's theories of "corporatism from below" and the idea of associational democracy,
as articulated by political scientists Joel Rogers and Joshua Cohen, provide a conceptual framework for
this process. In a nutshell, Offe argues that we have erred in conceiving of an impermeable dividing
wall between government and civil society organizations, and that democracy would benefit by creating
a wider role for nongovernmental groups in governance. CLAUS OFFE, DISORGANIZED CAPITALISM:
CONTEMPORARY TRANSFORMATIONS OF WORK AND POLITICS (1985). Rogers and Cohen and others
who have elaborated a theory of associative democracy take this idea one step further, exploring ways
that people directly affected by government programs might play concrete roles in decisionmaking
about those programs. See generally Joel Rogers & Joshua Cohen, Secondary Associations and
Democratic Governance, in ASSOCIATIONS AND DEMOCRACY 7 (Joel Rogers & Joshua Cohen eds.,
1995). Transnational labor citizenship would implement aspects of associational democracy on a global
scale.
The emerging field of Global Administrative Law offers useful insights with regard to how such a
regime might ensure accountability and establish democratic governance procedures. See N.Y.U.
School of Law, Inst. Int'l L. & Just., Research: Global Administrative Law, http://www.iilj.org/
global adlaw/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2007); Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The
Emergence of Global Administrative Law (Inst. Int'l L. & Just., Working Paper No. 2004/1, 2004),
available at http://www.iilj.org/publications/wpglobadminlaw.htm. In such a regime, questions of
potential co-optation and the challenges of sharing responsibility in a context of vastly unequal power
come to the fore. However independently an advocacy network operates at the outset, the state has
tremendous power to shape its goals and functioning, particularly where the relationship between the
two is explicitly designed as a collaborative one.
219. The literature on transnational advocacy networks ("TANs") is suggestive with regard to how
the individual transnational labor organizations would be established, how they would develop a
consistent internal culture and organizing approach, and how their interactions with each other-the
network-would be governed and monitored. For examples of TAN-led campaigns on issues related to
human rights, the environment, women's rights, and labor rights, and for discussion of the structure,
function and efficacy of TANs in general, see MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS
BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); Dave Trubek, Jim
Mosher & Jeffrey S. Rothstein, Transnationalism in the Regulation of Labor Relations: International
Regimes and Transnational Advocacy Networks, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1187 (2000).
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The resulting program could address problems beginning at the point
of recruitment and continuing through the migrant's return home through
joint efforts to regulate labor contractors, eradicate fraud and corruption,
eliminate labor abuses, and ensure compliance with program requirements
at all levels. It would also extend beyond the immediate migratory flow, to
establish a mutual commitment to sustainable development in both sending
and receiving countries and to genuinely enforceable labor rights in all
signatory countries.
2. Migrant Rights and Obligations
In practical terms, transnational labor citizenship would permit its
holder to work for any employer in the United States with full labor rights
and eventual conversion to permanent residence if the migrant so desired.
The migrant, and his or her family, could come and go between the United
States and Mexico, remaining here when jobs were plentiful and returning
home at slow times, for the harvest on their own farm, for family events, or
for holidays.22 °
The benefits of the program need little elaboration: the right to travel
freely, to work, and to adjust to permanent residence over time would be
enormous attractions for many. But the obligations participants incur would
be serious ones as well. In order to be certified as eligible to apply for
transnational labor citizenship by the Mexican government, interested
migrants would have to join a Mexican independent transnational labor
organization working in or near their sending community. To remain in the
United States more than a month beyond entry, migrants would also have
to join another transnational labor organization that was actively organizing
within the industry in which they worked, in the geographic area of the
United States where they settled. Equally important, each migrant would be
asked to take a "solidarity oath" as a condition of membership, promising
to take no job that violated basic workplace laws or that paid less than the
minimum set by the transnational labor organizations, to report employer
violators to their transnational labor organizations once discovered, and to
uphold union solidarity with other workers (for example, refusing to cross
picket lines). Failure to adhere to these requirements would be grounds for
removal from membership in the transnational labor organizations and
withdrawal of the visa.
220. In this sense transnational labor citizenship would do a far better job of supporting what
Maria Ontiveros has termed the "transnational lives" of labor migrants than our current system does.
Maria Ontiveros, Lessons from the Fields: Female Farmworkers and the Law, 55 MAINE L. REV. 158,
180 (2002).
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These features distinguish transnational labor citizenship from the"good guest worker" proposals outlined in the previous part. Different, too,
is the absence of numerical restrictions. Transnational labor citizenship
would be made freely available to those willing to comply with the oath
and membership conditions. 221
3. The Role of Transnational Labor Organizations
The centerpiece of this proposal is a network of transnational labor
organizations, grassroots groups located in sending and receiving
communities. Such organizations might emerge from existing NGOs,
worker centers, or unions, or might be founded independently. These
organizations would work intensively with migrants on the ground. In
Mexico, transnational labor organizations would hold a series of meetings
for would-be migrants, first to introduce them to the program and its
requirements, and-after visas were approved-to orient them to "how
work works" in the United States. This would include introducing them to
the transnational labor organization network in the United States and
providing training about labor laws, the labor and immigration history of
the United States, mechanisms for protecting rights, and the structure and
operation of the labor movement in the United States.
When the migrants arrived in the United States, the U.S. transnational
labor organizations in their area would hold welcome meetings, orienting
them to the region, laying out the options for membership, and inviting the
migrants to know-your-rights classes, English classes, and social, cultural,
221. In this sense, transnational labor citizenship is related to calls for open borders, although
there are key differences between the two. Open borders have long been advocated by libertarians and
pro-business conservatives. The Wall Street Journal, for example, has periodically reiterated its open
border position in editorials since the mid-1980s. See, e.g., Robert L. Bartley, Op-Ed, Thinking Things
Over: Liberty's Flame Beckons a Bit Brighter, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2000, at A13 (proposing a
constitutional amendment mandating open borders, and stating "We stand... for 'free markets and free
men' .... Someone who believes in the free trade in goods and free movements of capital will quite
naturally believe in free movement of labor, another factor of production."). Progressives have
advocated for open (or more open) borders on moral and human rights grounds, as well as a matter of
sound policy. See, e.g., Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV.
POL. 251 (1987); Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders? 51 UCLA L. REV. 193 (2003).
The transnational labor citizenship proposal is like an open border regime in that it would make
visas available to as many immigrants as were willing to comply with its membership and solidarity
requirements. The lack of numerical limits is a pragmatic element of the proposal, born of the belief that
efforts to restrict immigration will recreate a pool of undocumented workers. But unlike some open
borders proposals, transnational labor citizenship proposes continued (and in some cases increased)
engagement by agencies of various governments in regulation of the migration process, and introduces
a new role for transnational labor organizations in advocating and enforcing better wages and working
conditions in the industries where the new immigrants labor.
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and organizing activities. In the best-organized sectors, the transnational
labor organizations would be administering collective bargaining
agreements that covered transnational labor citizens together with other
workers. In those areas, transnational labor organization staff would also
provide copies of the contract and explain its benefits and grievance
process to the new arrivals.
The goal of the U.S. transnational labor organizations-and of the
program as a whole-would be to foster genuine labor citizenship not only
among the migrants as a group, but also among all workers in the area
across the boundaries of nationality, race, and immigration status. Essential
to that end would be concrete shared projects that involved local unions,
worker centers, and community groups, with the transnational labor
organization at the center. A good part of the energy thus generated would
be directed toward defending the rights of transnational labor citizens on
the job, through legal representation, protest, and media work.222 This
would serve the self-interest of unions because of their need to defend the
floor on the labor market but would also be an opportunity for the new
migrants and union members to get to know each other. These links could
then be strengthened through joint trainings on health and safety issues
and/or job skills, and through apprenticeship programs to draw migrants
into existing unions. 223
As migrants returned home, the Mexican transnational labor
organizations would staff ongoing organizing and leadership development
efforts and provide critical links between and support for ongoing
222. One obvious objection to the transnational labor citizenship proposal is that by improving
wages, it will cut into the number of jobs. This is the same objection that is routinely made to any effort
to set or raise a floor on wages and working conditions. See, e.g., D. Mark Wilson, Increasing the
Mandated Minimum Wage: Who Pays the Price?, BACKGROUNDER (Heritage Found., Wash., D.C.),
Mar. 5, 1998. One response is to argue that there are conditions of work that do not comport with basic
human rights, and that jobs lost as the result of an effort to eradicate such conditions are not jobs we
should have in this country. Another, more subtle approach is to explore ways for transnational labor
organizations to move with sensitivity to local conditions to incorporate those workers in the labor
market rather than displacing them. For models of similar approaches, see Jane E. Larson, Negotiating
Informality Within Formality: Land and Housing in the Texas Colonias, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION
FROM BELOW 140 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Csar A. Rodriguez-Garavito eds., 2005)
[hereinafter LAW AND GLOBALIZATION] (calling for informal, flexible housing regulation that is
sensitive to the needs of poor residents); SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 166
(1998) (calling for flexible schemes of economic regulation to support the growth of small businesses
currently located in the underground economy).
223. A particularly promising development in this regard was the initiation of a historic
partnership in the summer of 2006 between the National Day Laborer Organizing Network ("NDLON")
and the AFL-CIO. Steven Greenhouse, Labor Federation Forms a Pact with Day Workers, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 2006, at Al 8 (describing the new partnership and its implications).
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organizing campaigns and lawsuits related to the migrants' work in the
United States. Transnational labor citizens would be able to draw on the
transnational labor organizations' legal resources (either from within the
United States or from the sending country) to pursue claims against
employers in the United States for violations of workplace law, from being
paid less than minimum wage, to denials of workers compensation for on-
the-job injury, to sexual harassment. They would also have access to a
variety of other services, from notarization, to English classes, to health
care accessible in both countries.
U.S. and Mexican transnational labor organizations would be linked
through a network that enabled them to collaborate to defend the rights of
their members through a combination of government enforcement,
lawsuits, and collective pressure. As a part of that network, all transnational
labor organizations would be members of, and participate in, a parent
organization, the Transnational Worker Collaborative, with offices in the
United States and Mexico. The Transnational Worker Collaborative would
be run by a board of representatives from all of the transnational labor
organizations, elected representatives from the pool of transnational labor
citizens, and others as invited (advocates, workers, academics, and other
experts from both countries). Its main function would be oversight and
accreditation of the member organizations, monitoring of the migration
process, and policy reform efforts. In the sending country, as migrants
applied for transnational labor citizenship, Transnational Worker
Collaborative staff would act as observers during the selection process to
ensure that the rules established about eligibility for visas were followed.
The Transnational Worker Collaborative would be free-standing, not a part
of an already-existing labor union or worker center either in the United
States or Mexico. It would, however, have strong ties to and support from
such groups in both countries.
B. TRANSNATIONAL LABOR CITIZENSHIP: THE MICRO VERSION
I offer the transnational labor citizenship proposal in its full form even
as I recognize that its achievement is not currently feasible. Such a massive
overhaul of the current cross-border migration scheme would face obstacles
that are profound. For the realization of transnational labor citizenship, the
most necessary feature-the participation of the U.S. government-is also
the most unlikely. 224And yet, the project of concretely imagining how a
224. Nonetheless, there are some incentives for the business lobby (the primary moving force
behind the guest worker proposal) to accept transnational labor citizenship. It gives the Chamber of
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more just system would operate is critically important, especially when, as
now, the changes necessary to get there seem impossibly distant.
Furthermore, to recognize that the whole cannot be realized should not
mean giving up on the parts.2 25
The question at hand, then, is what a concrete and positive vision of
transnational labor citizenship might look like in a world where the U.S.
government remains determined to act unilaterally regarding its
immigration policy and, in so doing, continues to be highly responsive to
the demands of the business lobby. A new guest worker program crafted in
the current political moment is likely to contain some form of contract
between employer and worker, a visa status dependent on continuous
employment, a long path, if any, to permanent residence, and no rights for
family accompaniment. Is there any room in such a framework for positive
steps toward transnational labor citizenship?
I believe there is. In the United States, Canada, Mexico, and elsewhere
around the world, there are experiments underway today that give hope that
a micro version of transnational labor citizenship might be possible in the
near term even in the context of a traditional guest worker program and
without permission or even participation from the U.S. government. These
experiments are emerging from a range of binational and multinational
agreements, internal initiatives by sending-country governments, and
efforts led by unions and nongovernmental organizations. I describe here
three features of a realistic micro-experiment in transnational labor
citizenship: regulation by the Mexican state of key aspects of the migration
process, unionization of guest workers, and transnational legal advocacy to
Commerce and its industry allies precisely what they say they want: access to employees at a fair wage
where U.S. workers are unwilling to do the work at that level of compensation. And it eliminates the
features of the current program that draw the most frequent fire from its business beneficiaries.
Corporations will not have to bear the paperwork burden currently associated with the H-visa, about
which they frequently complain, and will not have to predict their hiring needs in advance as the current
program requires them to do. See Guestworker Visa Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration and Claims of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 15-32 (2001) (statement of
Randel Johnson, Vice President of Labor and Employee Benefits, U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
225. I approach the construction of my micro-experiment in the spirit suggested by Boaventura de
Sousa Santos and Crsar Rodriguez-Garavito in the introduction to their co-edited book, LAW AND
GLOBALIZATION, supra note 222. They argue for what they label the "sociology of emergence," which
"entails interpreting in an expansive way the initiatives, movements, and organizations that resist
neoliberal globalization and offer alternatives to it." Id. at 17. This approach seeks to "underscore the
signals, clues, or traces of future possibilities embedded in nascent or marginalized legal practices or
knowledge." Id.
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enforce guest worker rights. Each has its roots in a recent development on
the ground that I set out below.226
1. Unilateral Regulation by Mexican Federal and State Governments
Take as a starting point a guest work program set up exclusively by
the U.S. government, with (again, for the sake of simplicity) Mexico as the
sole sending country. Even in such a unilateral regime, the Mexican
government has latitude to shape the guest worker program, derived from
its sovereignty in the domestic realm and the presence within its borders of
the labor that U.S. employers seek.227 The federal government or the
various governments of the Mexican states could, for example, take direct
responsibility for recruitment, eliminating exploitative labor contractors. 228
226. There are a number of other promising developments that space does not permit me to
engage here. I save for a future date exploration of the parallels and lessons for my proposal from the
EU's experimentation with greater labor mobility among EU countries, and from incipient efforts by
building trades unions around the world to create an "international hiring hall," among other fertile
possibilities.
227. For an overview of Mexico's efforts to control emigration from 1900 to the early 1970s, see
David Fitzgerald, State and Emigration: A Century of Emigration Policy in Mexico (Ctr. for Comp.
Immigr. Stud., Working Paper No. 123, 2005). Today, Mexico has largely abandoned restrictions on
out-migration. Instead, it seeks to ensure that migration continues, to keep remittance dollars flowing.
Mexican migrants currently send home over $20 billion per year. Id.; INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT
BANK, REMITTANCES 2005: PROMOTING FINANCIAL DEMOCRACY 33 (2006).
228. Another objection to such a proposal from the Mexican perspective is that it might render
Mexico less competitive in the global tournament to supply workers to the United States. Although
guest work programs are frequently discussed as if they were exclusively U.S.-Mexican affairs (an
impression furthered by articles such as this one, which use Mexico as their primary example even as
they acknowledge that guest worker sending countries are scattered across the globe), there are no
country limitations on H-visas, nor do most current legislative proposals before the U.S. Congress
anticipate a country-specific guest work stream. The Mexican government, then, is acutely aware of the
need to minimize barriers to recruitment if it is to retain its favored status as the supplier of most guest
workers to the United States, something that it very much wants to do to ensure the continued flow of
remittances back home. When individual Mexican states consider inserting themselves into the
recruitment process, they face the same concern on the level of competition between states for visas and
remittances. This concern leads directly to the recognition that any full version of the proposal must be
not only bilateral, but also multilateral, involving all of the major sending countries.
In the meantime, however, and for the micro version, it is important to remember several things.
One is the overwhelming advantage that Mexico has because of its physical proximity with the United
States, which contributes greatly to the ease and relative cheapness of the recruitment process. A recent
legal holding has strengthened Mexico's position in this regard. In 2002, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that
employers are responsible for guest workers' travel costs from the hometown to the U.S. workplace.
Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, 305 F.3d 1228, 1228 (11th Cir. 2002). These travel costs are considerably
less expensive for workers coming from Mexico--where the entire journey, although arduous for the
worker, can be accomplished by bus-than from other nations that require airfare in addition to ground
transportation. Another is that few aspects of the transnational labor citizenship proposal would add in
any significant way to the price of labor recruitment. State-run recruiting centers could be as easy and
inexpensive for employers to deal with as privately created entities. Further, even the transnational
labor organization membership requirement does not impose costs on employers beyond a greater
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This may seem politically unlikely, given the officials and private citizens
at many levels who benefit from the web of kickbacks and lucrative fees
that the current system generates. Yet there is precedent for it. On the
federal level, the Mexican government already functions as the sole
contractor for its Canadian guest work program, which sends over 10,000
Mexicans to Canada annually. And individual Mexican states have
experimented with managing recruitment for U.S. guest work programs
through their state-run Migration Institutes, with no contractor
involvement. 229
Once they controlled the recruitment process, Mexican state or federal
authorities could set minimum requirements for workers eligible to
participate in guest work programs. For participants in its Canada program,
for example, the Mexican government prioritizes those with the lowest
educational levels, the largest families, and the fewest assets. 230  The
Migration Institute of Zacatecas, Mexico, meanwhile, selected the
unemployed and the poorest rural workers for its program. 23 1 In the context
of the micro transnational labor citizenship proposal, this authority could be
exercised to mandate membership in a transnational labor organization as a
prerequisite for applying for a visa through the state agency, on the grounds
that the interests of Mexico and its citizens were best served by sending
migrants with a watchdog on their shoulder. Such a policy might better be
able to guard against abuses and increase the income of migrants (and thus
the remittances they sent, the preservation of which is the primary concern
of the Mexican government) than the current system. 232
likelihood that they will be required to respect the minimum workplace standards embodied in law, a
point that employers are not in a strong position to resist.
229. For a description of the program in Zacatecas, where it was most fully developed, see Miguel
Moctezuma Longoria, Trabajadores Temporales Contratados por EE. UU.: Informe Sabre el Programa
Piloto del Gobierno de Zacatecas, (Temporary Workers Contracted by the U.S.: Report on the Pilot
Program of the Government of Zacatecas) (on file with author) (describing the state-run contracting
process in Zacatecas, in which the Zacatecan government screens and selects workers for placement in
participating companies, eliminating the role of the labor recruiter). The states of Michoacin and
Guanajuato have created similar experiments. Interview with Rachel Micah-Jones, supra note 214.
230. BASOK, supra note 210, at 98-99.
231. Longoria, supra note 229, at 5.
232. In the Mexico-Canada program, a Mexican consul meets the workers in Canada to monitor
employer compliance with the terms of the program. BASOK, supra note 210, at 39. The transnational
labor organization arrangement might reasonably be understood as serving the same goal at lower cost
to the Mexican government. In this regard, however, it is important to note that my proposal (unlike the
Mexico-Canada program) relies on the Mexican government to recruit workers but not to enforce their
rights once they arrive. Historically, the Mexican federal government has been ineffective as a
guarantor of its citizens' rights in migration programs. The Mexican government was supposed to play
this role with regard to the bracero program, but abuses were legion. GALARZA, MERCHANTS OF
LABOR, supra note 12, at 146, 183-98. The Mexican government was later sued together with the U.S.
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2. Guest Worker Organizing
As I note in the opening paragraphs of this Article, there are recent
models for how migrants might enter the United States as members of labor
organizations. Since 2004, both the FLOC, an agricultural workers union
concentrated in the Midwest, and the UFW have negotiated collective
bargaining agreements protecting H-2A workers. The UFW agreement with
Global Horizons, a labor contractor, was only announced in the spring of
2006,233 and it is too soon to know how it will work on behalf of the nearly
4000 workers it covers.234 But the FLOC contract went into effect in 2005,
and its early experience in representing another 5000 guest workers offers
promising outlines of how a transnational labor organization might
function.235 It is FLOC's meeting with workers in Monterrey, Mexico, that
I describe in opening this Article.
FLOC's contract with the North Carolina Growers' Association
("NCGA")-the largest employer of guest workers in the United States-
dramatically changes the landscape for the H-2A workers it covers. It
establishes a hiring system that allots employment slots in order of
seniority and, within seniority rank, by union membership.236 It mandates a
government for its failure to accurately account for millions of dollars withheld by authorities from
bracero paychecks and sent to Mexico for distribution to the workers once they returned home. Pam
Belluck, Mexican Laborers in U.S. During War Sue for Back Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2001, § 1, at 1.
In the context of the modem Mexico-Canada program, the Canadian government has failed to deliver
the full range of rights guaranteed to participant workers by the agreements establishing the program,
and the Mexican government again has been unwilling or unable to hold it to its promises. BASOK,
supra note 210, at 111-14 ("[T]he [Mexican] consulate ... is unwilling to interfere when workers
experience problems with their patrones."); UFCW CANADA NATIONAL REPORT ON THE STATUS OF
MIGRANT FARM WORKERS IN CANADA, UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS CANADA 3, 9
(2004) ("The [Canadian] government has indicated that consulates of the sending countries and their
staffs are responsible for supporting and advocating on behalf of workers, even when that support is not
up to the task .... The [Canadian] government insists it has no authority ... to enforce the terms and
conditions of the contract.").
233. See Jerry Hirsch, California and the West, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2006, at C2.
234. Id.
235. Karin Rives, Guest Workers Note Progress, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 29,
2005, at B4.
236. Te6filo Reyes, 8000 "Guest Workers" Join Farm Worker Union in North Carolina, LAB.
NOTES, Oct. 2004; Resumen del Acuerdo: Contrato Laboral Entre FLOC y la NCGA 2004-2008
(Summary of the Agreement: Labor Contract Between FLOC and the NCGA 2004-2008) 7-11, 13-16,
28, 50 (document prepared by FLOC, on file with author) (describing the seniority system, the
governance system, and the protections against unjust firing and failure to rehire). The priority offered
members has been limited in scope by the courts. The contract as originally negotiated mandated that
(with the exception of workers specifically requested by a former employer, who are the first to be
called) all migrants who were union members would be called back for work in order of seniority
before any migrants who did not belong to the union. This provision was later invalidated as a violation
of North Carolina's "Right to Work" laws. The current, modified seniority system reflects a more
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just cause standard for both firing and refusal to rehire, creates a grievance
procedure exclusively available to H-2A workers under the FLOC contract,
and gives FLOC the right to oversee recruitment in Mexico. 237
Most interesting for the purposes of my proposal is the union's new
transnational approach. In March, 2005, FLOC opened an office in
Monterrey, Mexico. 238 Only time will tell what road blocks this effort faces
and whether it ultimately succeeds. 239 But the structure that the union has
established and begun to implement is instructive-indeed, inspirational-
with regard to the idea of how transnational labor citizenship might be
brought to life through the efforts of workers organizations on both sides of
the border.240
FLOC's Monterrey office carries out three significant functions:
enforcing the contract rights of members still in Mexico, particularly
regarding seniority for those yet to be called for work; fighting exploitative
labor contractors; and, increasingly, serving as the headquarters for the
limited priority for members. After the specifically requested migrants depart, the remaining migrants
are called for work in order of the number of seasons worked since 2000; at each level of seniority (for
example, "four seasons worked"), union members are called first, followed by nonmembers. Interview
with Brendan Greene & C~stulo Benavides, FLOC staff, in Monterrey, Mex. (May 22, 2006)
[hereinafter Greene & Benavides Interview].
237. Resumen del Acuerdo, supra note 236, at 7-11, 28.
238. U.S. Unions' Mexico Office Will Aid Guestworkers, 19 LAB. REL. WEEK (BNA) 424 (Mar.
31, 2005); Ansley, supra note 174; Press Release, FLOC, Office Opening Thursday, March 17 in
Monterrey, Mexico (Mar. 17, 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter FLOC, Office Opening]. Its
location is critically important to FLOC, as in Mexico the union is free of North Carolina's "Right to
Work" laws and thus able to ask that workers sign FLOC membership cards at the same time that they
enroll in the H-2A program. Ironically, FLOC is confident in its judgment that North Carolina's "Right
to Work" law does not apply in Monterrey because of an earlier court ruling that went against the union.
In the late 1990s, FLOC sued the North Carolina Growers' Association for age discrimination in the H-
2A recruitment process. The judge in that case held that U.S. laws such as the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act did not apply in Monterrey, Mexico, where the growers did their recruiting. Reyes-
Gaona v. N.C. Growers Ass'n, Inc., 250 F.3d 861, 864-65 (4th Cir. 2001). FLOC is operating on the
assumption that the same would be found with regard to "Right to Work" legislation. Velasquez, supra
note 184.
239. There are recent indications that growers are beginning to pull out of the North Carolina
Growers' Association in order to avoid the union contract. Kristin Collins, Farmers Avoid Migrants'
Union Contract; Growers Look Outside of NC. Association to Find Workers, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 13, 2006, at BI ("This year, the association is down to about 500 farmers [from
1,000 at the time the contract was signed] and will only bring in about 2000 workers [from 10,000
before the contract was signed], director Stan Eury said. He said that if membership dips below 350
farmers, the association will probably shut down.").
240. As another interesting fragment of a potential transnational labor citizenship regime, see the
role of the United Food and Commercial Workers Canada in monitoring and ameliorating the treatment
of guest workers there through a network of five regional Migrant Worker Support Centers. UFCW
CANADA NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 232, at 3. Such centers share a number of characteristics with
the transnational labor organizations I propose.
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union's Mexico-based organizing efforts. In the winter, when migrants
have returned to their home villages, FLOC's staff visit the Mexican
villages where they have the greatest concentration of members. There they
hold house meetings to discuss worker concerns and union strategies, and
convene regional gatherings for members to get to know each other across
villages, to receive training on contract enforcement, and to elect local
representation. 241
This binational organizing strategy, in which guest workers are labor
citizens engaged with their transnational labor organization on departure,
while in the United States, and during their return home, provides a model
for the membership aspect of transnational labor citizenship. In lieu of an
entire network of transnational labor organizations, two or three pilot
projects could be founded in heavy migrant-receiving areas of the United
States, perhaps in collaboration with worker centers or unions.242 Parallel
pilot institutions would be established in major migrant-sending regions of
Mexico, with additional work being done by existing Mexican NGOs and
independent unions. These transnational labor organizations would work
closely together to defend and expand the labor rights of migrants across
the U.S.-Mexican border.
3. Cross-border Legal Advocacy
Migrants who move back and forth between countries face special
challenges when seeking to use courts or administrative agencies to
demand that employers in the United States comply with the law. It is
prohibitively difficult to gather physical evidence, interview witnesses, and
take deposition testimony across borders. 243 Although individual lawyers
have grappled with these challenges for decades, in the past year two
experiments with larger-scale solutions have come into being. The Centro
de los Derechos del Migrante, Inc. (The Center for Migrants Rights, or
CDM) and the Global Workers Justice Alliance extend the reach of U.S.
based lawyers into Mexico and Central America. CDM, located in
Zacatecas, describes itself as "the first transnational workers' rights law
firm" based in central Mexico. Among other functions, it provides support
241. Greene & Benavides Interview, supra note 236.
242. These communities might be selected according to a variety of other characteristics as well,
including the presence of locally rooted industries that would be likely to remain in place during an
organizing campaign, the existence of workers organizations and unions interested in supporting such
an effort, and the strength of the ties of the migrants in that community to an area in the sending country
that itself contained institutions in a position to support the effort.
243. See Ansley, supra note 174, at 44-45; Fundraising Proposal, Global Workers Justice Project
(2005) (on file with author).
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to lawyers pursuing workplace justice cases on behalf of migrants, and
does outreach to inform the migrants of their rights before departure and
after their return. 244 The Global Workers Justice Alliance seeks to establish
a network of collaborating advocates in the United States, Mexico, and
Guatemala.245 The Alliance will train these attorneys in the relevant law
and bring them into a formal network for the purposes of collaborative
representation across borders. 246  These projects reflect a growing
recognition that the current single-country framework for the law of the
workplace is inadequate to address the realities of transnational workers.
They lay the groundwork for a cross-border justice network into which the
transnational labor organizations could feed cases and to whose growth and
strength they would contribute. 247
All of the efforts that I outline in this Part suggest the possibility of
implementing a partial version of transnational labor citizenship without
the participation of the U.S. government.248 Migrants would thus travel as
244. See Centro de los Derechos del Migrante, Inc., http://www.cdmigrante.org (last visited Mar.
11, 2007); Site visit, Centro de los Derechos del Migrante, Inc., Zacatecas, Mex. (May 24-26, 2006);
Centro de los Derechos del Migrante, Inc., Programs, http://www.cdmigrante.org/Porgrams.html (last
visited Mar. 11, 2007).
245. See Global Workers Justice Alliance, http://www.globalworkers.org/programs.html (last
visited Mar. 11, 2007).
246. Id.
247. Other potentially important actors in this regard are the sending-country consulates. Some
consular offices have staff dedicated to addressing the work-related complaints of their nationals. See,
e.g., Consulado General de Mexico en Nueva York, Protecci6n a Mexicanos, http://www.consul
mexny.org/esp/proteccion.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2007) (listing a staff member dedicated to "labor
and immigrant matters" and promising assistance to Mexicans whose labor rights are violated in the
United States). Historically, however, the consuls' record is poor. Although consuls were assigned a
role in resolving bracero complaints, they often ignored workers' claims in order to maintain good
relationships with employers. See GALARZA, MERCHANTS OF LABOR, supra note 12, at 163, 183-98;
NGAI, supra note 12.
248. Other elements of such a regime-such as cross-border benefits-are also emerging through
both public and private efforts. Social security "regularization" is one example. Recently, lobbying by
transnational companies has resulted in the United States signing bilateral "totalization" agreements
with twenty-one foreign governments (the latest with Mexico), providing that in the limited
circumstance where a U.S. company employs U.S. workers in one of those countries, or a foreign
company employs its nationals in the United States, the companies are not required to pay into both
social security systems, and workers can aggregate credit for time worked in both countries to collect
benefits under either one. Soc. Sec. Online, United States/Mexico Totalization Agreement (June 2004),
http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/factsheets/USandMexico.htm.
Increasingly, health insurance plans, too, are available in cross-border forms. Rachel Maguire,
U.S.-Mexico Cross-Border Health Insurance: Opportunities for U.S. Insurance Companies, U.S. Dep't
of State (Aug. 10, 2004). Blue Shield of California, for example, offers a plan called "Access Baja" that
costs 40-50% less than comparable coverage within the United States, but requires that participants
obtain all nonemergency medical care in Mexico. Sonya Geis, Passport to Health Care at Lower Cost
to Patient: California HMOs Send Some Enrollees to Mexico, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2005, at A3. U.S.
citizens are eligible for the plan. Id. Health Net California has a similar plan, as does SIMNSA, a
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
labor citizens, even without a special designation as such by the United
States. This reflects and reinforces the idea that labor citizenship-unlike"economic citizenship"-is not primarily a status granted by the state, but
the product of ground-up collaborative worker action.
VI. EVALUATING TRANSNATIONAL LABOR CITIZENSHIP
Is transnational labor citizenship so different from our current regime
as to be unthinkable? The evolution of transnational nation-state citizenship
provides some conceptual scaffolding in this regard.
On the nation-state level, millions of people now reside outside their
countries of origin while maintaining economic, political, and cultural ties
with home. Although immigrants have lived dual lives for centuries,
today's cheap flights, couriers, phone cards, and internet access make it
easier than ever before to have one foot "here" and one foot "there." The
soaring amounts of money migrants send home as remittances and other
investments have moved sending-country governments to strengthen their
bonds with citizens in exile. 249 As a result, the past few decades have seen
an explosion in dual citizenship policies, mechanisms for migrant voting
and representation, and financial incentives to encourage the continuing
flow of income back home. 250 Noncitizens have also increasingly become
active and effective political participants in the countries to which they
have migrated.251 These shifts have been discussed at length by scholars
under the rubric of "transnational citizenship." 252  Although such
phenomena have by no means obliterated national boundaries, they have
Mexican company. Approximately 150,000 California workers have elected such coverage. Sarah
Skidmore, The Mexico Option: Cross-border Health Insurance Is a Hit with Employers and Workers,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 16, 2005, at HI. In the United States, such plans seem largely motivated
by private insurance companies' desire to capture the profits to be had by charging slightly less than
U.S. prices for much cheaper medical care provided in Mexico and-most recently-India. A Daily
Kos blog entry has offered one critique of the plans. Posting of nyceve, Blue Shield of Calif Sends
Enrollees to Mexico for Health Care!, to http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2005/l1/6/84017/0490
(Nov. 6, 2005). See also Saritha Rai, Union Disrupts Plan to Send Ailing Workers to India for Cheaper
Medical Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006, at C6 (exploring the backlash against companies sending
workers abroad for medical treatment).
In the European Union, however, a more comprehensive (and consumer-driven) transnationally
portable health plan has emerged. Since 2004, EU residents can use their European Health Insurance
Card to obtain health insurance from the public health system of any other EU country or Switzerland
while on a temporary stay there. For details on the plan, see European Health Insurance Card,
http://www.ehic.ie/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2007).
249. Chander, supra note 6.
250. Id.
251. See supra note 84.
252. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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opened up new possibilities for political and economic participation that
much more closely mirror the reality of many immigrants than the
traditional, one-nation citizenship paradigm.253
Although the formal citizenship policies of the world's receiving
countries have remained remarkably static in the face of a massive global
movement of people, sending countries and migrants themselves have
developed new structures and practices that facilitate migrants'
simultaneous political engagement in both their country of origin and the
land where they reside.254 Transnational political citizenship, then, models
a situation where institutions that reflect cross-border lives have taken
shape even as the receiving country's formal conception of citizenship has
remained static. Furthermore, transnational political citizenship puts
migrants in the role of agents, rather than supplicants or victims.
Transnational political citizenship thus usefully suggests that change in
citizenship models can be successful even when they are partial, and that
they do not always require top-down transformation in formal structures.
At the same time, because transnational political citizenship is by its
nature focused on participation, rather than more costly social rights or
economic benefits, it neither raises nor addresses some of the zero-sum
questions of distribution and exclusivity to which transnational labor
citizenship gives rise. In what follows, I turn to those issues in greater
detail. I begin by considering whether my choice of citizenship as a
framework will inevitably recreate the sort of exclusionary regime I have
sought to avoid. The defense mentality of traditional labor unions
highlights this concern. By way of response, I examine alternative forms of
labor citizenship that have a more open and inclusive approach. Finally, I
253. With its narrative of migrants who remain vigorously engaged with home-country politics
despite years of living elsewhere, transnational political participation also tests the communitarian
insistence on presence within the bounded territory as a precondition for rich democracy. See supra
notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
254. It is important to distinguish the claim that something new is afoot in terms of immigrant
political participation from the broader assertion that citizenship is now transnational where once it was
rooted in one country alone. Critics of the latter position have argued persuasively that for a century or
more immigrants to the United States could properly have been labeled "transnational." Even at the turn
of the last century, immigrants from Europe moved back and forth between countries, forged identities
that fused old and new roots, and remained highly engaged with home-country political, economic, and
cultural structures through the ethnic media, hometown associations, and cultural groups. See Nancy
Foner, What's New About Transnationalism? New York Immigrants Today and at the Turn of the
Century, 6 DIASPORA 355, 357-62 (1997). What is different today is a proliferation of formal structures
for political participation of emigrants in home-country politics (such as dual citizenship and
congressional seats representing the population in exile), on the one hand, and on the other an upsurge
of informal (that is, not state-sanctioned) political participation in the United States by new and even
undocumented immigrants. Foner, supra, at 365-69. See also supra note 84.
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return to the tension between solidarity and defense that I identify in
traditional labor citizenship, and ask whether transnational labor citizenship
perpetuates or eases that conflict.
A. CITIZENSHIP AS AN EXCLUSIONARY CONCEPT
As I acknowledge at the beginning of this Article, citizenship is a
problematic notion. One of its core difficulties is the way its inclusive and
emancipatory rhetoric can mask a dangerous reliance on exclusion.
Declarations of citizenship are circle-drawing exercises. 255 As Alexander
Aleinikoff has noted, "By defining insiders, the concept of citizenship
necessarily defines outsiders .... " 256 As members establish their privileges
in contrast with those who are not members, the idea of citizenship
crystallizes in opposition to those who have not and cannot achieve that
status." 7 Since Aristotle developed his foundational definition of
citizenship, which excluded women, foreigners, and slaves,258 society after
society has proudly proclaimed the universality and inclusiveness of its
citizenship framework while continuing to formally and informally exclude
significant numbers of its residents-and enormous numbers of
nonresidents-from the status and/or the benefits of citizenship. In the
United States, "universal" citizenship long excluded women, African-
Americans, and other people of color. Although the legal status of
citizenship was extended to these groups over time, many continue to
experience a diminished or "second-class" version of its privileges. 259 At
255. See Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizenship Talk: A Revisionist Narrative, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
1689, 1692 (2001); Bosniak, supra note 23, at 342-43; Ediberto Romdn, The Citizenship Dialectic, 20
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 557, 568-72, 573-75 (2006); Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black
Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J. 1563, 1574-5 (1996) (reviewing LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT
ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE (1994); JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF
WELFARE: How RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994)). See also Freeman, supra note
56, at 52 ("[T]he concept of membership implies the existence of persons who are not members and
who are, therefore, excluded from the process of sharing.").
256. Aleinikoff, supra note 255, at 1692.
257. Indeed, they must not achieve the status; if they did, it would threaten the meaning of
citizenship for many of its holders. See Roberts, supra note 255, at 1573-76.
258. Pocock, supra note 29, at 33-34.
259. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BoTToM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF
RACISM (1992); KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1989). For discussions of second-class citizenship by virtue of race and ethnicity, see
Devon Carbado, Racial Naturalization, 57 AM. Q. 633 (2005); Lolita Buckner Innis, Tricky Magic:
Blacks as Immigrants and the Paradox of Foreignness, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 85 (1999); Hope Lewis,
Lionheart Gals Facing the Dragon: The Human Rights of Inter/national Black Women in the United
States, 76 OR. L. REV. 567, 618-19 (1997). For discussions of second-class citizenship by virtue of the
permanent assumption of "foreignness" for some groups of immigrants, see NGAI, supra note 12, at 2
(describing a class of naturalized immigrants who remained "alien citizens," denied full recognition of
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the same time, millions of people physically present inside the United
States are formally excluded from citizenship and have no way to legalize
their status despite long residence in the country. 260
Linking a grant of citizenship to work may deepen this exclusionary
tendency. 26' As feminist scholars have long pointed out, a scheme that
denies full citizenship to those who cannot do paid work excludes large
numbers of people, including children, the elderly, the disabled, and those
(predominately women) caring for them.262 In addition, to the extent that
many immigrant-heavy jobs such as day labor, construction, and segments
of agricultural and industrial work essentially exclude women, it becomes
more difficult for women than men to attain transnational labor citizenship.
In a transnational labor citizenship regime, this would be partially
ameliorated by the fact that freedom of movement across national
boundaries would be available to the families of transnational labor citizens
as well. But this is only a partial solution, because the nonworking
partner's visa is contingent on a continued relationship with the primary
visa holder; indeed, this situation might lead to increased dependence and
the potential for abuse that has arisen in other derivative-visa situations. 263
their citizenship by virtue of their presumed foreignness); Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-alien
Alike: Citizenship, "Foreignness, "and Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261 (1997);
Volpp, supra note 31, at 453-55.
260. For some, citizenship's reliance on exclusion would disqualify it as a rallying cry for social
change. See, e.g., DE SOUSA SANTOS, supra note 26, at 311-12; Donna Baines & Nandita Sharma,
Migrant Workers as Non-citizens: The Case Against Citizenship as a Social Policy Concept, 69 STUD.
POL. ECON. 75, 75, 96 (2002); Rachel Moran, The Terms of Belonging (unpublished draft, on file with
author).
Others focus their critiques on the way particular citizenship schemes have developed, while
retaining their faith in the concept as a whole. Critical race scholars, for example, have detailed the
racist foundations of the U.S. citizenship regime, analyzed its disenfranchisement of black voters, and
decried its disentitlement of black citizens to the substantive benefits of citizenship. See Jennifer
Gordon & Robin Lenhardt, Citizenship Talk: Bridging the Gap Between Immigration and Race
Perspectives, FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). By and large, however, the remedies they propose
are framed in terms of holding citizenship to its promises, rather than of a foundational critique of the
concept as a framework. Id.
261. Furthermore, because of its focus on work, the transnational labor citizenship proposal does
nothing to address the even greater role of national borders in limiting who is eligible for social welfare.
See Freeman, supra note 56, at 50; White, supra note 57, at 866, 873-74.
262. See SHKLAR, supra note 18, at 63-101; Fraser & Gordon, supra note 23; Judy Fudge, After
Industrial Citizenship: Market Citizenship or Citizenship at Work? 60 REL. INDUSTRIELLES/INDUS.
REL. 631 (2005); Kessler-Harris, supra note 18, at 163; Carol Pateman, The Patriarchal Welfare State,
in DEMOCRACY AND THE WELFARE STATE 231 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1988).
263. Recognizing this danger, in 1994 Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act, which
amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to create special provisions by which requirements
relating to marriage visas and other immigration benefits are eased for battered spouses once they
demonstrate domestic violence. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796, 1902 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of 16, 18, and 42 U.S.C.).
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B. ALTERNATIVE FORMS FOR THE LABOR CITIZENSHIP NORM
In response to concerns about citizenship's exclusivity, and in light of
traditional labor citizenship's reliance on both union and national borders
as a part of its organizing approach, it is worth asking whether labor
citizenship can function once it abandons the fortress mentality that has
been its underpinning for so long. Can labor citizenship flourish in an open
model, founded on the assumption of a constant inflow of new members?
As we have seen, the type of labor citizenship that relies on restricting
membership in order to control the price of labor is threatened by a rising
influx of workers, because it sees each new migrant as a competitor. But
there are other versions of labor citizenship, both within and outside the
world of unions. An example of such an approach illustrates the conceptual
shift that underlies transnational labor citizenship.
Worker centers are membership-based organizing efforts, most often
located in immigrant communities, which seek to defend and expand
immigrant workers' rights in the United States.264 Such centers use a
combination of services, education, organizing, and advocacy to establish a
baseline of labor protections in the work that their members do.
Significantly, membership in most worker centers does not depend on a
particular employer-employee relationship. Workers can join independent
of the job they hold or the industry in which they work. Through this
structure, worker centers reflect the fact that many immigrant workers are
willing to, and do, take any available job, without limiting themselves to a
particular industry; and that mobility between jobs is high. They
accommodate employment patterns where periods of holding two or even
three jobs simultaneously, periods of rapid movement between a succession
of jobs, and periods of unemployment are irregularly interspersed over the
course of a year.265 And they acknowledge that over time, many low-
skilled workers accumulate enough skill and work experience to move into
somewhat more stable employment, but that, increasingly, institutional
support for such job ladders is lacking.
Worker centers' view of labor citizenship offers an interesting
alternative to the perspective of traditional unions. The potential tensions
264. For a description of the modem worker center model, see generally FINE, supra note 73.
Worker centers were preceded by other community-based approaches to organizing immigrant workers,
including the Workman's Circle and the settlement houses at the turn of the twentieth century. Id. at
33-36.
265. For data on this pattern in the Mexican immigrant community, see KOCHHAR, supra note
206, at 10-13.
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are all there. A new arrival on a day labor street corner where workers have
organized to demand a daily minimum wage has every incentive to
underbid it.266 This new worker's presence there could easily be perceived
as a threat by members of worker centers and day labor organizations, who
work so hard to establish the rules and minimum standards. 267 Indeed, more
than any other organizing effort in the United States, the newcomers are a
direct and immediate threat, not a metaphorical one, to the hard-won gains
that worker and day labor centers have eked out on street corners all around
the country. Yet rather than seeing the newcomers as competitors, most
worker centers would embrace them as potential new members, fellow
workers to be informed about the rules and the reasons behind them and
invited into the fold.268 Correspondingly, worker center positions on
immigration reflect broad concern for the needs of new immigrants and
strong support for ongoing immigration.
One might say that worker centers react this way because-having
targeted the newest and most exploited immigrants as their members-they
have no choice. But my argument throughout this Article has been that
unions that organize in industries where low-wage workers predominate
have no choice either, and yet some of them have taken a different route.
Worker centers have shown that even the newest workers are"organizable" in the sense of being interested in coming together to
establish and defend basic protections in the workplace. This does not
mean that they necessarily have the power to fight for, win, and defend
substantial victories in the workplace. 269 But organizing is a long process,
266. GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS, supra note 3.
267. A number of worker centers and day labor organizations work with day laborers. See
National Day Laborer Organizing Network, http://www.ndlon.org (last visited Mar. 11, 2007). The
results of the first national study of day labor in the United States have just been released. ABEL
VALENZUELA, JR. ET AL., ON THE CORNER: DAY LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES (2006).
268. This position echoes (although I believe, not knowingly) the position of Bert Corona and La
Hermandad Mexicana Nacional in the 1960s and 1970s. Corona repeatedly advocated for the
incorporation of undocumented workers into unions and for "an open immigration policy, as far as
Mexico was concerned, that did not victimize mexicanos because they did not have documents."
GARCiA, supra note 110, at 249. "We understood Crsar's dilemma but rejected his strategy. We
believed that these undocumented farmworkers who were being used to break strikes also had to be
organized. Unless we directed ourselves to educate them politically and to organize them, they would
always be at the disposal of the growers." GARCiA, supra note 110, at 287. Referring to UFW staff,
Corona recalled: "Some of these people had simplistic answers. They would say, 'Well, these people
are scabs. They should be kicked out, and no more allowed to enter.' What they didn't understand was
that many of the undocumented could and should have been organized into the union." GARCiA, supra
note 110, at 249.
269. See generally Steve Jenkins, Organizing, Advocacy and Member Power: A Critical
Reflection, 6 WORKINGUSA 56 (2002) (elaborating the ways in which worker centers overstate the
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with many stages. Workers who become active in fighting for their rights
through a worker center, whether by protesting outside an employer's
home, establishing a minimum wage on a day labor corner, or advocating
for a new law in a city council or state legislature, have begun that process.
(In all likelihood, the real beginning came long before, in a home-country
cooperative, union or community group.) As these workers change jobs and
industries, they bring those skills and their fighting spirit with them. Soon
enough, they will end up in an industry where union organizing is ongoing,
and they will bring all that to the battle.
Rather than a fortress, this model of labor citizenship evokes the
image of a river-fed lake, into and out of which workers flow. The flow is
part of the model-it must be, or we will have no model at all. This model
rejects the idea that a worker can be categorized as "unorganizable," or a"strikebreaker," based on his or her nationality, immigration status, or other
characteristics. Instead, it approaches migrants as individuals with the
potential to make the decision to stand in solidarity with other workers,
wherever they are positioned at the moment. The essential point here is that
we must free ourselves from a rigid concept of the organizational form of
worker representation if we are to realize the norm of labor citizenship in a
globalized world.
C. TRANSNATIONAL LABOR CITIZENSHIP AND THE SOLIDARITY/DEFENSE
TENSION
I have argued that transnational labor citizenship is better than current
alternatives from a union point of view. This is so, first and foremost,
because it definitively removes immigration control from the workplace,
where it has proven so devastating to labor citizenship, and replaces it with
the practice of solidarity. But will the transnational labor citizenship
framework, in the end, do a better job of addressing the tensions of labor
citizenship than the alternative approaches that unions have tried?
From the U.S. union perspective, the transnational labor citizenship
proposal raises the terrifying specter of nearly limitless competition for
low-skilled work.270 But the fear it induces is predicated on the idea that we
importance of consciousness raising efforts and fail to pay sufficient attention to their members' actual
social power).
270. Sociologist Paul Johnston has argued that unions should not be so worried about absolute
numbers of workers in the labor market. Johnston, supra note 77, at 71 n. I ("It is interesting to consider
... that the only break-through in private sector U.S. labor organizing on a scale comparable to that
which unions hunger after today came not in a tight labor market, but rather in the Great Depression.
Similarly, during a short-lived period of success in immigrant worker organizing of the late 1980s and
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do not already live in such a system. We do, though, and worse, because
today open labor competition is distorted by the undocumented status of
millions of the competitors. Transnational labor citizenship will bring more
people into the job market, but it may be able to restructure fundamentally
the terms on which those jobs are offered. 271 Transnational labor
citizenship definitively resolves the exclusion/inclusion conflict in favor of
inclusiveness. The labor movement would pledge its solidarity with all
newcomers, however many there were and whenever they came; and with a
new mutuality, those newcomers would pledge their solidarity in return.
Far from an abdication of the core principles of labor citizenship, this
proposal is a call for their intensive application to a world of massive
migration. Transnational labor citizenship would represent both an
acknowledgment of the inevitability of an ongoing flow of migrant workers
and a method for the steady incorporation of those workers into the fold of
labor. It would bring labor migrants into legal status and into an immediate
relationship with labor organizing efforts, two moves that have the
potential to dramatically challenge conditions of work at the bottom of the
labor market. Transnational labor citizens would arrive in the United States
a step ahead of all other migrants in terms of their relationship to the labor
movement: they would already be members of a labor organization, and
would have committed to the core labor citizenship tenet of solidarity as a
condition of their ability to work. By committing union resources to the
defense of those workers' rights (as an essential part of the defense of all
workers rights) and by developing ladders from transnational labor
organizations to full union membership, unions would create a permanent
early 1990s, low-wage labor markets were awash in unemployment. In such circumstances, social
movement unionism has generated political resources able to overcome the challenge of high
unemployment."). An approach that drew all migrants into a workers organization before they even
entered the country would be an extraordinary launching pad for a renewed spurt of organizing along
these lines.
271. It is important to remember, though, that some would-be migrants would still be excluded by
this system: those who do not agree to, or later do not comply with, the solidarity requirements of
transnational labor citizenship. It is worth considering whether their number will be sufficient to
generate a new market in illegal labor. Scholars have argued that the growth of legal markets facilitates
the development of illegal markets in the same commodity. See, e.g., Chantal Thomas, Disciplining
Globalization: International Law, Illegal Trade, and the Case of Narcotics, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 549,
553-55 (2003). Although immigration is not exactly a market in people (as slavery, tragically, was), it
shares some of the same characteristics. The argument that legal immigration programs have paved the
way for an increase in illegal migration has been made in the context of the bracero program. Philip
Martin, Guest Worker Programs for the 21st Century, BACKGROUNDER (Ctr. for Immigr. Stud., Wash.,
D.C.), Apr. 2000, at 1. In the current era, the communities and networks established by previous legal
migrants create social capital that continues to draw subsequent undocumented migrants over time.
Douglas S. Massey & Kristin E. Espinosa, What's Driving Mexico-U.S. Migration? A Theoretical,
Empirical, and Policy Analysis, 102 AM. J. SOC. 939,957, 963 (1997).
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and continual path from "new migrant" to "organized worker," and put
themselves in a strong position to maintain labor citizenship for all workers
in the country-not in spite of immigration but precisely because of it.
In addition, the practice of transnational labor citizenship has the
potential to smooth the road to the integration of these newcomers into the
political community of the United States. As I discuss in Part III, unions
have a vibrant history of engaging immigrants in political participation in
this country, both on the level of gaining formal citizenship and, often long
before that is possible, with regard to effective involvement in the process
of making change in their communities. Transnational labor organizations
would be well-positioned to launch coming generations of migrants onto
the path of union membership and full political participation.
VII. CONCLUSION
In a context of fluid transnational migration, the traditional approach
to labor citizenship is unable to achieve the goal of providing good jobs in
this country. A guest worker program is no solution. In the end, the
problem is that broader guest work programs position guest workers
outside the realm of labor citizenship. The transnational labor citizenship I
propose here is a response to these problems. It inevitably represents a
partial and contradiction-ridden approach to a complex issue. But it has
potential as a first step toward addressing the dilemmas of decent work in a
globalizing world.
Unions cannot change rules about national citizenship (although they
can try). They cannot themselves hold workers back at the borders
(although they have tried that too). Their efforts to shift the border into the
workplace have undermined labor citizenship at every turn. Wherever labor
draws the line dividing those workers with whom it seeks solidarity from
those against whom it defends-be it between white workers and African-
Americans, between citizens and immigrants, or between those present
within the United States by a certain date and those yet to come-it brokers
an unstable and ultimately destructive compromise. By its nature, such
line-drawing creates a group of outsiders who employers can and will use
to undermine the benefits won through the exercise of labor citizenship.
History is thick with examples of unions that have turned their back on a
group of workers only to see those outsiders bussed in to break strikes or
simply hired to replace union workers, breaking the union in the process.
Line-drawing undermines the only real protection from competition that
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unions will ever have, the broad solidarity that comes from understanding
all workers as potential labor citizens.
What can unions do? They can reject the idea that labor citizenship is
a fortress and see it instead as a pool of water fed by a spring, defined, and
indeed kept fresh and alive, by the constant flow of new workers. They can
recognize that the best insurance against unfair competition comes not from
the deployment of immigration law but from worker solidarity. And they
can work toward a policy of transnational labor citizenship that views
migrants as potential labor citizens from the start, and indeed structures
them as labor citizens before they even enter the country.
This Article chronicles a labor movement slowly breaking open under
pressure from the globalizing world. The same stresses reverberate in the
arena of national citizenship. As with most breaking, there is a great deal of
pain and very little certainty. But the rupture points the way toward the
future of work, of the law that governs work, and of efforts to make work
better for workers. The time has come to engage.
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